Category Archives: Politik

Om venstrefløjens barnlighed

tesfaye

Hvorfor går venstrefløjen amok i personangreb og nægter at forholde sig til substansen, selv når den kommer fra en af deres egne, som ovenikøbet vil dem det godt?

Måske fordi nogle mennesker (uanset deres faktiske alder) lever i et børneunivers, hvor de aldrig har set den ubehagelige erkendelse i øjnene, at voksenlivet kræver ansvarstagen og svære beslutninger, og at ingen andre kan løfte den byrde for en.

Kort sagt: Det er mennesker med behov for voksenfigurer, der kan tage ansvar for dem, der bliver tiltrukket af de partier, som tillader dem at blive i den psykiske barndom (“Tjener bankdirektøren mere end dig? Her, tag nogle flere lommepenge fra de voksne.”)

Raseriet mod Tesfaye kan ikke forklares politisk. Han har jo ikke gjort andet end at pege på det, som alle i forvejen ved. Raseriet mod Tesfaye er psykologisk: Han har svigtet den forælder-projektion, som hans vælgere har tilskrevet ham. Tesfaye bryder den implicitte kontrakt og siger til sine børn, at de bliver nødt til at blive voksne. Børnene beskytter sig ved at forstærke sig selv i børnerollen: De nægter at forholde sig til, hvad han siger, og angriber ham personligt i stedet. “Dumme far! Hader far!”

Keynes som figenblad

Forbrugspolitik og voksende offentlig gæld er yt. Men hvad gør man så, når man synes, at staten skal blive ved med at vokse? Man undlader at kalde sig selv socialist – man anvender Keynes som figenblad.

Af Ryan Smith, journalist og forfatter

To økonomer sidder og får sig en øl: ”Har du hørt, at min kone er keynesianer?” siger den ene til den anden. ”Jo, hun har altid travlt med at spendere sig ud af en depression.”

Den pointe, der ubesværet byder sig til, når man analyserer ovenstående vittighed er, at mange af de debattører, der i dag går rundt og kalder sig keynesianere, i virkeligheden gør det af opportunisme. Som med konen i vittigheden ovenfor, så holder disse debattører mægtig meget af forbrug, og det altså uden at de nødvendigvis har sat sig synderligt ind i Keynes’ tanker.

Ikke desto mindre går de dog omkring og kræver ”keynesianske” løsninger. Snart på det ene og snart på det andet. ”Keynes” er blevet det magiske ord. Det saglighedsskabende figenblad, som man kan smykke sig med for at lede fokus væk fra, at det, man egentlig ønsker, er en offentlig sektor, der helst skal være så stor som muligt. Et synspunkt, der ikke har meget at gøre med Keynes’ egen idé om at øge det offentlige forbrug som et midlertidigt tiltag i krisetider.

Med ufrivillig hjælp fra Keynes og fra figenbladets sagliggørende slør er det således kommet i stand, at hvad der før hed socialisme, nu om dage har det med at blive kaldt keynesianisme. Men det er falsk varebetegnelse, og figenbladets bedrag bliver tydeligt ved, at Keynes ikke selv var socialist: Keynes skrev uden blusel om socialismen som en doktrin for ”ulogiske og sløvsindige” mennesker, og for Keynes var det et mysterium, hvordan intelligente mennesker dog kunne tro på de rødes ammestuefortællinger om klassekamp og udbytning af arbejderen. I Keynes’ verden var den slags blot barnligt nonsens.

Keynes var altså ikke socialist. Han var økonom, uddannet i klassikerne på Eton og Cambridge, og således en mand der med indsigt i økonomernes læresætning om de såkaldte ’komparative fordele’ forstod, hvorfor international frihandel i udgangspunktet er en ganske god idé.  Ganske vist nåede Keynes at skrive sig ind i adskillige (og indbyrdes modstridende) holdninger til frihandel i løbet af sin karriere, men ifølge forfatteren Hunter Lewis, der har beskæftiget sig indgående med Keynes, så holdt Keynes aldrig op med at se international frihandel som det naturlige udgangspunkt for verdensøkonomien og for et tolerant og åbent samarbejde mellem nationer.

Med denne indsigt kan vi således se, at den historiske Keynes er milevidt fra vor egen tids figenblads-keynesianere. For figenblads-keynesianere er i virkeligheden blot socialister, og socialister er på en eller anden måde er kommet frem til, at frihandel er noget farligt noget.

Hvad en given ”keynesianer” synes om frihandel, er således den perfekte lakmusprøve på, hvorvidt vedkommende er en ægte keynesianer eller en figenblads-keynesianer:  Om han (som Keynes) blot tror på øget offentligt forbrug som et midlertidigt kriseværktøj, eller om han i virkeligheden er en socialist, som har lært at sige ”Keynes” som en slags trylleremse, der kan maskere hans kærlighed til dækningsløst forbrug.

Krugman som case study

Hvis der er én person, som inkarnerer denne konflikt imellem de halv- og helstuderede keynesianere, så er det nobelpristageren Paul Krugman, som også er professor i økonomi på Princeton universitet. Her taler vi selvsamme Krugman, som også danske politikere og meningsmagere undertiden har henvist til i deres argumentation (eks. Mogens Lykketoft, Berlingske 05.08.2010, samt Lars Trier Mogensen, Politiken 03.06.2011).

Krugman har altid været keynesianer, men i den tidlige del af sin karriere (da Krugman var mere ortodoks som økonom) der var han også glødende tilhænger af frihandel. I 90’erne skrev Krugman f.eks. bogen ’Pop Internationalism’, som leverede en knusende kritik af de moderigtige venstrefløjsfolk, der, med nyopfundne og uunderbyggede ideer på plakaten, skæpper op for at modsætte sig frihandel.

Vi kender også disse ”pop-internationalister” i Danmark: De er venstreorienterede typer, som gerne taler flot og længe om internationalt samarbejde og om deres bekymring for folk i den tredje verden. Men de forblommede ord falder til jorden, når de udsættes for lakmusprøven: I praksis modsætter de sig nemlig frihandel, og dermed spænder de også ben for den tredje verdens mest oplagte mulighed for nogensinde at komme til at stå på egne ben.

Ifølge Krugman er disse ”pop-internationalister” folk, som godt kan lide at fremstille sig selv som havende et globalt udsyn, men som i praksis ikke har det. Men det var alt sammen, før Krugman blev gjort til ikon for den internationale venstrefløj, der som sagt har det svært med frihandel.

