Category Archives: Filosofi

Roger Scruton om Lighed og Sindelagskontrol

“Det er et ejendommeligt faktum, at et samfund, som er meget optaget af at gøre sine borgere ens, meget hurtigt giver anledning til en kaste, der flyder ovenpå, og som består af de af dets indbyggere, hvis anliggende det er at påføre det øvrige samfund denne enshed,” skriver den konservative britiske filosof Roger Scruton i en af sine bøger. I en konservativ optik har socialisme, socialdemokratisme og socialliberalisme alle det til fælles, at lighed i et vist omfang også er lig med enshed, og at enshed har det med at medføre sindelagskontrol.

Dette ses f.eks. på arbejdsmarkedet, hvor man forsøger at udskamme og kontrollere de parter, der fuldt ud lovligt når til aftale uden om de retningslinjer, som visse parter synes bør gælde for andre. Men det ses også i værdipolitikken, hvor man forsøger at udskamme og udstøde eks. islamkritikere og modstandere af indvandringen.

I sin yderste konsekvens medfører denne tilgang til politik, at det er illegitimt for individet at have holdninger, der går mod fællesskabets. Skulle en arbejdstager hellere ville tage et job hos RyanAir end sidde derhjemme på kontanthjælp, så må han regne med repressalier fra fagbevægelsen. Og skulle en offentlig intellektuel eller kommunalt ansat afsky islam som idé eller modsætte sig ikke-vestlig indvandring (men i øvrigt opføre sig pænt over for muslimer og medborgere af anden etnisk oprindelse), kan vedkommende ligeledes se frem til en opsang fra dem, hvis anliggende det er at påføre andre de rette holdninger.

Det konservative svar er i dette henseende at træde et skridt tilbage og holde en national kernekultur i hævd, som alle kan være fælles om, og som derved danner et fundament for al videre uenighed inden for landets grænser. Sagt på en anden måde: I en konservativ optik er nationalkulturen selve det fundament, der tillader individer at have modsatrettede interesser.

Western Quotes on Islam

“It is a misfortune to human nature, when religion is given by a conqueror. The Mahometan religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.” – Montesquieu (1689-1755), Fransk oplysningsfilosof

***

“But that a camel-merchant [Muhammad] should stir up insurrection in his village; that in league with some miserable followers he persuades them that he talks with the angel Gabriel; that he boasts of having been carried to heaven, where he received in part this unintelligible book, each page of which makes common sense shudder; that, to pay homage to this book, he delivers his country to iron and flame; that he cuts the throats of fathers and kidnaps daughters; that he gives to the defeated the choice of his religion or death: this is assuredly nothing any man can excuse, at least if he was not born a Turk, or if superstition has not extinguished all natural light in him.” – Voltaire (1694-1778), Fransk oplysningsfilosof og forfatter

***

“Consider the Koran, for example; this wretched book was sufficient to start a world-religion, to satisfy the metaphysical need of countless millions for twelve hundred years, to become the basis of their morality and of a remarkable contempt for death, and also to inspire them to bloody wars and the most extensive conquests. In this book we find the saddest and poorest form of theism. Much may be lost in translation, but I have not been able to discover in it one single idea of value.” – Arthur Shopenhauer, tysk filosof (1788-1830)

***

“We do not know whether Hitler is going to found a new Islam. He is already on the way; he is like Muhammad. The emotion in Germany is Islamic; warlike and Islamic. They are all drunk with a wild god.” – Carl Jung (1875-1961), Schweizisk psykoanalytiker

***

“[E]xamine the Koran, I know that beyond any question every Mohammedan is insane; not in all things, but in religious matters.” – Mark Twain, amerikansk forfatter (1835-1910)

***

“The fact that in Mohammedan law every woman must belong to some man as his absolute property, either as a child, a wife, or a concubine, must delay the final extinction of slavery until the faith of Islam has ceased to be a great power among men. Individual Moslems may show splendid qualities – but the influence of the religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it. No stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith.” – Winston Churchiill (1874-1965), Britisk statsmand

***

“Qur’an… an accursed book… So long as there is this book there will be no peace in the world.” – William Gladstone (1809-1898), Britisk statsmand

***

“The ambassador answered us that [the right] was founded on the Laws of the Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have answered their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise.” – Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), Amerikansk præsident og forfatter til den amerikanske uafhængighedserklæring

***

“…he [Muhammad] declared undistinguishing and exterminating war, as a part of his religion, against all the rest of mankind…The precept of the Koran is, perpetual war against all who deny, that Mahomet is the prophet of God.” – John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), USAs sjette præsident

***

“The civilization of Europe, American and Australia exists today at all only because of the victories of civilized man over the enemies of civilization because of victories through the centuries from Charles Martel in the eighth century and those of John Sobieski in the seventeenth century…There are such “social values” today in Europe, America and Australia only because during those thousand years, the Christians of Europe possessed the warlike power to do what the Christians of Asia and Africa had failed to do — that is, to beat back the Moslem invader.” – Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), Amerikansk præsident

***

“Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam… Those who accept Bolshevism become impervious to scientific evidence, and commit intellectual suicide. Even if all the doctrines of Bolshevism were true, this would still be the case, since no unbiased examination of them is tolerated…Among religions, Bolshevism is to be reckoned with Mohammedanism rather than with Christianity and Buddhism. Christianity and Buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation. Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of the world.” – Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Britisk filosof

***

“The pope gets ridiculed every day, but you don’t see Catholics organizing terrorist attacks around the world.” – Salman Rushdie (1947-), Britisk-indisk forfatter

***

“I must [translate the Qur’an] into German so that every man may see what a foul and shameful book it is. … One is able to do nothing more grievous to Muhammad … than to [translate his] Qur’an … [so] that people may see how entirely cursed, abominable, and desperate a book it is.” – Martin Luther, tysk reformator

***

“It has been our misfortune to have the wrong religion. … The religion of … Muhammad would have been much more compatible with us [than] Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness.” – Adolf Hitler

What would Ayn Rand have said about climate change?

The growing problem of climate change is seen not just in the atmosphere, but in the minds of men as well. It is easy to see how in the olden days, men smoked cigarettes; man was at one with his creator aspect, embellishing himself with an example of the fire he had tamed (and the lung cancer he was seeding) wherever he went.

