Category Archives: Politik

De rette hormoner til politik

Af Ryan Smith

Politikere som Margaret Thatcher og Hillary Clinton samt politiske ideologer som Ann Coulter og Ayn Rand er forfulgt af en bestemt type latterliggørelse: De er ikke ’rigtige’ kvinder; deres retorik og tænkemåde synes maskulin, og det er ikke til at få øje på det moderlige aspekt af deres personlighed.

En sådan kritik, hvor meningmand sætter sig til dommer over, hvem der er ’rigtige’ kvinder, kan synes bigot og i modstrid med danske værdier om kønnenes ligestiling. Ikke desto mindre er der dog tale om en vedblivende kritik, der tillige kommer fra begge ender af det politiske spektrum (på højrefløjen mistænkeliggøres Hillary Clinton; på venstefløjen dæmoniseres Margaret Thatcher og Ayn Rand). Men selvom kritikken unægteligt indeholder ignorante elementer, er der muligvis noget om snakken.

Ifølge en dugfrisk videnskabelig undersøgelse foretaget af forskere fra to europæiske universiteter, samt et enkelt amerikansk, ser det nemlig ud til, at det mandlige kønshormon testosteron spiller en stor rolle for kvinders muligheder for at nå til tops i politik.

Problematikken, som forskerne satte sig for at undersøge, er simpel: Det er velkendt, at andelen af kvindelige toppolitikere varierer drastisk på tværs af landegrænser. Sverige har netop udnævnt en regering med 50% kvindelige ministre. Blandt parlamentarikerstanden ligger andelen af kvindelige parlamentsmedlemmer omkring de 40% i Danmark og Norge, mens den tilsvarende andel er 17% i USA og 0% i Saudi-Arabien. Disse forskelle forklares sædvanligvis med økonomiske, sociale og kulturelle faktorer, og det er da også kun de færreste, der vil benægte deres væsentlighed i slige anliggender. Eksempelvis er det så godt som sikkert, at graden af ligestilling i et land hænger sammen med, hvor udviklet det pågældende lands økonomi er.

Imidlertid ønskede forskerne at finde ud af, om ikke også biologi havde en finger med i spillet. Det gjorde de ved at undersøge det såkaldte 2D:4D-mål, dvs. forholdet mellem længden på en persons pege- og ringfinger. Dette forhold har længe været kendt som et indirekte mål for den hormonbalance, en person har været udsat for på fosterstadiet. Har en person været udsat for forhøjede mængder af det mandlige kønshormon testosteron, kommer det ganske pålideligt til udtryk i form af en længere ringfinger relativt til pegefingerens længde på samme hånd. Omvendt gælder det, at en person, der på fosterstadiet har været udsat for forhøjede mængder af det kvindelige kønshormon østrogen med stor sandsynlighed vil have en forholdsvis kortere ringfinger.

Ved at undersøge pege- og ringfingerlængde blandt personer af begge køn fra 29 lande var forskerne i stand til at påvise, at andelen af kvindelige parlamentsmedlemmer korrelerer uhyre tæt med 2D:4D-scoren for det pågældende land. Med andre ord har de lande, hvor kvinderne typisk har været udsat for større mængder testosteron på fosterstadiet, også flere kvindelige toppolitikere.

Kort sagt: Jo mere ensartet den hormonbalance, de to køn havde været udsat for på fosterstadiet, var, des mere ligeligt var de to køn repræsenteret i det nationale parlament.

Forskernes resultater komplementerer et større billede tegnet af tidligere videnskabelige undersøgelser. Eksempelvis har tidligere studier etableret, at kvinder med lav 2D:4D-score (altså høj testosteron) er overrepræsenteret i traditionelle mandejobs, såsom ingeniørfag, IT og produktionsarbejde. Ligeledes har tidligere undersøgelser vist, at personer med lav 2D:4D-score, uanset køn, er mere socialt dominerende, oftere udfordrer andre og tillader sig at kræve mere af deres medmennesker.

Forskernes undersøgelse tjener således til at anskueliggøre, at der biologisk set er mere end én variabel på spil, hvad angår en persons mulighed for at komme til tops i politik: Foruden det biologiske køn er der grund til at tro, at den rette hormonbalance på fosterstadiet spiller ind på den videre udvikling af hjernen og personligheden og prædisponerer personen for at udvikle en række kvaliteter, som er givtige i toppolitik. Det kan således vel være, at det i toppolitik alt i alt er bedre at være en ’mandig kvinde’ (såsom Margaret Thatcher), end det er at være en ’kvindagtig mand,’ eller blot en kønstypisk kvinde.

Når biologi bliver brugt som forklaring på kønsforskelle, er der ofte en tendens til at tænke, at går man med på biologiens præmisser, så må alt i sidste ende være determineret af arvelighed, gener og hormoner. Men det er dog ikke tilfældet, og forskerne bag undersøgelsen anfører selv, at hormonbalancen på fosterstadiet ikke synes at have meget at gøre med kvindernes gennemsnitlige uddannelsesniveau i et land.

Rifkin og Zero Marginal Cost-samfundet

Jeremy Rifkin har skrevet en bog ved navn Zero Marginal Cost Society. Heri argumenterer han for, at kapitalismen er ved at være slut til fordel for en økonomi, hvor folk deler designs for fysiske ting med hinanden gratis, og 3D-printer dem til sig selv billigt. Dette vil ifølge Rifkin sætte kapitalismens dominans under en skæppe.

Det er nemt at være enig med ham i, at der kommer et Wikipedia of Things i løbet af de næste årtier, og at dette kan løfte almindelige menneskers livskvalitet betragteligt. Dog kan er det svært at se se hvorfor dette skulle være dårligt for kapitalismen. Kapitalister er interesseret i profit, ikke omsætning. Den kvalitet af produkter, som vil blive billigere, eller næsten gratis, som følge af et Wikipedia of Things er alligevel mest produkter med høj omsætning og lav profit.