Siden Krugmans kanonisering som venstrefløjsikon har han derfor ikke skullet have klinket noget: Siden da har han nemlig været ”strategisk tavs” om, hvad han egentlig mener om frihandel, hvilket er højst usædvanligt for en mand, der vel bedst kan beskrives som en art ’økonomernes Robespierre’: Som en bulldog af en økonom, der altid har stået klar med en passioneret brandtale til fordel for sin egen holdning og med et lige så passioneret personangreb på enhver, som der ikke lige kunne tilslutte sig hans holdning.

Der er også figenblade i realpolitikken

Indtil nu har vi mest set på debattens overordnede linjer. Men kigger vi nærmere på realpolitikken, så finder vi også her en uhæderlig tendens til at forvanske realiteterne omkring, hvad det egentlig er, der sker med det offentlige forbrug i Europa.

Først lidt kontekst: Da finanskrisen ramte, var de politiske fløje uenige om løsningen: På højrefløjen mente man, at krisen skulle håndteres ved ”at spænde livremmen ind”, dvs. ved at bruge færre penge i den offentlige sektor. Men på venstrefløjen lunede man sig istedet ved tanken om keynesiansk inspirererede ”vækstpakker” og ”kickstarts” – det vil sige ved mere gæld og et højere offentligt forbrug, hvilket i øvrigt også var, hvad S og SF gik til valg på.

(Teksten fortsætter efter billedet.)


I den forbindelse anføres det ofte fra venstreorienterede, at det borgerlige bud på en løsning ”har fejlet.” At besparrelser simpelthen ikke har virket, og at de keynesianske ”kickstarts” med gældsstiftelse og et højere offentligt forbrug derfor er påkrævet (eks. Morten Bødskov, Kristeligt Dagblad 16.02.2011, samt Henrik Herløv Lund, Avisen.dk 01.12.2011).

Men dette postulat om, at besparelser i det offentlige ikke har virket, har et problem: Det har ikke hold i virkeligheden. Det er blot endnu et figenblad, som forbrugsivrige mennesker kan holde op for deres intellektuelle ædlere dele i et forsøg på at fremvise en fernis af saglighed.

Kigger man tallene efter, sådan som den fransk-amerikanske økonom Veronique de Rugy har gjort, så viser det sig nemlig, at de offentlige besparelser, som venstrefløjen har besunget som var de ødelæggelser af bibelske dimensioner, slet ikke har fundet sted i Europa. Ifølge de Rugy så har besparelserne på de offentlige budgetter været beskedne, grænsende til det insignifikante, og nedbringelsen af den europæiske gæld er i stedet foregået ved, at Europas regeringer har ladet skatterne stige.

Ser man f.eks. på den britiske premierminister David Camerons virke, så lovede han under sin valgkamp, at han ville skære dramatisk i samtlige af de britiske ministeriers budgetter. Cameron lovede tillige, at han ville gennemføre en ”seriøs” tilbagetrækningsreform, og at han ville sætte skatterne ned. Men går man Cameron efter i bedene, så viser det sig, at virkeligheden er en anden: Det offentlige forbrug er fortsat med at stige, blot med lidt langsommere hastighed end under den nuværende regerings forgængere.

Ligeledes mener Rugy at finde samme mønster i Frankrig, Spanien, og andre europæiske lande. Ifølge de Rugy så snakker de europæiske lande om at nedbringe deres gæld gennem en blanding af skattestigninger og offentlige besparelser, men i virkeligheden er det sådan, at skattestigningerne indtræffer, mens sparrelserne på de offentlige budgetter forbliver ved snakken

Såvel på debattens overordnede linier som på den konkrete realpolitik ser vi altså, at debatten om Keynes ikke er hæderlig, men at hans navn bliver anvendt som et figenblad, der skal maskere det bagvedliggende ønske om permanent vokseværk i den offentlige sektor.

Et ønske, som Keynes selv ville have været imod.

Guide til at blive rød politiker

af Ryan Smith

Du er ung, og du vil gerne ind i politik. Du er også rød, fordi “det er man bare,” hvilket vil sige, at du påtænker at stille op for S, SF eller Enhedslisten.

Du vil gerne ind og være MF’er. Og hvorfor ikke? Det er jo en fed hyre, og så behøver man ikke lave så meget. Og i modsætning til andre stillinger, som ville kunne indbringe dig lignende beløb, så behøver du hverken ekstraordinær snilde eller at gennemføre en lang og svær uddannelse, før du kan se pengene rulle ind. Ja, faktisk behøver du slet ingen uddannelse. Men det ser dog bedst ud, hvis du har ladet dig indskrive et sted, sådan at du har en uafsluttet BA i et eller andet samfundsvidenskabeligt, såsom afrikastudier.

Hav en vision

At stille op som rød MF’er kræver først og fremmest, at du har en vision. Der er ingen i politik, som har visioner, og det er derfor, det går så dårligt. Hvad din vision består i, er ikke så vigtigt, men dog er det af yderste vigtighed, at din vision aldrig under nogen omstændigheder vil kunne klare sig på markedsvilkår eller på anden vis kan risikere at tjene sig selv hjem.

Sikre visioner inkluderer, at Danmark skal bestå af 100% økologi og samtidig køre på 100% vindmøller. Tilhører du socialdemokraternes højrefløj, så kan du dog også klare dig med mere moderate visioner om, at “det, Danmark skal leve af i fremtiden” er at eksportere velfærd til andre lande.

Omtal altid din vision som ”langsigtet politik,” mens du konsekvent afviser enhver kritik af din vision som ”kortsigtet vanetænkning.” Giv også din vision en positivt-klingende overskrift à la ”grøn vækst,” som ingen rigtig ved, hvad dækker over. Det er ikke de kritiske vælgere, som du er ude efter.

Forbyd noget

Nu har du fundet dig en vision, og så er du faktisk allerede halvt i mål. Din vision er nemlig det eneste selvstændige tænkearbejde, du nogensinde kommer til at lave i din karriere som rød MF’er. For skulle du nogensinde gå hen og blive minister, ja, så vil du meget hurtigt gå hen og give de blå ret i alt det, du benægtede, mens du var i opposition. Debatter i Folketinget behøver du heller ikke argumenter for at vinde: Alt, hvad dine modstandere foreslår, kalder du nemlig blot for en ”velfærdsmassakre,” uanset om der faktisk skæres i velfærden eller ej.