But today, non-creators and second-handers do not want man to be creative. They want him to be a slave. This is why they oppose smoking. They oppose climate change too, of course, but climate change is just a red herring; the real issue is smoking as will be obvious from anyone who dares to discern the matter through the power of reason, making no excuses for himself and his reliance on man’s highest faculties.
 
The people who oppose climate change may tell you that they want you to ride trains and live in skyscrapers. I, of course, also like trains and skyscrapers (in general, I seem to have something about large and imposing inanimate objects that inspire peculiarly submissive sentiments in my otherwise domineering personality – however, it is very rational since skyscrapers and trains are less emotional than human males).
 
Rational. It is important to use that word when discussing climate change (as it is everywhere else). When people show you charts and statistics and talk about Co2 they are not empowering man’s individual agency. That is irrational. When they smoke cigarettes and live in skyscrapers they are rational. It is good to be rational. And that is how we solve climate change.

A Discussion on Hayek’s Epistemology

A: What do you think about F.A. Hayek’s criticism that economic models can never “exhaust” societal problems and therefore that we cannot rely on them overmuch?

B: Well, Hayek does allow for what he calls “pattern predictions” in some cases, but it’s true that his epistemology often leads him into the position that “we can never say anything about anything.” Overall, I actually agree with him that there’s a lot that we cannot know, but on the other hand, I also think he goes too far sometimes. See, if you’re really a die-hard Hayekian, you would say that thinks that were have evolved “bottom-up”; by having been discovered over time should not be tampered with. – Since we cannot know their full epistemological import, we cannot know that society won’t collapse if we start altering them too radically. But slavery and racism also fit these criteria – they were also discovered over time and evolved “bottom-up.” Personally, I think we can say something about these things and that, no, society won’t collapse because they are abolished. That’s where things can get a bit precarious and I think that Hayek loses himself in his own skepticism.

A: On the other hand, though, isn’t it true that unquestioning faith in economic modelling has caused considerable society damage over the years?

B: Oh yes, it’s very true. Economists have done a lot of damage over the years. But I think it has gotten better. I actually think that modern economics has absorbed a lot of Hayek’s thought, even though his name is rarely mentioned in the textbooks.

A: That may be so, but then again, modern economics has also absorbed some of Keynes’ thought, so couldn’t you argue that the two balance each other out?

B: No, I don’t think so. Intellectually, there’s very little left of Keynesianism in mainstream economics. Even modern Keynesians openly tend to say that they have no theory; no intellectual leg to stand on. Why, last December, one of them wrote a piece entitled “Try Anything”! – it’s not so much that they are Keynesians, as that they simply don’t believe in the present course.

A: That is not my impression. When you had the huge stimulus packages under Obama, and when certain European countries try to “kick the economy into gear” through short term spending increases, isn’t that in the spirit of Keynes?

B: Well, the stimulus packages in the USA could be regarded as a series of gigantic experiments in Keynesianism. And most economists I talk to say that the lesson from those moves was that it didn’t work and that monetary policy is far more important when it comes to handling a depression. It is true that some European countries have followed suit, even after it was clear that the American stimulus did not work, but that has far more to with the way laypeople perceive economics than what economists think: A lot of people approach economic crises with an unfortunate mixture of amateur philosophy, amateur psychology, and amateur economics where they think that public spending will raise everyone’s faith in the economy and get the wheels rolling again. Most of the really high-ranking economists I talk to know that it doesn’t work that way. But on the other hand, the politicians and central bankers can’t be seen “doing nothing” while people are hit by a crises that puts them out of a job, so they tend to throw some “stimulus” out there, even though they know it won’t work. In a way you could say that stimulus spending is like the bright lights and window dressing that people think is the heart of economics while monetary policy is the greasy engine room that really runs the ship.

Epicurus, Poststructuralism, and Nāgārjuna as Sources of Eudemonia

By Ryan Smith

1 Reason: An enemy and enslaver or a friend and helper?

The ”destabilization” of facts, the resistance to categories of knowledge, the cult of the immediate, the ”non-hierarchical communities” (Foucault) all point towards a common poststructuralist project, namely the dismantling of classical humanism and the philosophical notion of the individual subject: As a phase in the “emancipation” from bourgeois norms, the individual must cast off all conceptions of identity, as these are just the machinations of an external bourgeois discourse that have been forced upon the individual. As Deleuze and Guattari would posit in Mille Plateaux (1980): “[We should aim to] reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves.”[1]

This project of de-subjectification is but philosophical flotsam from Nietzsche’s “Dionysian impulse” as originally depicted in Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872) as well as from the subject-less Dasein of Martin Heidegger which simply just is.[2] This subjectlessness stands in the starkest possible contrast to the philosophical project of Socrates which constantly underlined the importance of continuously greater sophrosyne (wise self-insight) which is attained through critical introspection and gnōthi seauton (knowledge of the self).[3]

This approach to philosophical practice, however, would not reach its zenith with Socrates, but rather with Epicurus’ development of the original Socratic position. As we shall see, the Epicurean philosophy possesses an epistemology and an elaborate psychology of the subject which directly opposes the poststructuralist precept that the existence of the individual is derogated when tied up with rational categories of knowledge.[4] To the extent that the poststructuralists depict themselves as philosophers it seems quite odd that there does not exist a single poststructuralist refutation of Epicurus, for even in spite of the poststructuralist “de-centralization” of facts, the philosophy of Epicurus is at heart a unison of exactly the two things that poststructuralists believe to be irreconcilable: Rational knowledge and sensory happiness.[5]

According to Epicurus, man experiences happiness by understanding the material world rationally. Earthquakes are not the wrath of the gods, planets are not omens, and death is not eternal pain. Rationality is not the nemesis of human nature, but a friend and a helper.

2 Liberating the soul: Transgression versus Ataraxia

As an applied philosophy, and a way of life, Epicureanism, like poststructuralism, aims to liberate the individual by uncovering the hidden forces that coerce it. For Foucault, these are the so-called “techniques of knowledge and subjectification”[6], while for Lyotard ”The notorious universality of knowledge […] [is] a mark of the destruction of personal identities.”[7] Common to each of these approaches is the fact that they endeavour to challenge the primacy of the singular, cognizant individual (often called ‘the subject’). For Lyotard, dispassionate analysis is the arch nemesis of the subjective, sublime feeling that cannot be analysed and cannot be shared with others in the least.[8] While for Foucault there was the Bataille-inspired ‘Limit-experience’:[9] Experiences so intense that they scramble all individual cognisance and reveal analytical modes of thought as unreal derivatives of reality, rather than true reality. The sensation generated by the limit-experience, then, is what Foucault referred to as transgression.[10]

Common to each of these approaches, however, is that they are epistemologically untenable: For without the notion of a subject, how can Foucault and Lyotard know that the subject is curtailed by knowledge-categories and analytical modes of thought? Likewise, how can poststructuralists know that individual identity exists when there is no subject on which to pin it?