I modsætning hertil kender man lækkerhedsmonopoler såsom Iphone og Porsche. Disse produkter vil ikke blive billigere så længe, der stadig eksisterer intellektuel ejendomsret, tværtimod vil de snarere blive dyrere, da folk nu er i stand til at spendere en større del af deres indkomster på livsstil og luksus. Den udvikling, Rifkin beskriver, sandsynligvis vil føre til bedre levestandard for almindelige mennesker. Men samtidig vil den også føre til større ulighed, da konkurrencen om at levere et produkt, folk vil have på markedsvilkår vil blive så skarp, at færre vil være i stand til at deltage.

Derudover er der intet, der tvinger kapitalister til at sætte prisen i nærheden af marginalomkostningerne, sådan som Rifkin hævder – Google AdSense har f.eks. en zero marginal cost på deres reklameservices. Alligevel tager Google 32% af partnerens indtjening, ikke 1% som de ville gøre, hvis deres priser var bestemt af marginalomkostningerne. På samme måde kan man forestille sig andre aggregatorer og “essentielle led” i hans fremtidsøkonomi vil få et ganske behageligt liv som kapitalister hvor alle er afhængige af deres services, og de egentlig bare kan læne sig tilbage og se pengene rulle ind fra hele verden.

Derudover er det overdrevet at snakke om Zero Marginal Cost som en erstatning for kapitalismen. Hvem skal bo på Manhattan og hvem skal bo i Brooklyn? KBH K og Ishøj? Alle positionelle goder må stadig fordeles kapitalistisk.

Alt i alt: Den er en god idé Rifkin har, og sandsynligvis kommer meget af det, han beskriver til at ske. Men det virker som om, at dette ene facet af fremtidens økonomi, som han beskriver, bliver strukket aaalt for langt i hans bog. Økonomien er kompleks og der opstår hele tiden nye jobs og servicebehov, som ingen kunne have forudsagt. Den udvikling, Rifkin beskriver, kan højest erstatte en del af økonomien, som vi kender den. Næppe den hele, som bogen ellers lægge rop til.

Monogami er moderne, polygami er passé

Af Ryan Smith

Frankrigs ministerpræsident Francois Hollande befinder sig i øjeblikket i en mediestorm, efter at det franske ugeblad Closer har beskyldt ham for at have været sin partner utro med en kendt skuespillerinde. I november 2012 kæmpede den amerikanske general og daværende øverste chef for CIA David Petraeus en lignende kamp for sin karriere, efter at det kom frem, at han havde været sin kone utro med en kvindelig forfatter. Og i 1998 havde Bill Clinton nær mistet sit embede, da det kom frem, at han havde bedraget Hillary Clinton med en ung praktikant ved navn Monica Lewinsky.

I en traditionel venstreorienteret analyse er magtfulde mænds tendens til udenomsægteskabelige affærer historisk betinget. Sexlysten er ifølge den socialistiske analyse en biologisk konstant for begge køn. Hvis vi mennesker kunne vælge, så ville vi dyrke sex på kryds og tværs, sådan som chimpanserne gør. Men hvad det menneskelige samfund angår, så er det ifølge den socialistiske analyse magt og kapital, som bestemmer, hvem der dyrker sex med hvem. Og da samfundets kapital og magt til alle tider har været snævert koncentreret i hænderne på en lille gruppe mænd, så følger det af analysen, at disse magtfulde mænd sikrer sig den eksklusive brugsret til så mange kvinder, som deres kapital tillader.

Men den traditionelt socialistiske analyse kan ikke forklare, hvorfor JFK kunne slippe afsted med at have stribevis af elskerinder som præsident, når Clinton end ikke kunne have en enkelt. Den kan heller ikke forklare, hvorfor den amerikanske general (og senere præsident) Eisenhower slap afsted med at gå i seng med sin kvindelige chauffør, når nu Petraeus ikke kunne få lov. Og endelig fejler den socialistiske analyse i at forklare, hvorfor den franske præsident de Gaulle kunne have en elskerinde, når nu Hollande ikke kan.

Polygami er en opfindelse

Nyere studier inden for antropologi tyder da også på, at den socialistiske analyse ikke helt holder stik. Snarere end altid at være promiskuøse i naturtilstanden, så lader det til, at primitive jæger-samler-samfund også kender til ægteskab og monogami. Polygami er ikke automatisk givet for den menneskelige natur, sådan som socialisterne troede.

I stedet opererer flere antropologer nu med den teori, at polygami opstod som et svar på de uligheder, der indtraf i samfundet i forbindelse med overgangen fra jæger-samler-samfund til landbrugssamfund. I et jæger-samler-samfund kan stammens dygtigste jæger aldrig blive ret meget rigere end gennemsnittet, da hans kød og bær vil fordærve. Men i et landbrugssamfund med ejendomsret og kornlagre kan den dygtigste bonde blive mange gange rigere end sin nabo. Med ulighedens komme opstod også muligheden for en polygam livsstil, hvor nogle få rige mænd havde penge til at underholde et personligt harem af kvinder, mens fattige, uambitiøse og uheldige mænd måtte undvære.

Således finder vi de berygtede polygame kulturer igennem historien, hvor polygami var institutionaliseret og gennemreguleret. I Osmannerriget måltes husstandes sociale status efter antallet af konkubiner, som manden var i stand til at holde foruden konen. I Inka-riget fik en kejserlig embedsmand en ekstra elskerinde leveret af staten for hver 30 undersåtter, han herskede over.

Kristendom, demokrati og liberalisme

I Vesten har kristendommen spillet en unik rolle, idet den har modsat sig institutionaliseringen af polygami. Men kristendommen alene kan ikke forklare, hvorfor Hollande og Clinton ikke kan have affærer, når de Gaulle og JFK slap afsted med det. Den tiltagende modstand mod polygami kan læses ind i en større civilisatorisk proces, som i øjeblikket er i gang i Vesten. Og denne proces har mindst to andre ophav: Demokrati og liberalisme.