Nu har du lagt dig fast på en vision, men hvor der er plus, er der også brug for et minus. Du må altså også finde noget, som du ikke bryder dig om, og som du derfor vil have forbudt. Når du taler om din vision, så lyder du fremsynet, men for en rød MF’er som dig, så består mindst halvdelen af jobbet i at lyde indigneret.

Nu kan du måske gå hen og blive urolig og føle dig snydt over udsigten til også at skulle finde på et forbud. Jeg lovede jo, at der ikke ville være meget tænkearbejde involveret i din karriere som rød politiker. Men bare rolig: Du kan faktisk forbyde hvad som helst. Du slår bare op i ordbogen og vælger en tilfældig ting, som du vil forbyde. Der er ingen i rød blok, som vil bemærke det. Så se at finde dig et forbud. Det tæller altså ikke som arbejde.

Peg fingre

Til sidst er der prikken over i’et. Glasuren på din kage. Geden på dit bjerg. Du må finde dig en fjende. Når man er venstreorienteret, så ligger det i kortene, at man er et bedre menneske end andre. Du er selvfølgelig bedre end de borgerlige; det ved du fra DR’s dramaserier. Men der er et problem: Hele Europa er på vej til højre, og borgerlig-bashing har det blot med at skræmme vælgerne væk. Nyrup brændte nallerne til små askepølser på at rive Foghs bog i stykker, og dine forgængere – alle dine forgængere – har prøvet at dæmonisere DF med samme iver og udfald, som når en fireårig stikker en kniv i en stikkontakt.

Nej, du må finde nogle andre at slå på end de borgerlige. Du taber alligevel langt de fleste af dine debatter mod de blå, så det er nemmere, hvis du blot undgår debat.

Den fjende, som du skal slå på, skal helst være nogen, som ikke kan slå igen. Nogen, der ikke kan tale. Nogen, som har en interesse i at fremstå professionelle og respektable, og som derfor ikke har interesse i at blive fanget i et offentligt slagsmål med visionære politikere. AHA! Hvad med bankerne? Måske var det bankernes skyld det hele. Både finanskrisen, de dårlige meningsmålinger og det strukturelle underskud på statens finanser. Ja! Det var sgu bankernes skyld det hele! På den måde kan du også få noget science fiction med ind i politik. Folk elsker science fiction.

Afsluttende råd

Sådan, det var det. Nu er du klar til at være rød MF’er. Herfra skal blot lyde et par afsluttende tips, som du vil finde nyttige på din vej igennem systemet: Husk altid at pege fingre ad folk, som er rige. Og når du selv får mulighed for det, så malk systemet til det yderste. Undskyld dig med, at det var ”særlige behov,” ”personlige valg,” eller at du blot fulgte reglerne. Note: Disse undskyldninger må du dog aldrig under nogen omstændigheder godtage fra bankdirektører og lignende. De har jo hverken vindmøller, visioner, eller lige så stort et hjerte som dig.

God fornøjelse, kammerat.

Hideki Tojo’s Prison Diary

Source: The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 31-85.

Published here for the first time in English is the postwar prison “diary” of Japanese General and Premier Hideki Tojo.

After an outstanding army career and service as War Minister, Tojo served as Prime Minister from October 1941 to July 1944 – perhaps the most critical period in his country’s history. A few weeks after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Tojo was arrested by American occupation forces and then put on trial for alleged war crimes. By all accounts, he conducted himself with dignity and composure during the proceedings. After being sentenced to death, he was executed in December 1948.

Imperial_Japanese_Navy_Flag Written while in prison, this “diary” consists of several essays, a reconstructed daily log of the critical period of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, and answers to anticipated prosecution questions.

Composed in part as an aid in trial proceedings, and in partas an explanation for posterity, this memoir/justification by a central figure of twentieth century history is a valuable historical document. Unknown to the world for more than forty years, these papers were first published in 1991 by historian Sanae Sato in the August and September issues of the Japanese monthly magazine Hoseki.

This translation was jointly prepared by General Hideo Miki, retired professor of Japan’s National Defense Academy, and Henry Symington, an American specialist of Japanese economic and social affairs. This material has been very slightly edited, and clarifying information has been added in brackets.

I. Events Leading to the First Greater East Asian Outbreak

Immediately before the beginning of the Great East Asian war [which commenced on December 7, 1941], Japan was still engaged in the unfortunate Sino-Japanese War, which had already gone on for more than four years. Throughout that period, Japan had made honest efforts to keep the destruction of war from spreading and, based on the belief that all nations of the world should find their places, had followed a policy designed to restore an expeditious peace between Japan and China. Japan was ensuring the stability of East Asia while contributing to world peace. Nevertheless, China was unfortunately unable to understand Japan’s real position, and it is greatly to be regretted that the Sino-Japanese War became one of long duration.

map-japanClearly, this Sino-Japanese War of more than four years was a considerable burden on Japan’s national power and an obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. From the point of the view of the nation’s power, it was obvious that while we were fighting the Sino-Japanese war, every effort was to be made to avoid adding to our enemies and opening additional fronts. Naturally, this was the view of those who then held positions of responsibility.

In the past, the theory had been: Advance towards the north while defending the south, or advance to the south while defending the north. However, as the Sino-Japanese War dragged on, the only objectives that bore consideration were: 1) a swift peace between Japan and China; 2) the maintenance of international peace; and 3) the restoration of national power.

It was for this reason that Japan: 1) attempted to establish peace with China through negotiations, sometimes through American mediation; 2) strengthened the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty [April 1941] in the hope of avoiding war with the Soviet Union; and 3) tried as much as possible to use diplomatic means to respond to signs that relations with the United States were worsening, even though in so doing it was necessary for Japan to endure things that were unendurable.

Despite Japan’s desires and efforts, unfortunate differences in the ways that Japan, England, the United States, and China understood circumstances, together with misunderstandings of attitudes, made it impossible for the parties to agree. Up until the very end, these were important reasons for the outbreak of war, and from Japan’s point of view, this is a matter of great regret.

Thus, England and the United States supported the Chungking [Chinese] government [of Chiang Kai-Shek] in every way, obstructed the peace between Japan and China that Japan desired, and thwarted Japan’s efforts towards East Asian stability. During this period, in July 1939, the United States suddenly gave notice of the abrogation of the treaty of commerce [signed in 1911, its termination restricted the importation of essential raw materials] thereby threatening the existence of the Japanese people. At present, looking back coolly upon the past, I think that both nations have much to reflect upon.