So according to poststructuralism impersonal knowledge restricts and fetters the individual and compels it; governs it to be inauthentic. (As Lyotard said, only the self that is free of contact with knowledge-categories is in fact a self.)[11] Faced with exactly the same problem, Epicureanism argues instead for a synthesis that makes use of knowledge-categories as a way to liberate the subject:

”Just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul.”[12]

According to Epicureanism, expelling the suffering of the soul will lead to ataraxia, that is, a state of mental ease which – ironically enough – corresponds extremely well to the sensation described in Foucault’s account of transgression. So while Epicureanism and poststructuralism could not be further from each other with regards to means, they are essentially the same with regards to ends: The existential condition craved by each of these philosophies is ultimately very similar.

Where they differ, however, is that ataraxia is achieved through rational and calm contemplation of the human conditions and the often harsh terms of life on Earth, whereas transgression is instead facilitated though extreme and destructive experiences: Crime, drugs, sexual and political violence. As Foucault said, everything short of the extreme is nothing:

”Those middle-range pleasures that make up everyday life … are nothing. … A Pleasure must be something incredibly intense. … Some drugs are really important … because they are the mediation to those incredibly intense joys.”[13]

Or as the very same thought was sloganistically expressed in Surveiller et punir (1975):

”The soul is the prison of the body.”[14]

Meaning essentially the soul as the reflecting Cartesian cogito and the body as immediate, unreflective modes of existence: Thus according to poststructuralism, the more the cogito reflects on impersonal, identity-compelling knowledge-categories, the more the immediate and subjective is coerced into objective inauthenticity.[15]

An argument along the same lines can also be found in Foucault’s earlier work,

Folie et déraison (1961): Having subjected madness to science (and dubbed it déraison), the West no longer fears folkloric madness (called folie) as a force with the potential to erupt into a pandemonium that can possess us all.[16] According to Foucault, science has dispelled the tenseful duality between sane order and mad chaos that had persisted from ancient times.[17] And consequently, life in the scientific episteme, that is, in the West, has become a bland and sterile unity.[18]

Such themes evoke parallels to Nietzsche’s early Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) as well as the later Götzen-Dämmerung (1889). In Nietzsche’s rendition of events, the Apollonian and the Dionysian impulses are poised in equilibrium; they constantly curb and check each other, until sometime in the fifth century BCE the Apollonian gained the upper hand.[19] In Nietzsche’s narrative, the Apollonian without the Dionysian heralds the decline and decadence of Greek culture[20] and culminates in the perverse, ”wrong” Socrates who curtails Der Wille zur Macht (the Will to Power).[21] And what, according to Nietzsche, was the cardinal sin of Socrates’ philosophical endeavour? It was precisely that he sought to equip the Greeks with a self-consciousness that made use of objective knowledge-categories.[22]

Confronted with these same problems, the Epicurean posits instead that the greatest threat to ataraxia is the irrational fear that results from holding irrational beliefs.[23] (For example, believing that the reason that your house burned down is that Zeus is angry with you; this irrational belief leads to a constant irrational fear.) According to Epicurus, such irrational beliefs are best eradicated by the subject becoming acquainted with logic and material science and especially physics. Through an insight into science and epistemology the subject will eventually come to know that the celestial bodies above are not gods waiting to rain their wrath down upon you, but rather clouds of atoms; worlds such as this one.[24] To the poststructuralists discussed above such an approach to epistemology would lead to a convoluted Cartesian life, but to Epicurus it leads, fundamentally, to a life in accordance with nature.[25]

”What produces the pleasant life if not continuous drinking and parties of pederasty or womanizing or the enjoyment of fish and other dishes of an expensive table, but sober reasoning which … banishes the opinions that beset souls with the greatest confusion.”[26]            (boldface added)

Rational knowledge and categories of knowledge do not just compound with human happiness and the wise self-knowledge that is sophrosyne. According to Epicurus, rational deliberation and introspection is the very precondition for human happiness and thus an unbending affront to the central premise of the supposed need for the poststructuralist emancipation-project. For according to the poststructuralist view, the very rational deliberation that Epicurus would have us engage in, in order to set us free, provokes “existential anxiety” and prohibits the delight in the senses that leads to true happiness.

3 Which Position is more Epistemologically Tenable?

Finally, leaving the question of happiness, we will look into which position is more epistemologically tenable. To this end we will need to define what kind of knowledge we are inquiring into. To this aim, I will present a theory not entirely unlike that of Karl Popper’s classical Three-world Theory to help us discern which kind of knowledge we are talking about.[27] The three kinds of knowledge that I will posit for this purpose are Immediate knowledge, Existential knowledge, and Objective knowledge. We will now look into each in turn.

Immediate Knowledge: By ‘Immediate knowledge’ we mean somatic, subjective and phenomenological knowledge. For example, how do you subjectively experience the phenomenon of thirst; what personal psychological connotations do you attach to it; what unconscious associations does thirst whirl up in you? This kind of knowledge is profoundly personal to the point where it cannot be communicated onto others; indeed even if it could, doing so would border on meaninglessness as the knowledge is both idiosyncratic and so inwardly richly textured that any recounting of the experience onto the other would be but a pale shadow of one’s own Immediate knowledge of it.

Hence, with regards to the domain of Immediate knowledge, Epicurean epistemology falls rather flat: To Epicurus, fear of phenomena is always lurking around the corner; a rainbow may be beautiful, but it could also be an omen; a particular dish may be delightful, but it may also sow the seeds of avarice and obesity.[28] Thus the Epicurean ‘cure’ is always to distance oneself from subjective and personal experience and seek a rational, trans-personal explanation to put in the place of personal meaning.[29] Thus, Epicurean epistemology is the enemy of Immediate knowledge.