Demokrati og liberalisme giver tilsammen et samfund, hvor borgerne i stadig mindre grad er villige til at acceptere adfærd fra magthaverne, som de ikke ville acceptere fra hinanden. Hvor demokratiet gør, at vi selv vælger vore magthavere, så tilsiger liberalismen, at magthaverne ikke er herskere, men et nødvendigt onde hvis løn vi andre finansierer.

Den socialistiske analyse havde for så vidt ret i, at det var opsparet magt og kapital, som førte til polygami. Men den tog fejl, hvad angår naturtilstanden. Menneskets præference er ikke at dyrke skødesløs sex som chimpanser. Vi foretrækker faktisk en monogam tilværelse med mulighed for enkelte sidespring for os selv. Men adgangen til kvinder er et nulsumsspil, så hvad naboen angår, foretrækker vi, at han holder sig til sin kone og kun sin kone. Jo mindre benovede vi er over magthaverne, og jo færre muligheder de har for at underkue deres befolkninger, des sværere bliver det for dem at få befolkningen til at acceptere deres sidespring.

En parentes, der startede med agrarbrugets komme for ca. 12.000 år siden, er således nu ved at lukkes i Vestens kulturkristne og liberale demokratier. Præcis hvornår denne parentes lukker, og om den nogensinde vil lukke helt, står hen i det uvisse. Men meget tyder på, at mens Eisenhower, de Gaulle og JFK befandt sig på indersiden af denne parentes, så kom Bill Clinton, David Petraeus og altså nu Hollande for sent til festen.

An Open Letter to Sonu Shamdasani from Deirdre Bair

An Open Letter to Sonu Shamdasani From Deirdre Bair

By Deidre Bair

Dear Sonu Shamdasani:

I am writing this open letter to you because of your lecture to the
London Confederation of Analytical Psychologists (CAP) on April 22nd.
As you know, it was my honor to inaugurate the series on January 22nd
and Christian Gaillard will conclude it on June 24th. We three were
each asked to speak for 45-50 minutes about our recent books, in my
case the biography of C. G. Jung, after which we were to respond to
questions for 20-30 minutes. You attended my presentation but did not
respond to my greetings when you entered the hall. You chose instead
to snub me and you did not speak to me when you left. I was told by
those in the audience who sat near you that you and your companion,
Maggie Baron, were disruptive throughout my talk with loud, negative
comments.

On April 22nd, you did not present a talk about your book, Jung and
the Making of Modern Psychology. Instead, you dishonored your
invitation to speak about your own work and chose through the
cowardice of stealth and secrecy to attack me and my scholarship. You
told none of the conveners in advance that you intended to dissect my
book, which you did for one hour and forty minutes. I shall quote here
from an email sent to me on April 27th by the chairman of the series,
Martin Stone, who described what you did as a “100 minute attack on
the research basis, standing, and accuracy of your [that is, my]
recent biography of Jung.” Martin Stone also wrote that during the
question period, you announced that you had no intention of presenting
your criticisms directly to me because your “critique would be
published by Karnac in book form.” Since April 27th, I understand that
Martin Stone has asked you to do two things:

1. to present another lecture, the one CAP paid you to deliver about
your own book. I believe this demonstrates the displeasure and dismay
your lecture caused to the organizers and the audience.

2. to make the full text of every charge you made against my book in
your talk available to me for my evaluation and response.

Martin Stone has informed me that you have refused to agree to the
second request, and that you will not make any of the allegations and
aspersions you cast upon my work available to me for my commentary and
response.

I am a writer who has worked hard for more than three decades to
establish a career that is praised for the thoroughness of its
research, its integrity, and objectivity, I cannot permit you to make
such unfounded allegations against me without demanding that you
provide the specifics of your charges. If you are the genuine scholar
you claim to be and if you have the interests of scholarship in
general at the forefront of your work, you have the moral and ethical
obligation to do so. Not to provide specifics is an act of
intellectual dishonesty, hubris, and cowardice that I cannot allow to
pass unchallenged. Nor can it be the case that material presented in a
public lecture can be regarded as confidential. If you felt able to
say what you said in public, there is no excuse for refusing on any
grounds whatsover to convey your comments to me in a form to which I
can respond.

I understand that although you refuse to make your charges available
to me, you intend to take them directly to print through Karnac Press.
If you do this, I must advise you for the record, that my publishers
and their lawyers will scrutinize whatever you write for possible
legal ramifications.

Besides Martin Stone, who maintained on behalf of CAP a scrupulous,
non-partisan position in this sad matter you created, many other
persons who were in the audience contacted me by email and telephone.
First, I shall summarize their reactions and then I shall respond to
the charges they can remember that you leveled against my book. Their
reactions ranged from “shock,” “outrage,” “anger and horror” to
“distress” and “dismay.” When I pressed for specifics, the
correspondents told me they could not decide the veracity of your list
of my “errors” because they were so taken aback by your “”shrill” and
“vitriolic” presentation that they had difficulty at times in focusing
on what you were saying and could only remember the most egregious
remarks. The talk was not tape recorded, nor did these correspondents,
stunned as they were by your unexpected attack, have the presence of
mind to take detailed notes. Therefore, some of what they have told me
may not be exactly what you said, but as you refuse to make your
remarks available to me, I have no other point of reference and must
respond to you through their communications.