1. Both China and Japan should have emptied their hearts of ill-will, calmly explained their true positions to each other, and reflecting deeply on the fact that they were the corner stones of stability in East Asia, should have more bravely followed the path of direct peace negotiations.

2. Likewise, in dealing with the China problem, the British and American side, which had particularly strong interests in China, should have based its judgments about the origins of the problem on direct observation of the actual circumstances at the time. Moreover, both sides should have considered the point of view and survival of the one billion people of East Asia, who were awakening to world development. Rather than be trapped in the narrow-minded maintenance of old power structures, it was necessary that both sides deliberate together, work harmoniously, and take a broader view of mutual prosperity, cooperation, and the establishment of stability in East Asia.

Note 1. As for the China Incident [the alleged attack by Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking on July 7, 1941, which triggered the Sino-Japanese War] and the problem of whether or not it was possible for Japanese forces to withdraw from China, before concluding for formalist reasons that this was a simple invasion, it is necessary to consider the deeper origins: the exclusion and insult of Japan throughout the entire Chinese region, boycotts of Japanese goods, the infringement of rights and revenues, and violence against resident Japanese. The [Western] powers have had similar experiences with China, such as the exclusion of foreigners in 1899 and the anti-Christian Boxer Rebellion [1899 -1901].

Note 2. All peoples are created by God and have the same rights and freedoms to survive on earth together according to law. It goes without saying that when survival is threatened, struggles erupt between peoples, and unfortunate wars between nations result. Furthermore, in the period when they awoke to world development, the one billion people of East Asia had greater demands to make with respect to their survival because of economic development and unusual increases in population. I believe that it is in East Asia, where these demands must be met.

Of course, the peoples of East Asia have a natural obligation to be grateful for the sacrifice and efforts of the European powers and America in leading the peoples of East Asia to their present circumstances, and they should respect the existing rights and privileges of those powers. The stability of East Asia can be hoped for only if both sides understand and appreciate the other’s position and have the magnanimity to adjust to circumstances. Moreover, this is part of the obligation towards East Asia that the great powers have as part of their fundamental responsibility for ensuring world peace.

3. With respect to the above and considering the case of Japan, recourse to arms has a profound relation to national policy and bears the following considerations: before resorting to military action, it should be strongly deterred at the appropriate time by diplomatic means if necessary. Unnecessary escalation is to be prevented by diplomatic power, and all efforts should be made to keep operations from interfering with policy.

(Explanation 1) On this matter, in the Japanese system [of the 1930s and 1940s] there are many aspects that relate to the independence of the high command. Actions of the high command are not, as in other nations, included in the national government, but are outside and independent of the nation’s constitutional government, and it is natural that they should brook no interference. Consequently, these matters are different from those on which the Interior Minister assists the Emperor. In actions relating to the high command, the Chiefs of Staff of the Imperial General Headquarters, that is to say, the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, have a responsibility that is separate from that of the cabinet, and they take independent responsibility for the assistance they provide the Emperor. According to our current system, in matters pertaining to both sides, this is the role of the Army and Navy ministers.

Consequently, once operations have begun, they are largely conducted according to the independent will of the high command. Frequently, the national government finds that it has no choice but to make the best of things or simply submit in silence. In time of war, especially, these conditions become even more extreme because the Imperial General Headquarters has primary control over conduct of the war, and its word carries much weight.

Even military ministers have no more than a certain amount of control. It is customary that they have the right and the power to participate, from a political and military point of view, in the planning of actual operations.

It is obvious that in purely military matters, it is absolutely necessary that operations be energetically executed, and that military objectives be achieved quickly without any political restrictions. However, unanticipated ill results may ensue when there are delicate policy considerations or when there is an important diplomatic connection. This is to be expected in contemporary warfare because it is often the case that the success or failure of operations is instantly reflected in world conditions.

It is for this reason that relations between the national government and the [military] high command must be harmonized from time to time. This is something to be much reflected upon in the future. In fact, past cabinets have set up regular meetings with the high command and tried to harmonize relations, but such bodies had no formal responsibilities (under the current constitution, each minister counsels and assists the Emperor individually, so organizations of this kind cannot be set up). Furthermore, they were not actually involved in the conduct of operations so their effect was not great. In later years, they were formalized as Meetings of Chief Executives [Liaison Conference], but that probably did not make much difference. This is suggested by the fact that although at that time the Prime Minister attended meetings at the Imperial General Headquarters, it is my recollection that he was not to be involved in the conduct of operations.

(Explanation 2) From around the time of the February 26 incident of 1936 [when an insurgent group of army officers attempted a coup in Tokyo], there appeared in the military trends towards subordinate policy-making (subordinates would ignore the wishes of their superiors) and staff-level control of government (staff officers would seize control, ignoring the ministers and director-generals). These trends were particularly apparent in the army. In that manner, there was a tendency for decisions, entirely contrary to national policy or to top military policy, to be made according to the limited understanding of lower-ranking men, and this, without the knowledge of their superiors. This, too, hindered the smooth operation of national government.

Half of the reason for this was shortcomings in the instruction on staff officer attitude at the War College and deterioration within the military of the psychological and formal feeling of subordination and assistance to superiors. There remains, however, the fact that there had been a loss of ardor and enthusiasm in the spirit of command at the higher levels. There was an absence of strong leadership and initiative, and a tendency to think that given the choice, the best course of action was to do nothing.

After I became Army Minister [in July 1940], His Majesty [the Emperor] told me what he had said to the Army Minister at that time, General Terauchi, immediately after the February 26 incident, namely, that His Majesty was very worried about these matters. After becoming minister, I tried to make improvements. As it happened, at the time troops were dispatched to French Indochina, misbehavior of that kind was detected and those involved – from top to bottom – were firmly disciplined. Later, I worked from time to time to counter those tendencies, but left office before improvements were complete.

As is the case with civilian bureaucrats, the reasons for the abuses committed by lower-ranking bureaucrats are different, but they are the source of the sclerotic manner in which Japan executes policy.

(Explanation 3) For a long time, we have heard about military factions. Also, we have heard for a long time that the armed forces were high-handed, and recently this idea has been particularly widespread. There were many things in the past about which the military should reappraise its own behavior.

Nevertheless, there is something that must be said about military factions. [A reference to the so-called “Control” and “Imperial Way” factions within the Japanese military.]

Today, it is an error to think that there are factions in the military. A soldier holds his rank for life, but his authority begins only when his position is conferred upon him by the Emperor. With this authority comes the right to influence the high command or, according to his position, the execution of government policy. However, as soon as a man leaves the service, even if he had been a general, his authority ceases and he no longer has the power even to adjust the rank of a second lieutenant. If such power were to continue, that would mean the creation within the military of an individual faction, and it would be impermissible. This has always been the case in Japan, and explains why there are no factions in the military.