By contrast, however, Immediate knowledge is the stated soteriological goal of poststructuralist epistemology.[30] It is through the intense and boundary-absolving experience of immediate reality that one can really live as a subject-less, emancipated, indefinable agent.[31] As we have seen, crime, drugs, sexual and political violence are all acceptable (and at times, recommended) as means to the end that is the poststructuralist conception of Immediate knowledge. Indeed, as we saw from Foucault above, anything short of the extreme is nothing.[32] By the same token, that is also why, when Foucault was asked to characterize Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical project, with its somber system of personal ethics, the former had but one word for it: “Terrorism”.[33]

However, when examining the poststructuralist recipe for inquiring into Immediate knowledge, we should be aware of a crucial critical interjection: Why are the extreme limit-experiences perceived as holding the key to an immediate understanding of reality when the brunt of reality plainly does not consist of such experiences? Of course, as the poststructuralists would no doubt posit, this touting of the limit-experience as a source of truer knowledge is due to the fact that our everyday notion of reality is to some degree socially constructed, wherefore we should seek out experiences that are not associated with our everyday lives in order to steal a peek at what lies behind the web of social constructs – to de-construct it, so to speak.

Yet a pertinent rejoinder presents itself in the face of this response: How can reality be defined by marginal experiences that are not central to it? Indeed in other sciences, researchers are often encouraged to discard outliers, while poststructuralists would seem to accord value only to outliers. In the same vein, if one wanted to say something about human cognition, one would get a skewed picture if one only used the exceptionally bright and the exceptionally dull for data. There is a fundamental misnomer at work here, which is how and why it becomes reasonable to the post-structuralist to inquire into a thing solely by virtue of its extremes all the while ignoring the bulk of it. And after all, even in a life filled with limit-experiences, the everyday sensations of thirst, hunger, sleep, fiscal ruminations and sex will remain largely the same with regards to Immediate knowledge.

Existential knowledge: By ‘Existential knowledge’ we mean extant knowledge of reality as it exists and the psychological self-knowledge that can be derived from this type of knowledge in order to allow man to find a personally meaningful place in the universe and a sense of purpose in life. This knowledge is not entirely rational, but nor is it entirely irrational. Existential knowledge is not impersonal (like Objective knowledge; to which we will turn shortly), but nor it is entirely personal (like Immediate knowledge, with which we have just dealt). Naturally this “middle of the road” quality makes the exact properties of Existential knowledge hard to pin down, but in making the attempt, we will posit that Existential knowledge is a kind of psychological knowledge or insight into reality. It is the type of knowledge that we all use when we decide whether to pursue one prospective partner over another, or deciding whether to have (more) children or that the family is now of an adequate size. It is the type of knowledge of which the fruits are sophrosyne (wise self-insight) which is attained through critical introspection and gnōthi seauton (knowledge of the self).[34]

Now at first glance it might seem like poststructuralist epistemology would be a good source of Existential knowledge (after all, several of most prominent poststructuralist philosophers were the intellectual scions of the great French existentialists). But, inspired by the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 CE), we will argue that limit-experiences, of the kind trumpeted by poststructuralists, in fact constitute a hindrance to Existential knowledge.

According to Nāgārjuna, intense emotional experiences will not at all allow you to conceive reality any clearer than adherence to the rational cogito.[35] Both the insistence on rational knowledge (as trumpeted by Epicureans) and a familiarity with limit-experiences will, according to Nāgārjuna, ultimately distance your mind from the true nature of reality. But the poststructuralist approach will be the worse of the two, and for two reasons:

(1) Limit-experiences are so intense that they will tie your experience of reality to your own emotional life, whereas reality is far vaster than the personal subject. The poststructuralists claim that limit-experiences are so intense that they will dismantle the personal subject, but indeed, who has ever seen a shell-shocked soldier experiencing sudden bursts of universal empathy or an inexplicable experience of the vastness of the cosmos? Thus, limit-experiences will dismantle a person’s rational notion of his or her subject, but limit-experiences will not at all dismantle a person’s practical focus or groundedness in his or her own subject, quite the contrary; being shell-shocked, raped or cut with a knife (all examples of limit-experiences) will only serve to preoccupy a person all the more with his or her own well-being. Thus, as existence is obviously larger than one person’s pain or pleasure, limit-experiences will actually serve as a diminishment of Existential knowledge.

(2) By its very definition, a limit-experience is so intense that it will flood a person’s cognition with the derived effects of that particular experience. But a limit-experience is not something vast and multi-faceted; indeed it is usually of a quite singular nature. Conseuently going through a limit-experience will again diminish one’s ontological outlook. For example, let us say that a person is suspended in space, looking over Times Square in New York City: If he is stuck in the Epicurean cogito, he will see knowledge-categories walk by: Young/old, male/female, rich/poor, human, pigeon, dog and so on. If he is a follower of Nāgārjuna, he will see no categories, as he will pass no rational judgment (having relinquished the Epicurean cogito), and yet he will be keenly observant – he would indeed experience something like the transgressory state that limit-experiences supposedly lead to. However, if our observer is undergoing a limit-experience while watching the activity at Times Square – if he is simultaneously being subjected to intense physical pain, for example – our observer will surely not notice much of the activity in Times Square, as he will be completely overwhelmed by the limit-experience and thus attached to a narrow corner of existence rather than to existence itself.[36]

Thus poststructuralist epistemology is most certainly not a good source of Existential knowledge.

What about Epicurean epistemology as a source of Existential knowledge, then? As Nāgārjuna would have it, rational knowledge and knowledge-categories would also be a hindrance to existential knowledge yet not one that is nearly as bad.[37] If one’s primary approach to reality is through knowledge-categories (such as young/old, male/female, rich/poor, human, pigeon, dog etc.), then one is indeed depriving oneself of Existential knowledge as one would naturally miss all the idiosyncrasies and in-betweens that are present outside of the subject’s pre-conceived mental pigeonholes. But, as opposed to the limit-experience which, as we have seen, is a tyrant of the psyche, knowledge-categories at least constitute a reductionist model of reality and thus a broader outlook than the one provoked by the the limit-experience.

Thus, while poststructuralist epistemology as a source of Existential knowledge is decidedly poor, Epicurean epistemology is simply ok.