Here is a summation of what they remember: you began your talk by
chastising the audience for having allowed a “con [artist]” to “con”
them into a “fete” for a “worthless” book. You told the audience they
should be “ashamed” of themselves “for being taken in” by me. You
alluded to “hundreds of errors” in my book. Here is a summation of
what they remember of these alleged “errors” and again, it may or many
not be exactly what you said but the gist is certainly there: Some of
the “errors” you cited concerned misspellings of German words. Despite
an excellent copy editor and two full-time proofreaders who were all
fluent in German, it is indeed regrettable that so many misspellings
crept into the book during the production process. Many of my readers
(genuine scholars all) wrote thoughtful, constructive letters pointing
them out to me and my excellent German translator of the German
edition caught the rest. These will all be corrected in the
forthcoming English language paperback, due in October, 2004.

Some of my correspondents remember that you dwelt on another “typo” or
“slip” (my words, not yours) on p. 432, where I referred to the
“International” General Medical Psychotherapy Association. In that
particular clause it is not correct for it did not become
“international” until the “hereafter” clause that follows. This
unfortunate “slip” (again, my word) was pointed out by several
collegial scholars and has since been corrected. It was due to
carelessness, not to the “lack of knowledge” you implied and it is
hardly of enough magnitude to merit your using it to condemn the
entire book, as you did. I will myself call attention here to a very
serious “typo” which many kindly scholars have pointed out and which
members of the CAP audience disagree over whether or not you cited it:
the caption for the photo of the Weimar Congress in the first edition
is incorrectly given as 1912, when it should be 1911. This, too, has
been corrected for the paperback.

To discuss what I consider your most serious allegation, I shall quote
again from Martin Stone’s email: “Sonu made remarks about Deirdre
Bair’s sources and her probity and trustworthiness.” These remarks
apparently concerned the documents and conversations that came to me
from “private sources, private archives.” According to various
correspondents, you stated that I had “made them up” or “invented
them.” You said that I had made “so many misreadings and misuse of
what is publicly available” that my interpretations of the “private
sources, private archives” could not be trusted. You said that unless
I made the confidential documents available to you, the audience
should disregard the veracity and accuracy of my scholarship because
confidential information can never be regarded as trustworthy. My dear
Sonu Shamdasani, I cannot believe you are so naïve as to think that I
will betray these confidences to satisfy your curiosity, nor can I
believe that you, as a self-proclaimed scholar, would discredit or
call into question the confidential sources of a respected biographer.
May I remind you also of “Deep Throat,” who contributed to the
downfall of a government as an honest, off-the record source?

Actually, you are directly responsible for bringing one of my “private
sources, private archives” to me. You contacted this particular person
and, “acting like a thug and a bully” (I quote my source here), you
demanded that this person surrender all relevant family documents to
you because you are the “Intellectual Advisor to the Jung Heirs” (your
term for being in their employ) and as such, have the right to claim
possession of all documents pertaining to C. G. Jung in private hands
for his heirs. This person told you quite firmly that the documents
belonged to that family’s archives and not to the Jung heirs. The
person’s family then made the decision to let me use these archives
because they knew I would treat them honestly and they feared the
“slanted” version you might present should you gain access to the
materials. I cite this anecdote to show why so many persons who all
knew of your scholarship refused to have anything to do with you.
Perhaps this has contributed to your rage and anger toward my work.

In my four biographies, all of which have been continuously in print
since the first was published in 1978, no major errors of fact have
been found by other scholars (and believe me, there were many who
tried!). This being the case, I must leave it to my readers to decide
for themselves who they wish to believe – you or me – regarding my use
of information in “private sources, private archives.”

The next major charge you made, as various correspondents recall,
concerns what I must call your deliberate lie. You said that when I
began my research I asked the Jung heirs to prohibit any other scholar
from consulting any or all documentation about C. G. Jung throughout
the years it would take me to finish my book. This is a complete and
utter falsehood. I have NEVER asked for such status for any of my four
biographies. As a scholar, I recognize and respect the need for full
and open access, not only for my own work but for all other scholars
as well. In fact, Sonu Shamdasani, it was YOU who asked the Jung heirs
to refuse to grant me access to the archives they control and if they
could not do so, you urged them to limit my access as much as
possible. And shortly before my book was published, you convened a
meeting in Zurich of the Jung heirs and their legal and publishing
representatives to ask them to take measures to stop publication of my
book. I understand that everyone present informed you that you had no
grounds for such action and they took none.

In your diatribe against my biography of Jung, you cited a 1978 review
of my biography of Samuel Beckett, written by the late Richard Ellmann
in The New York Review of Books. With mockery in your voice, you
referred frequently to Ellmann’s creation of the word “factoid” to
describe my Beckett book (winner of the National Book Award among its
many honors and citations). You did not tell your CAP audience the
context of Ellmann’s remark: that as the biographer of Joyce and
Yeats, he expected Beckett to anoint him to write an authorized
biography. Because Beckett cooperated with me instead, Ellmann was
enraged. I have correspondence from other worried scholars to whom
Ellmann wrote even before he read my book that he would “savage Bair”
and would “destroy her.” In his review, Ellmann insinuated that the
only reason I was permitted to write the book instead of him was
because the “mere girl” had seduced Samuel Beckett. You neglected to
tell this to your CAP audience.

I am not clear on whether or not you connected the Ellmann review with
the following charge because my correspondents differ, but some insist
that you connected it with how I wrote about the genesis of Jung’s
“Seven Sermons.” You faulted me for describing the “oppressive
atmosphere” surrounding the scene as being “in the heat of summer.” My
sources for this were my personal interviews and the Harvard Countway
interviews with three of Jung’s surviving children: Agathe
Niehus-Jung, Gret Baumann-Jung, and Franz Jung. All three remembered
it this way. So, too, did Helene Hoerni-Jung, in information conveyed
to me by her son, Ulrich Hoerni. So, too, did the Barbara Hannah
“private archive” I consulted, and so, too, did Jung’s grandchildren
repeat it in interviews with me. You apparently held up a document for
the CAP audience dated “January” and said it proved my account “false”
and “wrong.” Perhaps it is, but isn’t’ it interesting that the entire
Jung family shares such a collective memory? If it isn’t true, how did
it come to be? Concerning the document dated “January”: Do you have
proof that this is the first and original composition? Did you provide
full documentation to support this claim for the CAP audience? In
summation, I regret that you chose such confrontational tactics
throughout your entire talk, but I especially regret it in this
instance. This was not the place for rancorous hostility but rather,
the place where cooperative scholarly discussion between you and me
might have led us to a definitive solution and conclusion.