As for whether or not the military has been high-handed, it is not as though there are no reasons for thinking this is so. This is something that requires self-examination.

However, I think it possible that much of the public criticism about high-handedness arose from the power of execution born of the command/obedience relationship and strength that come from the military’s organization, especially from the importance placed on timing that arises from the requirements of war. I believe that this is what produced the consequences of Explanations 1 and 2 noted above, that is to say, those things that must be acknowledged as highhandedness and reflected upon as such.

4. Later, as operations against China followed natural operational exigencies, the front was gradually expanded towards the south. In order to put a quick end to the Sino-Japanese War, it was necessary first to strike a mortal blow against the Chungking forces [of Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek]. For this reason, it was necessary to strengthen the blockade of the Southeast China coast and to establish a large, new operations route deep into the South.

5. At about that time, in order for Japan to sustain its own people, and because of the necessity of maintaining internal production, and in order to prosecute the Sino-Japanese War, we were faced with the necessity of obtaining such things as rice and oil from the southern islands, including French and Dutch Indochina. Particularly at the time when the United States broke off commercial relations with Japan, and the routes that depended on the United States were cut, the survival of Japan was closely connected to whether or not peaceful commerce would be possible with these southern areas. Consequently, Japan despatched ambassadors and conducted negotiations with these areas, but since they already had hostile feelings, nothing could be smoothly established.

Furthermore, it had been clearly established by intelligence that French Indochina was an important, hidden supply route for [the Chinese forces headquartered in] Chungking. Consequently, it was necessary to cut this off, as part of the strengthening of our China operations. At the time, given the conditions in Europe, France was a friendly nation with a duty to cooperate with Japan. Therefore, the peaceful occupation of Indochina (September 1940) was carried out with the understanding of France. Thus, given the uncertainties in the southern Pacific, and the necessity of putting a quick end to the Sino-Japanese War and establishing the cooperative relations necessary for the survival of both nations, a portion of our military was gradually transferred to southern French Indochina.

However, the British-American side called this a threat to their own territories, and in July 1941, together with Holland, ordered the freezing of assets and, in effect, commenced an economic blockade.

This was a grave threat to the existence of Japan. In addition to this, the British-American side concentrated troops in Hawaii, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaya, and reinforced their defenses. In this way, economic pressure was increased just as the circle around Japan was tightened, and conditions arose that severely threatened the existence of Japan.

(Note) The reasons for the occupation of French Indochina are as explained above, and in outline they were as follows:

(1) To cut the enemy’s supply lines, to make it easier to launch aerial attacks, and to finalize the defenses of French Indochina. This was done on the basis of a mutual defense pact.

(2) Because commercial relations were smooth, trade was facilitated and relations of mutual benefit were established.

The reasons for the occupation of southern French Indochina were essentially the same. However, conditions in the Pacific had worsened, and the need to end the Sino-Japanese War was felt more keenly than ever, and the conditions outlined above were more severe.

One of the reasons that Japan prepared for a passive national defense was the worsening conditions in the Pacific, but this was not the main reason.

6. Since conditions were deteriorating,it was necessary to resolve them quickly. It was proposed that the Prime Minister of the time [Konoe Fumimaro] meet directly with the President [of the United States] so that both could express their feelings and debate the general problems of the Pacific that had arisen between the two nations, so as to resolve these dangerous circumstances by political means. However, even though the United States agreed to this proposal in theory, they claimed that since it was an important matter, they preferred that such a meeting take place after differences of opinion had been resolved. Ultimately there was no such meeting, which was very unfortunate. The Japanese government had thought that a meeting would take place, and actually selected an entourage and prepared a ship.

7. The hope for a peaceful solution by means of a summit meeting thus disappeared, but Japan, wishing to reach a solution through diplomatic means, made several later proposals in response to the American position. However, the United States held firm to its initial position and would concede nothing.

8. Around November 20th [1941], conditions were on the verge of deteriorating even further. In order to avoid a rupture of diplomatic relations, the government resisted strong pressures from the high command and made a proposal containing a number of concessions. As I recall, the proposals were the following:

(1) Neither nation will send military forces to the southern Pacific or to any part of South East Asia other than French Indochina. (2) Should peace be established between Japan and China or in the Pacific region, all Japanese troops in French Indochina will be withdrawn. (3) If this agreement is concluded, all Japanese troops in southern French Indochina will be rotated to the north. (4) Commercial relations will be restored to their former state. Assurances will be given so that necessary materials can be obtained.

9. The United States did not agree to these proposals. Furthermore, it took back what it had previously said about acting as an intermediary in Sino-Japanese peace-making and refused to perform this service.

In any case, if one looks at the circumstances immediately before the outbreak of the Great East Asian War from a Japanese point of view, one notes that the China Incident had continued for more than four years without solution. Efforts had been made to resolve the situation by negotiations between Japan and the United States, but this had failed. Furthermore, in accordance with the requirements of operations, the theater of action of the Sino-Japanese War had moved ever more deeply towards the Southwest and international relations continued to deteriorate.

During this period, Japan’s peaceful commercial relations were successively obstructed, primarily by the American rupture of commercial relations, and this was a grave threat to the survival of Japan. In particular, the economic blockade by the various powers, led by the United States, inflicted a mortal blow to the survival of Japan.

In connection with these multiple economic pressures, the ABCD [American-British-Chinese-Dutch] encirclement of Japan only drew tighter, and defenses in Hawaii, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaya were strengthened. The main American naval forces were shifted to the Pacific region and an American admiral made a strong declaration to the effect that if war were to break out between Japan and the United States, the Japanese navy could be sunk in a matter of weeks. Further, the British Prime Minister [Churchill] strongly declared his nation’s intention to join the fight on the side of the United States within 24 hours should war break out between Japan and the United States. Japan therefore faced considerable military threats as well.

Japan attempted to circumvent these dangerous circumstances by diplomatic negotiation, and though Japan heaped concession upon concession, in the hope of finding a solution through mutual compromise, there was no progress because the United States would not retreat from its original position. Finally, in the end, the United States repeated demands that, under the circumstances, Japan could not accept: complete withdrawal of troops from China, repudiation of the Nanking government [formed under Japanese auspices and headed by Wang Ching-Wei, previously an important Chinese Nationalist leader], withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact [signed by Germany, Italy and Japan on September 27, 1940]. At this point, Japan lost all hope of reaching a resolution through diplomatic negotiation.