Objective knowledge: By ‘Objective knowledge’ we mean much the same as what Karl Popper meant by his Third World, that is, the state of our scientific and objective knowledge as it exists in books, letters, on discs, hard drives etc.[38] Without going into it here, we shall also assume, as did Popper, that the epistemology of the Third World is possible, even without a knowing subject.[39] This condition is not central to our argument, but it will help us unite our inquiry into Objective knowledge with the subject-less philosophy of poststructuralism.

4 Conclusion

While poststructuralism may indeed surpass the traditional Epicurean-Cartesian system with regards to auiring self-knowledge of one’s everyday persona, the poststructuralist adherence to the limit-experience is flawed as a source of Existential knowledge, and regarding objective, scientific knowledge, only the Epicurean-Cartesian system of rational knowledge will ultimately do.

Immediate Knowledge Existential Knowledge Objective Knowledge
Epicureanism Poor Ok Good
Poststructuralism Good Poor Poor

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Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Condition (Manchester University Press 1984
Miller, James: The Passion of Michel Foucault (Harvard University Press 2000)
Nāgārjuna: Nagarjuna’s Letter to a Friend: With Commentary by Kyabje Kangyur Rinpoche (Snow Lion Publications 2005)
Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: Writings from the Early Notebooks (Cambridge University Press 2009)
Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: Writings from the Late Notebooks  (Cambridge University Press 2003)
Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (Cambridge University Press 1999)
Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The Will to Power (Random House 1973)
Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: Twilight of the idols, or, How to philosophize with the hammer (Oxford University Press 2009)
Oksala, Johanna: Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge University Press 2005)
Popper, Karl R.: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University Press 1979)
Rabinow, Paul (ed.): Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, ed. (The New Press 1997)
Scott, G.A.: Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond (Pennsylvania State University Press 2004)
Simons, Jonathan: Foucault and the Political (Routledge 1995)
Warren, James: Facing Death – Epicurus and his Critics (Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 155-6

Ancient Sources
Epicurus: The Four-Part Cure
Epicurus: The Letter to Pythocles
Epicurus: The Letter to Menoeceus
Epicurus: The Sage as an Ethical Role Model
Nāgārjuna (attributed): Hymn to the Dharmadhātu
Nāgārjuna: Letter to a Friend
Plato: Apology
Plato: Symposium
Plato: Theaetetus
Porphyry: The Letter To Marcella

NOTES

[1] Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F.: Thousand Plateaus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia pp. 3-4

[2] Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time p. 150, pp. 165-6, cf. Ferry, L. & Renaut, A.: French Philosophy of the Sixties p. 214

[3] Plato: The Theaetetus 210bc, cf. The Apology 29b, cf. The Symposium 218bc, cf. Scott, G.A.: Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond pp. 204-7

[4] Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 1995 ed.) p. 287

[5] Dews, Peter: Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist thought and the claims of critical theory p. 259, cf. Foucault, Michel: “Michel Foucault: An Interview by Stephen Riggins“, featured in Rabinow, Paul (ed.): Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, ed. p. 129

[6] Foucault, Michel: Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison pp. 127-131 cf. Dean, Michell: Critical And Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology pp.164-167, cf. Kelly, Michael: Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate pp. 269-271

[7] Lyotard, Jean-François: Libidinal Economy p. 249

[8] Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Condition, §15. The full quote will convey the author’s intent: “A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at ‘nodal points’ of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be.” That is supposedly to say: Only through the relinquishment of analytical knowledge-categories can the individual truly be himself. For further examples, see: Lyotard, Jean-François: Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime pp. 238-239

[9] Foucault, Michel: The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences p. xxvi cf. Foucault, Michel: Religion and Culture p. 23, cf. Miller, James: The Passion of Michel Foucault p. 32

[10] Foucault, Michel: A Preface to Transgression in Foucault, Michel: Religion and Culture pp. 57-72, and Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 2006 ed.) pp. 249-254, and Foucault, Michel: Abnormal: Lectures at the College De France 1974-75 pp. 173-4, cf. Gutting, Gary: The Cambridge Companion to Foucault p. 22, cf. Simons, Jonathan: Foucault and the Political pp. 69-70,

[11] Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Condition, §15

[12] Porphyry: The Letter To Marcella, 31

[13] Foucault, Michel: “Michel Foucault: An Interview by Stephen Riggins“, featured in Rabinow, Paul (ed.): Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, ed. p. 129

[14] Foucault, Michel: Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison p. 30

[15] In Foucault’s rendition of the scientific episteme, van Gogh would supposedly need doctors’ permission to paint paintings. Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 2006 ed.) p. 203, 273

[16] Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 2006 ed.) p. 223

[17] Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 2006 ed.) pp. 100-101

[18] Foucault, Michel: Madness and Civilization (Routledge 2006 ed.) pp. 263-4

[19] Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music §22

[20] Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music, An Attempt at Self-Criticism §1, cf. Appendix, §2

[21] Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: Twilight of the idols, or, How to philosophize with the hammer, cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music, §13 cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: Notebook Entry, KSA 8.97, 6: “Socrates … I am constantly doing battle with him.”, cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich W.: The Will To Power, §432

[22] Ansell-Pearson, Keith: An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist pp. 67-68

[23] Epicurus: The Four-Part Cure (“Do not fear God / Do not Worry about death / What is good is easy to get / and what is terrible is easy to endure.”), cf. Letter To Pythocles, 110, 111, cf. The Letter to Menoeceus, 124, 132, 133, cf. Warren, James: Facing Death – Epicurus and his Critics pp. 155-6

[24] Epicurus: Letter To Pythocles, 88, 89, 96, 97, 112

[25] Epicurus: The Letter to Menoeceus, 128, 133, cf. The Sage as an Ethical Role Model, 118-120

[26] Epicurus: The Letter to Menoeceus, 131

[27] Popper, Karl R.: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, chapters 3 and 4.