To finish up with your deliberately misleading misuse of Ellmann’s
review, may I direct your attention to the introduction of his revised
edition of the Joyce biography (Oxford University Press, 1983) in
which he begs his readers to read this version rather than his
original text, for “readers of the first edition will discover that
more pages have been altered than not, by insertions ranging from a
line to a page or more.” Joyce scholars who have counted tell me there
are more than 536 textual changes or corrections. This, I am also
told, is par for the course with most biographies. Not so in mine: I
invite readers to consult the various editions of each biography to
see for themselves that this is not true of my writing. Perhaps it
will become true for the Jung biography, and if so, I stand ready to
make changes and to correct errors of fact or event. So far, about
twenty persons have contacted me in the spirit of collegial
scholarship. Where they have pointed out errors, I have eagerly
corrected them; where they have differing opinions, I have managed in
many cases to incorporate them into both text and notes so that both
sides of the story, theirs and mine, are given. Here again, Sonu
Shamdasani, I regret that you have chosen to attack and destroy rather
than to cooperate as one scholar with another.

I must remind you that historical scholarship (of which biography is a
genre) consists of collecting as many facts as can be found. After
that, the historian/writer must weigh these facts carefully to sift
their weight and veracity and then must present the most accurate,
sensitive, and truthful account possible. This is not “artistic
license” as you accused me of writing, but rather, it is a genuine
scholarly effort to sift the evidence in order to convey the “truth”
in every sense of that much- debated concept. Naturally this falls
within the realm of the writer’s opinion, a fact you disparage where
it pertains to the work of others but which you insist upon
conveniently forgetting when you employ it within your own writing. In
your arrogance, you insist that only your version of the facts or
events of Jung’s life is the correct one. I could not help but think
that your comment about Freud on p. 93 of your book applies equally
well to your conduct of Jungian scholarship: “Freud’s failing was that
he could never see beyond his own conception, which he took to be
universal.”

I also wish that you had heeded what you wrote on p. 56 when you
quoted Jung on how he thought a book should be reviewed. You quoteJung
as stating that “In many cases, reviewers failed to deal with the
essence of a work, and overcompensated for their lack of competence
through irrelevant and unjust criticism.Individuals who had already
achieved something in the same field do not consider that anyone else
knows as much as they. Consequently, ‘one arms oneself against new
ideas as against the evil enemy and reads each line onlywith the aim
of finding the supposed weak point.’ Due to this, one picked up on
trifles such as errors in citations, grammatical errors, etc. without
seriously engaging with the work.” –I regret that this is exactly
what you have done with my book.

I regret even more that you dishonored your invitation to address the
CAP audience about your own work and chose instead to attack mine
through stealth and cowardice. For me, the writing of this letter has
been much the same as shadowboxing with an invisible assailant, as I
have only the testimony of concerned members of the Jungian community
who were in your audience to guide me .

To continue with a boxing metaphor, I quote the great Muhammad Ali:
“you can run but you can’t hide.” Your version of Jung’s reality has
so far been based on your privileged status as an employee of the Jung
heirs: when you say you have read manuscripts and letters, others have
been inclined to accept your conclusions because you have had access
to materials that are restricted and therefore unavailable to the rest
of us. It is unfair for you to criticize me as you did in your CAP
presentation because I stated some of the difficulties I encountered
when I asked the Jung heirs for access to certain archives. You stated
that you had never had a single problem of this nature, which as an
employee of the heirs you no doubt escaped. I am delighted for your
good fortune but: your statement of the ease with which you consult
materials constitutes a clear defense of the Jung heirs made by one in
their employ and who seeks to remain in their good graces. Don’t you
think you had the moral obligation to declare this to the CAP
audience, and to make this known as well within your writings?

I knew from the beginning of my research that you enjoyed this
privileged status and therefore, I never took what you said or wrote
at face value. I always scrutinized your conclusions and indeed, I
challenged a major one many years ago at the Sebasco Conference in
Maine. You presented your version of the creation of Memories, Dreams,
Reflections which included a strong defense (if not a total
absolution) of the Jung heirs in the “auntification” debate. In the
question period, I stated that, as you and I had both read the same
documents (all of which I used in Chapter 38 and the Epilogue of my
book), I wondered why you chose to ignore relevant information that
contradicted some of your pronouncements. Your reply to me was
“Because I chose to do so. Sit down.” I, and many others in that
audience, have never forgotten it.

On the positive side, because you are in the employ of the Jung Heirs
and because you are privy to information that others do not have, you
are in the fortunate position of being able to make a genuine
contribution to the history of psychoanalysis and to Jungian
scholarship. This can only (and here I stress ONLY) happen if you are
willing to write honestly, and then to hold your own writing to the
same exacting standards by which you judge (and unfortunately, mainly
condemn) all others. You can not be permitted to issue a fiat by which
you cavalierly seek to destroy the scholarly reputations of others
without providing full documentation for your allegations. You must
realize that you are merely a rival author to all other scholars. You
are not the be-all and end-all, the ultimate authority. Therefore, you
cannot continue to make claims of absolute certainty unless you
provide the proof. If you do continue to make your claims without
making the proof available for scrutiny, your behavior will indeed be,
in the words of my “private source” that of a “thug and a bully,” and
in my words, an act of moral cowardice. It was especially distressing
for me to learn that in the dinner hosted by CAP following your talk,
you raised your glass and invited others to join you in toasting to
“Jung without Bair.” This is not the behavior of a scholar.