Since events had progressed as they had, it became clear that to continue in this manner was to lead the nation to disaster. With options thus foreclosed, in order to protect and defend the nation and clear the obstacles that stood in its path, a decisive appeal to arms was made.

(Explanation) War was decided upon at the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941, and the shift to real operations was made at this point. However, even during the preparations for action, we laid our plans in such a manner that should there be progress through diplomatic negotiation, we would be well prepared to cancel operations at the latest moment that communication technology would have permitted.

II. Concerning the Three Final Problems in Japanese-American Negotiations

1. The demand that Japanese troops be withdrawn completely from China.

The causes of the China Incident were the exclusion and insult of Japan throughout China, the exclusion of Japanese goods, the persecution of Japanese residents in China, and the illegal violation of Japanese rights. As Japan had declared on such occasions, it was thought that the stability of East Asia depended on the close, mutual assistance and cooperation between China and Japan. That Japanese troops were stationed in China at the time was the result of unfortunate incidents and not something that Japan had originally desired. Consequently, there would have been no objection to the total withdrawal of troops should the causes be eliminated, and even with respect to the New China-Japan Treaty [March 30, 1940], discussions were pursued in this fashion. However, this required the elimination of those causes and would have been possible only on the basis of a guarantee to that effect.

To withdraw troops without having obtained such guarantees would be only to repeat what had happened before (the troop withdrawal of 1932 after the Shanghai Incident), and would have caused unhappiness not only to Japan and China but would not have permitted the anticipation of stability in East Asia. On the British-American side the causes were seen entirely to be a Japanese policy of invasion, and little thought was given to actual circumstances. The Japanese policy, as was made clear at the time, was a non-expansionist policy, and it was not carried out as a matter of national intent.

Looking back on that period from the present, there is some cause for self-examination. Even though the Sino-Japanese war was called a non-expansionist policy, it is clear that over a long period events expanded to a wide area. However, this was not the will of the nation but a result of the exigencies of operations, combined with the inability of a weak government to prevent it. The reasons for the latter lie in Japan’s internal systems and traditions.

Whether the fundamental cause was China’s illegal activities or Japan’s invasion may be something of a chicken-and-egg question. The reason was the failure of both Japan and China to understand each other and the inability of America and the European powers to sympathize, without prejudice, with the peoples of East Asia.

2. Repudiation of the Nanking government.

The establishment of a national [Chinese] government[based in Nanking] with Wang Ching-wei as Premier was primarily a domestic question for the Republic of China. Of course, it must be conceded that it was born of the stimulus of Japanese operations, but this is only a secondary reason and not the real reason. As opposed to the Chungking government, which continued to exclude, insult and make war on Japan, the Wang Ching-wei government made overall peace its objective, and attempted to establish permanent peace in East Asia by means of Sino-Japanese mutual assistance. Therefore it was natural that Japan recognize this government and feel friendly towards it.

(Note) When a new government is formed in any country, it is normal to recognize it if it is in harmony with one’s own government, and to show it good intentions. The [Western] powers have done the same in the course of the current war. However, to repudiate a government less than one year after having recognized it would cause the world to doubt a nation’s faith, and therefore it could not be done.

The Nanking government essentially wished for overall peace in China. Consequently, it was thought that when overall peace had been achieved, questions about it would be resolved as a domestic matter. For that, it was necessary that peace be concluded between Japan and China through termination of the Sino-Japanese War. However, even with Japanese assistance, prospects were uncertain, so it was impossible to resolve questions about the Nanking government.

3. The problem of repudiating the Tripartite Pact

The Americans demanded that, “the governments of both parties agree not to interpret any agreements concluded with third countries in a way that contradicts the purpose of this agreement, which is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific region.” This clearly required that Japan breach the Tripartite Pact and that, consequently, was the same as requiring that Japan renounce the alliance.

Essentially, the reason for concludingthe Tripartite Pact was the fact that as a result of the Washington Conference [on naval armaments, in 1922], the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been annulled, and world circumstances were such that Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations [announced in 1933, effective in 1935] because the League would not recognize Japan’s claims. In order to end its isolation, alliance was sought with Germany and Italy, which found themselves in much the same circumstances. Furthermore, it was expected that German power could be used to help in a solution to the China problem. However, if Japan were to accede to an American demand of this kind, it would indicate to the world the untrustworthiness of Japan. In the past, Japan fulfilled the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and at the request of Britain, advanced all the way into the Mediterranean. As is clear from the fact that today, the souls of those fallen [Japanese] soldiers are still on the island of Malta, I believe the world will recognize that Japan is faithful to alliances. [A Japanese destroyer was sunk during the First World War while on escort duty in the Mediterranean, in fulfillment of Japan’s obligations to England under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.] Therefore, Japan could hardly take, for purposes of momentary gain, measures that would cause it permanently to lose the faith of the world.

III. Circumstances Around the Time Of the Resignation of the Third Konoe Cabinet

1. My recollection is that it was at a time when, in accordance with the Imperial Policy Execution Outline adopted at the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, the point had been reached when troops were moved into Southern French Indochina, and the situation had become tense. It was something that had been determined as necessary in order to carry out national policy and, as I recall, we were to be prepared both for war and for peace.

2. The US-Japan summit that Prime Minister Konoe had hoped for was rejected by the American side and did not take place. [The summit proposal was made on August 8.]

There was a difference of opinion between Foreign Minister Toyoda and myself at a cabinet meeting around the 14th or 15th of October. I recall that the points of disagreement were as follows:

(1) My opinion was that, as could be seen from a review of the US-Japan negotiations, Japan had striven for a solution by means of repeated concessions but the United States had stuck firmly to its initial positions and would make no concessions.

(2) US approval could not be obtained for a diplomatic solution by means of the US-Japan summit that the Prime Minister had hoped for. Furthermore, military and economic pressures were being stepped up day by day.

Therefore, if one were to consider that there was virtually no possibility of success through the US-Japan negotiations, the military and economic pressures would only force Japan into further crisis if time were allowed to pass in vain. It was my position that we must recognize that it was impossible to meet Japan’s objectives as decided at the Imperial Conference, and that the time had come to make war on the United States (at the Imperial Conference [of September 6] the start of operations had been set for mid-October). At the time, the high command of the army advocated this (starting operations in mid-October).