[28] Epicurus: The Letter to Pythocles, 98, 109, cf. Letter to Menoeceus, 132-133

[29] Epicurus: The Letter to Pythocles, 85

[30] Foucault, Michel: The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences p. xxvi cf. Foucault, Michel: Religion and Culture p. 23, cf. Miller, James: The Passion of Michel Foucault p. 32

[31] Foucualt, Michel, quoted in Oksala, Johanna: Foucault on Freedom p. 129

[32] Foucault, Michel: “Michel Foucault: An Interview by Stephen Riggins“, featured in Rabinow, Paul (ed.): Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, ed. p. 129

[33] Foucault, Michel, quoted in Bülow, Katharina von: Contredire est undevoir p. 177

[34] Plato: The Theaetetus 210bc, cf. The Apology 29b, cf. The Symposium 218bc, cf. Scott, G.A.: Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond pp. 204-7

[35] Nāgārjuna: Nagarjuna’s Letter to a Friend: With Commentary by Kyabje Kangyur Rinpoche p. 33, 93, 96, 150

[36] As we have seen, the poststructuralists claim that you cannot be free whilst experiencing the world through the rational cogito, but they fail to explain how one can be free while undergoing an arbitrary limit-experience. In the world of knowledge-categories there are at least several different categories to choose from, whereas in the world of limit-experiences there is only one limit experience at a time. The poststructuralist might argue that one can choose what type of limit-experience one would subject oneself to, thereby constituting a similar multitude of options, but how could a person choose between different types of limit-experiences without relying on knowledge-categories in the first place?

[37] This will be my argument, but I believe it fairly evident from passages such as Nāgārjuna’s Hymn to the Dharmadhātu, verse 6, trans. Donald Lopez in Lopez, Donald S., Jr. (ed.): Buddhist Scriptures (Penguin Books 2004) p. 466

[38] Popper, Karl R.: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach p. 107

[39] Popper, Karl R.: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach pp. 115-117

Sun-faced Buddha, Moon-faced Buddha

By Shunryu Suzuki

Because I have been practicing zazen for many years, some people may say, “He will not catch cold. He will not suffer from flu . . . but it was funny for him to stay in bed for so long.” We may believe that zazen will make us physically strong and mentally healthy, but a healthy mind is not just a healthy mind in its usual sense, and a weak body is not just a weak body. Whether it is weak or strong, when that weakness or strength is based on so-called “Truth” or “Buddha Nature,” then that is a healthy mind and a healthy body.

My voice may not be very strong yet, but today I’m testing it. Whether it works or not, or whether I speak or not, is a big problem for us. Whatever happens to us is something which should happen. So the purpose of our practice is to have this kind of complete composure.

In the Blue Cliff Record is a koan which concerns Baso Doitsu. Baso was big and physically very strong, a man of great stature. Once when Baso was ill, the monk who took care of the temple came to visit and asked him, “How have you been? Are you well . . . or not?” And Baso said, “Sun-faced Buddha, Moon-faced Buddha.”

The Sun-faced Buddha is supposed to live for one thousand eight hundred years. And the Moon-faced Buddha lives only one day and one night. So, when I am sick, I am like the Moon-faced Buddha. When I am healthy, I am like the Sun-faced Buddha. But neither the Sun-faced Buddha nor the Moon-faced Buddha has any special meaning. Whether I am ill or healthy, I am still practicing zazen. There is no difference. Even though I am in bed, I am Buddha. So, don’t worry about my health.

This is quite simple. It is actually what we are doing every day. The difference is that whatever happens to Baso, he can accept “things as it is, as it happens.” But we cannot accept everything. Some thing we think is good, we may accept, but some thing which we dislike we don’t accept. And we compare things. We may say, “He is a true Zen Master, but this other one is not,” or, “he is a good Zen student, but I am not.” That kind of understanding may be quite usual, but actually you cannot say say for sure.

To attain enlightenment means to have complete composure in our life, without any discrimination. But if we stick to the attitude of non-discrimination, that is also a kind of discrimination. The point is to attain complete composure, and ordinary effort associated with comparative thinking will not help you.

When I was still in Japan, I had some Zen students. Some of them were very rich and influential people, and others were students, carpenters, or people who did other kinds of work. In Japan we still respect or treat some people, a mayor or a teacher, in a different way. We have a special way of speaking to them. But I always told my students, “If you are a Zen student you should forget all about your position, work, or title. Otherwise we cannot practice zazen in its true sense.”

When you sit I say, “Don’t think.” “Don’t think” means not to treat things in terms of good or bad, heavy or light. Just accept “things as it is.” Even though you do not think, you may still hear something; and usually, the moment you hear it your reaction is, “What could it be?” “That is a car,” or “That’s very noisy. Maybe it’s a motorcycle.”

In zazen you should just hear the big noise or the small noise and not be bothered by it. This may seem impossible, especially for the beginner, because the moment you hear it, some reaction follows. But if you practice zazen, if you continuously just accept “things as it is,” eventually you can do it. The way you can do it is to be concentrated on your posture and your breathing.

In Japan a samarai practiced zazen to master the sword. As long as he was afraid of losing his life, he could not act with his full ability. Only when he was free from “to kill or to be killed,” would he react just to his enemy’s activity, and win. If he tried to win, he may lose. So practicing how to act without fear, which limits his activity, is the most important thing. Although it was a matter of whether or not he could survive on the battlefield, he fought his fight in the zendo.

We don’t have that kind of need in our everyday life, so we don’t feel the same necessity to practice. But our human problems are created because we make an effort to achieve something in a materialistic sense, and this limits our activity. Then we cannot achieve anything. That is what it means to achieve nothing.

We should understand our everyday activity in two ways, and be able to respond either way without a problem. One way is to understand our life dualistically: good or bad, right or wrong. And we should try to understand things in these terms. Also we should be able to ignore this dualistic understanding. Then everything is one. That is the other understanding: the understanding of oneness.

So at first you should be able to understand or accept things in two ways, but this is not enough. It is still dualistic. Without being attached to one of the two understandings, you should have the freedom to move from one to the other. Then you will not be caught by your particular understanding. Whatever you do will be the great activity of practice.

The Sun-faced Buddha is good; the Moon-faced Buddha is good. Whatever it is, that is good–all things are Buddha. And there is no Buddha, even. But usually when you say “no Buddha,” it means you are sticking to one way of understanding. When you do not stick to one understanding, then whatever you say is all right.

When you do not understand Buddha, then you will be concerned if I say there is no Buddha: “You are a priest, so how can you say there is no Buddha? Why do you chant? Why do you bow to Buddha?” There is no Buddha so we bow to Buddha. If you bow to Buddha because there is Buddha, that is not a true understanding of Buddha. Whatever you say, it is all right. “Sun-faced Buddha, Moon-faced Buddha”–no problem. Whether I am at Tassajara or San Francisco, no problem. Even though I die, it is all right with me, and it is all right with you. And if it is not all right, you are not a Zen student. It is QUITE all right. That is Buddha.