This will be my only response to you. I will not engage with you
further until or unless you provide me with the full text of what you
said in your CAP presentation. I conclude my open letter to you by
once again apologizing to CAP and to the international Jungian
community on your behalf because I do not believe that you will have
the decency to do so. Because you intend to attack me in print, I must
ask all the Jung websites to post this letter and journals to print
it. I willl also send it to selected individuals. I regret that I must
involve the Jung heirs, but because you claim to be acting on their
behalf, they should be informed of the very real damage your behavior
does to their reputation.

With deep regret, and most sincerely,

Deirdre Bair

Uddrag af Freud: En Illusions Fremtid 

Fra En Illusions Fremtid:

Lad os forsøge at måle de religiøse læresætninger med samme målestok. 
Når vi opkaster det spørgsmål, hvad dens krav om at blive troet 
bygger på, får vi tre svar, der passer besynderlig dårligt til hinanden. 
For det første: de fortjener at blive troet, fordi allerede vore forfædre 
troede på dem. For det andet har vi beviser, der er overleveret til os 
netop fra denne fortid. Og for det tredie er det overhovedet forbudt 
at opkaste spørgsmålet om denne begrundelse. En sådan dristighed 
blev tidligere belagt med de allerhårdeste straffe, og den dag i dag 
ser samfundet ugerne, at nogen på ny gør forsøget. 
Dette tredie punkt må vække stor betænkelighed hos os. Et sådant 
forbud kan jo kun have een motivering, nemlig at samfundet udmærket 
godt ved besked med usikkerheden i det krav, som det gør gældende 
for sine religiøse doktriner. Hvis det forholdt sig anderledes, 
ville det afgjort med stor beredvillighed stille materialer til rådighed 
for enhver, der selv vil danne sig en overbevisning. Vi går derfor med 
en skepsis, der ikke er let at bortvejre, til prøvelsen af de to andre 
bevisgrunde. Vi skal tro, fordi vore forfædre har troet. Men disse vore 
aner var langt mere uvidende end vi; de troede på ting, som vi i dag 
umuligt kan godtage, Den mulighed anes, at også de religiøse doktriner 
kan være af en sådan art. De beviser, man har efterladt os, er 
nedfældet i skrifter, der selv i sig bærer alle upålidelighedens egenskaber. 
De er selvmodsigende, overarbejdede, forfalskede; hvor de beretter 
om faktiske dokumentationer, er de selv udokumenteret. Det 
hjælper ikke meget, når der for deres ordlyd eller endda blot for deres 
indhold postuleres en oprindelse fra en guddommelig åbenbaring, thi 
dette postulat er selv en del af de doktriner, hvis troværdighed skal 
undersøges, og som bekendt kan ingen sætning bevise sig selv. 
Vi når da til det besynderlige resultat, at netop de af vor kulturbesiddelses 
meddelelser, der kunne have den største betydning for os: 
meddelelser, som har til opgave at forklare os verdens gåder og at 
forsone os med livets lidelser – at netop de har den allersvageste 
dokumentation 

Fra samme værk:

Vi kalder alså en tro for en ilusion, 
hvis ønskeopfyldelsen trænger sig frem i dens motivering,og 
ser derved bort fra dens forhold til virkeligheden, ligesom illusionen 
selv renoncerer på dokumentation. 
Vender vi os efter denne orientering atter mod de religiøse doktriner, 
så tør vi endnu engang sige: De er allesammen illusioner, ubeviselige, 
og ingen bør tvinges til at betragte dem som sande, altså til 
at tro på dem, Nogle af dem er så usandsynlige, i den grad i strid 
med alt, hvad vi møjsommeligt har erfaret om verdens realitet, at 
man – med passende hensyntagen til de psykologiske forskelle – kan 
sammenligne dem med vrangforestillingerne. 

Classical Liberalism vs. Conservatism in Denmark

The debate is swirling again between classical liberals and conservatives. But the two camps actually need each other. Without conservatism, liberalism is a travesty. And without liberalism, a conservative society is repressive.

By Ryan Smith

I myself am a classical liberal, but I admit it: Looking at the last twenty years of major policy issues in Denmark, namely EU membership as well as the package of problems relating to the non-Western immigration, it’s mainly conservatives who have been right, while we liberals have been far too optimistic.

For example, we were many classical liberals who believed that even though the non-Western immigrants immediately created problems for the existing order, these immigration evils would soon blow over. All we needed was for the immigrants to make their entrance on the labor market. More hands in the labor market meant a bigger economic pie, and on the whole “people are ultimately steered by economic (rather than cultural) interests”, said the liberal logic. For the same reasons we were many who gladly welcomed any further strengthening of the EU-node: Every step towards a closer union was of course also a step towards greater free trade – or so we thought.

Many years later, we can see that the non-Western immigrants cannot simply be integrated and that they still show up in all the wrong statistics. And the EU, which many liberals once saw as a hope in the fight against regulation and monopolies, has now ended up as its very own brand of postmodernist regulatory hell. In both areas, it was the conservatives who were first to say no, and in both areas it was the conservatives who were right.

Although I am a classical liberal, I recognize that conservative thinkers and conservative politics historically have had a great deal of the credit for the ‘liberal’ success like the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA, as these have unfolded in the best periods of these countries. Liberalism without conservative moderation all too easily becomes a parody of itself, a kind of right-wing utopianism, where people want to abolish national borders, police, military and taxation. A mirage that – somewhat like communism – looks good on paper, but is guaranteed to lead to death and destruction if implemented.