3. As opposed to this, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister took the position that the obstacle to the negotiations was the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and that if concessions were made on this point, an agreement might not be impossible. As for troop withdrawal, that was a matter of great interest to the army, which was then conducting operations. There were no objections to withdrawal as such. However, the reasons for the China Incident [the alleged attack by Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking on July 7, 1937] had been the insults to Japan, and the anti-Japanese and illegal acts that had occurred in various parts of China. Therefore, if there was not to be a guarantee that those causes would be eliminated, the result would simply be a repetition of the same incidents. Furthermore, a withdrawal that did not achieve its purpose would demoralize the Japanese army to no avail, and it was feared that it would confirm the American claim that the China Incident was provoked by a Japanese invasion. This was something to which the army could not agree.

At the time, both the high command and the army in the field were firm on this from top to bottom; a withdrawal without guarantees was unthinkable.

Thus, because of this difference of opinion, the cabinet resigned en masse. I might add that I had nothing whatsoever to do with Prime Minister Konoe’s memorandum to the throne on the resignation of his cabinet.

4. On October 18, 1941, I suddenly received a mandate from His Majesty to form a new cabinet. This was completely unexpected, and when I was summoned to the Imperial Palace I thought I would be questioned on the army’s point of view. I took with me documents related only to this.

(1) With respect to the formation of a cabinet, I received an Imperial mandate to return to blank paper [that is, with a free hand to direct national policy] and to make no missteps in policy. Therefore,considering that the national leadership responsibilities of the Prime Minister and Army Minister are different from each other, I was unswayed by the usual claims of the army. Though there were demands that negotiations be cut off and war begun, I was unmoved by them, arguing that so long as there was the slightest hope of a negotiated breakthrough, efforts should be continued.

Since there was no desire on the part of the high command for a troop withdrawal from China, it was determined to seek a breakthrough in negotiations on the importanat matter that had caused a worsening of conditions, namely, the movement of Japanese troops into French Indochina. Even about this, there was considerable unhappiness in the high command.

IV. Various Problems To Which The Pearl Harbor Attack is Central

It is natural that I should bear entire responsibility for the war in general, and, needless to say, I am prepared to do so. Consequently, now that the war has been lost, it is presumably necessary that I be judged so that the circumstances of the time can be clarified and the future peace of the world be assured. Therefore, with respect to my trial, it is my intention to speak frankly, according to my recollection, even though when the vanquished stands before the victor, who has over him the power of life and death, he may be apt to toady and flatter. I mean to pay considerable attention to this in my actions, and say to the end that what is true is true and what is false is false. To shade one’s words in flattery to the point of untruthfulness would falsify the trial and do incalculable harm to the nation, and great care must be taken to avoid this.

As it happens, what has been called the speech of Fleet Admiral Nagano [Chief of the Naval Staff] with respect to the Pearl Harbor attack, was publicized on October 27th. Upon reading it, errors can be found in important matters, and I shall here write the true facts for the benefit of future generations.

1. At the Imperial Conference on December 1, it was decided to make war against England and the United States. How the procedures for the commencement of hostilities were to be carried out was deliberated upon at the Liaison Conference [a joint meeting of civilian and military personnel] where the agenda of the Imperial Conference was discussed. It was decided to proceed according to international treaty and confirm the propriety of those actions while at the same time avoiding a too-early disclosure of our operations. Ambassador Nomura was to deliver a note by hand to the US State Department an hour and a half ahead of time, and the text, as well as the time of domestic notification [within Japan] were to be the responsibilities of the high command and of the foreign ministry. Therefore, I have thought to this day that the notification that Japan was breaking off diplomatic relations and was shifting to the unfettered conduct of its affairs [by declaring war] should have been under the responsibility of the Foreign Minister, communicated without fail. Of course, if there was failure in this matter, I have no argument with the view that, as Prime Minister, the responsibility is mine.

The draft of the final rupture of diplomatic relations was written under the responsibility of the Foreign Minister of the time, and its contents were not reported to the Cabinet.

2. The Imperial Rescript on war, as can be seen from its first page, is directed primarily to the Japanese people. In order that this be made public as soon as possible after the commencement of war, approval from the Privy Council was obtained on the morning of the 9th.

Though this was a domestic matter, if these procedures had been followed in advance, it might have resulted in a too-early disclosure of operations.

In any case, the way the Imperial Rescript was handled was not by any means intended as a means of concealing the attack on Pearl Harbor. On this matter, according to Fleet Admiral Nagano, it was understood that the declaration of war was to be made before the start of the Pearl Harbor attack, before three in the morning, but this is a grave mistake. That is something that the government would not have known about. Three in the morning would mean getting Privy Seal approval in the middle of the night on Sunday, and the government would not have agreed to something so out of keeping with Japanese custom. Fleet Admiral Nagano has probably confused this with the final official note [to the Americans]. It is most unbecoming that the Fleet Admiral should give the world an impression that is not only mistaken but suggests that Japan deliberately delayed the declaration of war.

When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven. It was clear that a great American fleet had been concentrated in Pearl Harbor, and we supposed that the state of alert would be very high. At the same time, since we were approaching with a great fleet of our own, there were grave doubts as to success. It is intolerable to think that on that occasion the government did something incorrect, and we had absolutely no intention of doing so.

V. The Manchurian Incident And International Relations

1. After the first Great European War [of 1914-1918], our country made, as the basis of its foreign policy, the support of international understanding and the development of good relations with the powers.

2. At that time, in China, internal disorders had continued ever since the establishment of the Republic of China [in 1912]. Regional war lords proliferated and the internal disorders due to the struggle between the northern and southern governments did not cease. Even after the beginning of the Showa era [1926] and the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek as Premier, its power was not sufficient to ensure an orderly nation.

3. After the Nine Power Treaty [of 1922] was concluded [at the Washington Conference], American East Asian policy became more vigorous, and at the same time the Communist movement gained strength on the Chinese mainland. International relations, especially concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, became more complex and tense.

4. Despite this situation, the Nationalist government as well as the [Chinese] war lords were taken in by the East Asian policies of such countries as Britain and the United States, and they did not understand our own spirit of justice and friendship. Furthermore, seeing that public opinion in our country was confused, that the political situation was unstable, and that our foreign policy appeared to be unstable, they insulted our nation, took policies opposed to Japan, and continued on a national scale with their resistance to Japan, with such efforts as the boycott of Japanese products.