If I suffer while I am dying, that is all right, that is suffering Buddha. No confusion in it. Maybe everyone will struggle because of physical agony or spiritual agony, but that is not a problem. We should be very grateful to have a limited body like mine or like yours. If you had a limitless life, it would be a great problem for you.

On my wife’s favorite TV program there are some ghosts of people who lived long ago. They appear in this world, and create many problems for people and for themselves. That is what happens. We are reaching to the moon now, but we cannot create a human being in its true sense. A human being is a human being. We can enjoy our life only with our limited body. This limitation is a vital element for us. Without limitation nothing exists, so we should enjoy the limitation: weak body, strong body; man or woman. The only way to enjoy our life is to enjoy the limitation that was given to us.

“Sun-faced Buddha, Moon-faced Buddha does not mean to be indifferent: “I don’t care whether it’s the Sun-faced Buddha or the Moon-faced Buddha.” It means whether it’s the Sun-faced Buddha or the Moon-faced Buddha, we should enjoy it. This is also beyond non-attachment, because when our attachment reaches the point of non-attachment, that is real attachment. If you are attached to something, you should be attached to something completely. SUN-FACED BUDDHA, MOON-FACED BUDDHA! “I am here, I am right here.” This kind of confidence within ourselves is important. When you have this kind of confidence in yourself, in your being, you can practice true zazen, which is beyond perfect or imperfect, good or bad.

Den frustrerede ophavsmand og politisk korrekthed

Når man ser en person, der aktivt søger at ensrette debatten via politisk korrekthed og krænkelseskultur, så falder vedkommende typisk i en af to kasser: Enten (1) Den identitetspolitiske (”jeg er kvinde/muslim/sort, og derfor har jeg særlig indsigt i, hvad alle kvinder/muslimer/sorte mener og føler”) eller (2) det, vi kunne kalde ”den frustrerede ophavsmand.” Det er ham, denne postering handler om. På alle felter gælder det, at pladserne på parnasset er begrænsede: Der findes langt flere musikere, forfattere, billedkunstnere, forskere og meningsdannere end det fåtal, der kan sikre sig en prominent plads inden for deres felt. Det betyder, at der inden for alle disse discipliner findes et anonymt og frustreret proletariat, der savner anerkendelse af deres bøger, musik, billeder, forskning eller holdningsjournalistik. Disse folk _har_ forsøgt at gøre sig gældende inden for deres felt, men deres produktioner har ikke opnået den anerkendelse, som man kunne have håbet. Og hvad kan de så gøre ved det?

En af indsigterne fra evolutionær psykologi er som følger: Hjernens højere kognitionsevner er først og fremmest gearet til at genkende mønstre i sin omverden og handle på dem. Men da det enkelte mønster kan realiseres af flere forskellige kombinationer af enkeltbestanddele, vil man ofte se ”misapplikationer” af handlingen i forhold til mønsteret. Således kunne man også tænke sig, at grunden til, at der synes at være et sammenfald mellem personer, der gerne vil hunse rundt med andre i debatten, og ”frustrerede ophavsmænd,” er, at disses bevidsthed gennemgår en misapplikation i forhold til analysen af eget virkes manglende gennemslagskraft. Kokurrencen om en plads i rampelyset er hård på de kreative felter, og hvis man ikke evner at brillere på traditionel manér, så kan man muligvis opnå prominens ved at sætte dagsordenen i forhold til den politiske korrekthed på sit felt. Krænkelsesklummen bliver således den frustrerede ophavsmands genvej til anerkendelse – i hvert fald i vedkommendes eget sind.

Information bragte for nylig en artikel af en (relativt ukendt) fantasyforfatter, der mellem slet skjult reklame for egne værker rakkede ned på H.P. Lovecraft og ’Game of Thrones,’ mens vedkommende søgte at bestemme racemæssige standarder, som alle skulle operere efter i fantasymiljøet. Et større dansk dagblad har en (igen relativt ukendt) musiker, der løbende blogger om det, han ser som sexisme i mere kendte musikeres kvindesyn (hans eget virke som musiker bliver i øvrigt udbasuneret med hver eneste byline i hver eneste blog, som han skriver). Og nu er der så nogle kulturforskere, som søger at komme til prominens ved at gøre den æstetik, der pryder visse kolonialvarer, synonym med racisme.

Måske er den frustrerede ophavsmands tilgang end ikke så irrationel igen – skulle han lykkes med sit foretagende, vil han blive husket som den, der med sit progresssive menneskesyn afstedkom en forandring til det bedre for sit felt. Måske vil han endda være så heldig, at folk vil blive ansporet til at kigge nærmere på hans produktioner (da det jo ikke er hvem som helst, der kan have held til at sætte dagsordenen for et helt felt).

Derfor, lad os huske på, at mens det er svært at være nyskabende, så er det uendeligt let at lire den politiske korrekthed af som en erstatning for ægte kreativitet. Grebet kommer endda med indbygget ønskeopfyldelse: Folk, der ikke gider høre på det, har ikke bare et andet syn på kontekst og individualisme end den frustrerede ophavsmand. Ved at ignorere ham gør de sig til racister eller sexister, og ingen kan således tillade sig at ignorere den frustrerede ophavsmands budskab på samme måde, som de ignorerede hans oprindelige produktioner. Ned med den frustrerede ophavsmand!

Hume mellem konservatisme og liberalisme

Af Ryan Smith

Mens David Hume ubestridt regnes blandt Vestens betydeligste filosoffer, så er hans politiske tænkning historisk blevet mødt med en mere blandet reception. Humes politiske skrifter er blevet anklaget for at være overfladiske og ahistoriske og for at bære præg af Humes personlige ønske om at opnå litterær berømmelse i brede kredse snarere end at opfostre akademisk indsigt i snævre.

I forbindelse med grundlæggelsen af Amerika er Humes direkte indflydelse begrænset: Det er velkendt, hvordan Jefferson nærede afsky for Hume, ligesom John Adams mestendels erklærede sig uenig med Hume.