I therefore recognize that liberalism needs conservatism. Yet I am still a classical liberal. For a purely conservative society is not a society that I personally would like to live in. If liberalism without conservatism becomes a right-wing utopianism, then a conservative society that does not have a liberal gadfly to keep it on its toes tends to stagnate and become repressive: To become a strict ‘father state’ which discriminates ruthlessly against religious, sexual, and political deviants.

A purely conservative society resembles those found in antiquity, where even a democratic state like classical Athens ended up condemning a deviant like Socrates to death for presenting the city’s young people with ideas other than those of the establishment. Contrary to what many of my contemporaries seem to believe, democracy is not in itself a guarantee against the unnecessary discrimination of misfits, which the disgraceful treatment of homosexuals in contemporary America proves to the fullest.

In addition to continuously challenging the existing order, the liberal opposition can also play a crucial role for the Conservatives, as classical liberals like to remind anyone who will listen that the state is too large (always too large) and that state power should be constitutionally limited. Briefly stated, the liberal reminds the powers that be that the preferred civil values of the state should not be enforced by the police power, which ultimately is what conservatives argue for when they want to ban certain symbols or items of clothing from the public sphere.

I’m not saying that all conservatives need to be reminded of this lesson, simply because they are conservatives. Within the conservative ranks there is an excellent tradition in which conservatives fight, first and foremost, for the right of free people to choose, of their own free will, to honor and live by their traditional values. But against this tradition, there is also a more state-friendly conservative tradition, which has an unfortunate tendency to want its preferred values enforced by law.

The conservative intelligentsia in Denmark is troubled by the fact that this country does not (any longer) have a strong conservative tradition that is of the people in the same way that it once had. After half a century of socialist majority governments, we know that the people have been accustomed to think of civil society as something that the state is in command of and that the individual does not need to take responsibility for his own life. This development makes it inherently difficult for today’s conservatives to win support for their views by appealing directly to the public. Hence they compensate by succumbing to the intellectually lazy solution: To get the state to enforce the value policies they happen to like best.

No matter how many laws you manage to force through, you do not foster a genuine conservatism that way. You cannot create a public sentiment of conservatism from above, by means of the state. A true conservative society is the opposite of a society in which all decisions regarding civil life emanate from parliament. This also means that the more conservative commentators help to politicize civil society, the more they also counteract their own long-term goals, as they leave more and more up to a future socialist majority.

So dear conservatives: Get to work. Get out of the armchairs and drop the idea of introducing the ‘right’ values per government decree. The real conservative work is to raise a conservative culture among the population in this country after 50 years of social democracy. And you have to start from the bottom.

Velfærdsstatens fortid og fremtid

Tirsdag d. 24. april kunne økonom og forskningschef i den borgerligt-liberale tænketank CEPOS Henrik Christoffersen præsentere sin nye bog, Den mindst ringe, for et interesseret publikum. Bogen er med Christoffersens egne ord en opsamling på adskillige års forskning i velfærdsstaten.

Ifølge Christoffersens analyse kan velfærdsstatens historie inddeles i tre hovedfaser: (1) Dens indstiftelse i 1950’erne. (2) Dens opstigen og dominans fra ca. 1960 til 1995. (3) Dens nuværende status som slagmark for modsatrettede interesser.

Velfærdsstatens begyndelse

For at blive klogere på velfærdsstatens spæde begyndelse har Christoffersen været på jagt i arkiverne for at finde ud af, hvad den oprindelige motivation for indstiftelsen af velfærdsstaten var. Ifølge Christoffersen var velfærdsstaten oprindeligt tænkt som en pragmatisk samfundskontrakt mellem frie mennesker. Argumenter om økonomisk rationalitet og langsigtet rationalitet var i højsædet. 1950’ernes velfærdsstat var ikke et moralsk projekt, men essentielt tænkt som en forsikringsordning, som staten blot var tovholder på.

Her giver Christoffersens analyse ham anledning til en sammenligning med Schweiz: I 1950’erne lignede Danmark og Schweiz hinanden på en lang række områder. Siden da besluttede de sig begge for at satse på velfærd. En afgørende forskel var dog, at mens Danmark lod staten stå for ydelserne, så påbød man i Schweiz borgerne at erhverve sig sundhedsforsikringer på et privat marked. Denne forskel skulle vise sig at blive afgørende for schweizernes succes med at holde kvaliteten af disse ydelser oppe, og omkostningerne nede.

Velfærdsstatens storhedstid

Den tidlige velfærdsstat var fortrinsvis skruet sammen af økonomiske eksperter og betonede langsigtet økonomisk rationalitet. Sætter vi vækst i højsædet, vil kagen blive ved med at vokse, og der vil over tid blive mere til alle. Men økonomerne havde ikke forudset, at ikke alle har en præference for at handle langsigtet.

Velfærdsstaten kunne nemlig ikke kun bruges til at sikre udsatte borgere et eksistensminimum. Den kunne også anvendes som løftestang for kortsigtede egeninteresser. I stedet for et bredt samvirke, hvor alle samfundsgrupper samarbejder om at få kagen til at vokse mest muligt, kan en mere snæver koalition også koncentrere sig om at omfordele mest muligt af den eksisterende kage til sig selv.

I velfærdsstatens anden fase går velfærdsstaten fra at være et pragmatisk og universalistisk projekt, hvor selv A.P. Møller skulle have folkepension, til at blive et moralsk projekt, hvor de velstillede var forpligtet til at dele ud af deres indkomst. Velfærdsstatens grundfortælling skifter fra den jordnære forestilling om en gensidig forsikringsordning til at blive et moralsk og idealistisk projekt, hvor de rige ensidig forpligtelser overfor de fattige. Pligter og rettigheder adskilles, sådan at den, der er mindrebemidlet, altid har krav på ydelser, uanset hvordan han i øvrigt opfører sig.