I Storbritannien er Humes politiske tænkning især blevet sat i forbindelse med tre senere traditioner:

  • Humes pragmatisme og utilitarisme er blevet set som forløberen for Jeremy Bentham og James Mills utilitaristiske liberalisme.
  • Humes økonomiske teori er blevet set som den grundsten, som klassisk liberale økonomer som Adam Smith og David Ricardo byggede videre på.
  • Humes angreb på kausalitet og på fornuften er blevet udlagt som legitimation af konservatismen og som et forsvar for sædvaner og for patos som sluttemåde.

Hvilken af disse David Hume’er er så den ”sande” David Hume? Det er de alle, da Hume bredte sig over så mange emner og gjorde sig til talsmand for så mange (ofte modsatrettede) synspunkter, at han med rimelighed kan udlægges på alle tre måder.

For at forstå bevæggrundene bag David Humes politiske temperament  er det nødvendigt at se nærmere på den tid, som han skrev i. Humes dødsår var 1776, hvilket vil sige, at hans filosofi er udfærdiget i den magelige æra, som gik forud for Den Franske Revolution i 1789. Oplysningen lå bag ham og i hans samtid, mens Den Franske Revolution endnu lå forude. Senere konservative tænkere har ofte set med skeptiske øjne på Oplysningen, da den efter deres mening stod i direkte slægtskab med Den Franske Revolution. Men i Humes egen tid synes Oplysningen uundgåelig. Hans tid kan måske sammenlignes med tiden umiddelbart efter Berlinmurens fald, hvor fremskridt og liberalt demokrati ligeledes synes uomgængeligt, som ville de komme anstigende af sig selv – et tidsbillede profant indkapslet i Fukuyamas The End of History and the Last Man (1992).

I begge tilfælde var samtidens politiske tænkning præget af slaphed forårsaget af troen på, at  fremskridtet ville komme af sig selv, og en manglende bevidsthed om en faretruende modpol (det være sig Den Franske Revolution, Sovjetunionen, eller Putins imperialisme), som man selv bliver fast i kødet af at skrive sig op imod.

Denne tidsmæssige forskydning mellem Hume og senere tiders konservative betyder, at der er en række særkender ved Humes konservatisme. I modsætning til senere tiders konservative er Hume ikke mystiker: Han er helt igennem sekulær og behøver ikke Forsynet, kirken eller nationalstatens mytologiserede rødder som aktører i sin konservative orden. Erfaringen er det råstof, som vi må tænke politik på baggrund af. Oplysningens analytiske dissektion er det nåleøje, som den etablerede moralfilosofi må passere igennem (her har vi den utilitaristiske del af Hume). Temperamentsmæssigt var han optimist og sensualist; identitetsfællesskaber og autoriteter, der påtvinges oppefra, er unødvendige – ethvert individ har egeninteresser og sanselige behov, som det af sig selv søger at realisere i fællesskab med sine medmennesker – derved opstår den sociale orden og de borgerlige dyder (her har vi den klassisk liberale del af Hume).

Såvidt de klassisk liberale og liberal-utilitaristiske dele af Humes politiske filosofi. Det er dog Humes konservatisme, som står i det tætteste forhold til hans vigtigste opdagelser – nemlig hans kritik af kausalitet og fornuften. I generelle filosofiske termer er Hume mest kendt for at have betvivlet kausalitet: Når vi ser A forårsage B, så ser vi et sammenfald i tid og rum, men vi ser ikke selve årsagsvirkningen. Vi postulerer den med fornuften. Men fornuften kan kun bedømme observation; den kan ikke selv observere. Vi har altså at gøre med en fejlslutning. Ligeledes kan fornuften ifølge Hume ikke fortælle os, hvad godt og slet er, men blot beregne, om noget er godt eller slet, når først patos og sædvaner har udstyret fornuften med rammerne for, hvad godt og slet overhovedet er.

Det siger sig selv, at dette syn på fornuften underminerer den tidligere tradition for naturlige rettigheder og for en naturlig moral, som vi kan opdage med fornuften (her ser vi, hvorfor Hume aldrig blev populær blandt de amerikanske founding fathers). Moral er noget, vi føler, og ikke noget, vi analyserer os frem til.

Således kan der næppe herske tvivl om, at der findes et betragteligt konservativt element i Humes politiske tænkning. Alligevel er der dog en række særkender ved Humes konservatisme, der gør, at Hume adskiller sig markant fra de fleste konservative: Vi har allerede nævnt Humes afsmag for mystik, religion og autoriteter. Tillige kan vi pege på Humes skepsis, hvad angår den absolutte værdi af menneskets sluttemåder. For Hume kan menneskets tendens til at slutte på baggrund af sædvaner og patos bedst karakteriseres som deskriptive fakta vedrørende menneskets natur:  Hume har med sine argumenter vist, at fornuften ikke kan erstatte patos, men deraf følger det ikke, ifølge Hume, at patos’ domsafsigelser så er korrekte, endsige normativt værdifulde. Selvom Hume ikke har noget rationalistisk aspekt at falde tilbage på, så anerkender han dog rent pragmatisk, at entusiasme og glæde ved egne følelsesslutninger ikke er det samme som en overbevisning opnået gennem reflektion over generaliseret viden. Mens nutidige konservative ofte følger Hume i at postulere sædvane og patos som grundlaget for værdidomme, så synes de samtidig at afvise, eller helt at mangle, Humes bevidsthed om, at værdidomme afsagt på dette grundlag ikke nødvendigivis er hverken korrekte, værdifulde eller berettigede.

Samtidig kan man dog også i Hume finde en bevidsthed om forhold, som liberale sædvanligvis overser. Hvis mennesker, som de er flest, uundgåeligt slutter på baggrund af patos og sædvane, så smuldrer store dele af Hobbes og Lockes drejebøger for den politiske orden bort. Snarere end individer, der har sluttet sig sammen i fællesskaber på baggrund af deliberation og egeninteresse, så kommer ”samfundet” og fællesskabsfølelsen først. Behovet for at ”høre til” og for at kunne identificere sig med en leder kommer i de fleste menneskers tilfælde før abstraktioner som ”rettigheder” og ”individet.” Samme forhold vil i praksis også sige, at magten i et samfund ”sidder i sprækkerne” og ikke direkte i love og regler. I praksis er det sædvanen og flertallets sym- og antipatier, der har magten i et samfund, og kun uhyre sjældent ser vi abstrakte principper og hensynet til eksisterende love komme sejrrigt ud af en direkte konfrontation med sædvanerne og den menneskelige natur.