Christoffersen fremlægger her citater fra periodens velfærdstænkning: Velfærdsstatens særlige konstruktion, hvor rettigheder og pligter er adskilt, kræver af sine borgere, at de er solidarisk sindede. Fra oprindeligt at være en overbygning til det samfund, der i forvejen eksisterede, bliver velfærdsstaten nu en toneangivende institution med autoritet til at kræve bestemte sindelag af sine borgere.

At være uenig med velfærdsstatens politik anses nu ej længere som et spørgsmål om økonomi eller politik. Det er en moralsk brøde.

Velfærdsstatens fremtid

Afslutningsvis gør Christoffersen status over velfærdsstatens fremtidsudsigter. De senere års udvikling har truet velfærdsstatens eksistensgrundlag, både indefra og udefra. Udefra udfordres velfærdsstaten af den økonomiske globalisering. Udlandet kan i stigende grad producere de ting, vi vil have, billigere og bedre, end vi selv kan. Danmark er ikke længere så konkurrencedygtigt, som det var engang.

Samtidig er velfærdsstaten løbet ind i finansieringsproblemer. Flere og flere vil nyde, og færre og færre vil yde. Dog uden, at befolkningen synes indstillet på at indskrænke antallet af danskere, som har krav på ydelser og overførsler fra velfærdsstaten.

Resultatet bliver den gradvise forringelse af velfærdsstatens ydelser. Almindelige danskere efterspørger i stigende grad privatskoler og private sundhedsforsikringer. Vi ved godt, at velfærdsstaten er blevet economy class, og at denikke leverer ydelser af samme kvalitet, som borgerne i andre Vesteuropæiske lande nyder godt af. Men samtidig synes tiden ikke rede til et opgør.

Velfærdsstaten udhules i det stille, snarere end den beskæres i det åbne.

Human or Objective? – An Answer to ‘The Moral Landscape Challenge’

Dear Dr. Harris

Thank you for your continued contribution to the public debate concerning science and religion, as well as your willingness to take on the tough questions that concern us all.

You have recently issued a public challenge for readers to refute the central thesis of your book, ‘The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values‘. Please allow us to point to some reservations regarding the thesis of your ambitious book.

(1) The book’s subtitle says that science can determine human values. With that, we agree. Insofar as similarities can be found in human populations across the globe, these findings do indeed constitute a case for science determining human values.

However, throughout the book the term human values is then bolstered with some pretense to be objective values. The book argues the existence of a morality that is objective and scientifically true based on a series of hard-wired tendencies in the human brain. Excuse us, but all that means is that this morality has been evolutionarily beneficial to the human species. In no way does it assert that these values are objective.

As William James has said in ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience‘, the human brain in its normal state is not necessarily objective. The human brain has evolved capabilities that ensure our survival, but which do not necessarily render reality as accurately as possible or process moral questions as objectively as possible. Your own experiences with psychedelics and meditation will no doubt have hinted this same thing to you: The sum total of possible perceptions and judgments that are objectively there for us to perceive is infinitely vast compared to the humbling subset of perceptions and judgments that we actually do perceive.

In his ‘Descent of Man‘, Charles Darwin himself considered the notion of morality to be a byproduct of evolution; just one more effect of natural selection working upon the raw material of the species. So again: Insofar as the science presented in your book is correct, you are right that science can determine human values. But human values are not necessarily objective values in the sense that they would be valid independently of our species as collective subject.

(2) It is enormously high-minded of you to air the possibility that you might be convinced and recant your view by an argument submitted in this challenge. The probability of that happening through any argument, however, is much lower than first meets the eye. As peer-reviewed studies by Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Spassena Koleva and others have shown in recent years, there are considerable variations in the moral instincts of people.

According to these studies, a difference in moral instincts is one of the roots that sprout to create different political affiliations on the emergent level.  Liberals chiefly care about fairness and not harming the weak. Conservatives primarily care about loyalty, authority, and sanctity, and Libertarians mainly care about freedom. In your book, you aim to separate “genes from memes”, but according to the findings of these scientists, these variations in moral instinct are partially genetic.

Such variations in instinct, even within the same species, are in accordance with the ‘Baldwin effect’ as known from developmental biology. Daniel Dennett has referred to this effect as being “no longer controversial” in science and it presumes a developmental framework of epigenesist, phenotypic plasticity. If such mechanisms are indeed at work in shaping our instincts, including our moral instincts, then the premise of separating genes from memes cannot be meaningfully upheld.

(3) In your book, you propose to contest the findings of Haidt and others by conjecturing that “conservatives have the same morality as liberals do, they just have different ideas about how harm accrues in this universe.” But by this argument, any morality could potentially be said to be the same morality as any other morality, albeit with “different ideas about how harm accrues in this universe.” Where a liberal might see cuts in social security as doing harm to society’s poorest, a libertarian might see their continued existence as doing harm to his negative liberties. The differences in empirical data are there, yet your book reasons that these differences are merely different manifestations of the same ultimate morality.

As you do not establish a definitive demarcation line between one and the other, this manner of reasoning must leave you, or some other subject, as the umpire of when these occurrences in the empirical data do indeed constitute a meaningful difference (Haidt), a non-meaningful difference (Harris) or an instance of “moral confusion” (which is how you characterize morality of political Islam in your book). Thus, by the manner of reasoning employed in the book, empirical data acquired through science cannot stand on its own as objective data, but is in need of some subjective interpretation. If two bright, young, well-educated and scientifically minded gentlemen such as Dr. Haidt and yourself cannot even agree on whether what we are seeing in the empirical data is one or several moralities, this constitutes ample illustration that whatever objective data we have to work with cannot be interpreted objectively on its own account, but must be subjected to subjective interpretation in order to make sense to us.

***

So this constitutes our argument against the thesis of your bold and adventurous book: We agree that science can and should be used to establish an inquiry into human values. We also agree that science can determine what those human values are. But human values are not necessarily objective, and if they are, there is no way to assert that their objectivity without involving memes and subjectivity.