5. Especially in Manchuria, where our special privileges had been secured, such war lords as Chang Tso-lin, who held real power in the region, failed to understand the true significance of the Russo-Japanese War, and lost their understanding and gratitude of what our country had done on the continent on behalf of the stability of East Asia. They called for the recovery of Port Arthur and Dairen, violated our interests, and took an arrogant attitude. After Chang Tso-lin died [in 1928, in an explosion attributed to Japanese plotters] and the era of his son, Chang Hsueh-ling began, outrageous circumstances only worsened.

(1) Plans were undertaken, with American finance, to build a new railroad that would encircle our South Manchurian Railway.

(2) Farmers from the Korean peninsula were persecuted and attempts were made to expel them. Treaties were spurned, and our interests were destroyed. Further, our nation’s existence was threatened, and there were continuous plots to disturb the peace of East Asia. Our government was patient, sometimes negotiating, sometimes trying to set up agreements. In return, China showed no sincerity whatsoever, and thus arose a mountain of unsolved problems, both great and small.

6. On the night of September 18, 1931, Chinese [?] troops occupying Mukden blew up the South Manchuria Railway, and that became the Manchurian Incident.

On March 1st, 1932, [the state of] Manchukuo was established [in northern China], and this fact was proclaimed both domestically and to the world. That proclamation meant that a peaceful and happy world was to be built by means of the rule of virtue, that peoples would cooperate and contribute to the peace of the East.

On September 15, 1932, its independence was approved, and the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo was signed.

Modkraft-blogger Erik Storrud forsvarer vold

Efter at to journalister måtte flygte fra 25 hætteklædte unge der var bevæbnet med brosten, som kort forinden havde smadret journalisternes sendevogn, tager Modkraft-blogger Erik Storrud nu voldsmændene i forsvar. Hans argument:

At en sendevogn kan blive smadret uden at journalisterne kommer noget til viser i øvrigt en tilbageholdenhed der er prisværdig, når vi snakker om en befolkningsgruppe der slås for deres kulturelle overlevelse.

Det ser unægteligt ud som, at Modkraft-bloggeren forsvarer vold mod pressen.

Kønskvoter som rent seeking

af Eva Gregersen

Allerede i 1982 sagde Margaret Thatcher: The battle for women’s rights has been largely won. Det var det år, jeg blev født, og de erfaringer, jeg hidtil har gjort mig, har kun bekræftet Thatchers udlægning. Jeg har hverken oplevet selv at blive diskrimineret på baggrund af mit køn eller fået det indtryk, at andre (gammel-)danske kvinder blev det – med en enkelt undtagelse, som jeg skal komme tilbage til. Det er min klare oplevelse, at kvinder har lige muligheder for at gøre karriere – at vi ligesom mænd bliver vurderet på den vare, vi leverer. Denne lykkelige tilstand er naturligvis resultatet af mange års kamp, og til de læsere, der personligt har bidraget til at nå hertil, vil jeg gerne rette en tak.

At der fortsat ikke er lige så mange kvinder som mænd i toppen af dansk erhvervsliv mv. er for mig at se det naturlige resultat af den videnskabeligt veldokumenterede kendsgerning, at der er forskel på mænd og kvinder. Bl.a. er kvinder simpelthen mindre interesserede i at gøre karriere og mere interesserede i yngelpleje end mænd. Der findes undtagelser fra denne generalisering – herunder blandt de 14 underskrivere af svaret til Albrightgruppen – men det er netop undtagelser, der bekræfter reglen. Og når kvinder generelt vælger at investere mindre tid i deres karrierer end mænd, er det kun forventeligt, at kønnenes resultater bliver derefter.

Nutidens feminister ignorerer tilsyneladende denne basale sammenhæng mellem indsats og udbytte. Det er som om, de ikke vil acceptere, at man ikke på én og samme tid kan være en nærværende forælder (og trofast veninde og hengiven elskerinde osv.) og hellige sig sit arbejde i det omfang, det kræves for at nå til tops inden for erhvervslivet, kulturlivet mv. Man må prioritere. Og den prioritering er suverænt et personligt valg. Det er ikke en sag for kvindekampen.

Derfor kan jeg ikke støtte op om dagens feministiske agenda. De tiltag, Albright-gruppen ønsker sig for at få flere kvinder til at blive ingeniører og iværksættere og for at ’fremme mangfoldighed’ i kulturlivet, handler ikke om at sørge for lige muligheder, men om at favorisere kvinder på bekostning af mænd for på kunstig vis at opnå resultatlighed.

Min primære anke imod det er, at det er uretfærdigt over for de mænd, der bliver forfordelt, men jeg sympatiserer heller ikke med feministernes optagethed af at sikre sig, at andre kvinder træffer de valg, som feministerne mener er de rigtige. Hvis de synes, det er så vigtigt, at kvinder indtager de mandsdominerede fag, hvorfor starter de så ikke selv en vækstvirksomhed med flere end 10 ansatte eller melder sig ind i en skakklub?

Nutidige feminister modsiger ofte sig selv: På den ene side er der ikke forskel på mænd og kvinder, og derfor skal der partout rettes op på, at kvinder ikke fylder på direktionsgangene, ministertaburetterne og musemsvæggene i lige så høj grad som mænd. På den anden side er der forskel på mænd og kvinder, og derfor beriger kvinder arbejdspladserne med særlige kompetencer så som samarbejdsevner og empati mv. Jeg har fået at vide, at hvis jeg læser en mursten af Simone de Beauvoir på over 700 sider, vil jeg forstå det, men helt ærligt, hendes budskab må kunne formidles på mindre plads – hvis ellers der ikke er tale om hjernevask?

Den ene erfaring, jeg har gjort mig med diskrimination af kvinder, har været i forbindelse med barsel. Det er velkendt, at virksomheder alt andet lige er mindre tilbøjelige til at ansætte en kvinde i den fødedygtige alder end en mand, fordi kvinder tager mere barsel end mænd. Denne såkaldt statistiske diskrimination er velbegrundet, for det er jo et problem for en arbejdsplads at måtte undvære en medarbejder i en længere periode. Selv hvis medarbejderens løn bliver betalt af en central barselsfond, er barslen ikke omkostningsfri for virksomheden, som stadig enten skal undvære arbejdskraften eller bruge ressourcer på at oplære en vikar (der først vil opnå fuld produktivitet, når medarbejderen alligevel er ved at være tilbage). At virksomhederne derfor diskriminerer mod kvinder er selvfølgelig urimeligt over for de kvinder, der ikke vil udsætte virksomheden for den omkostning.

Øremærkning af barsel til mænd ville mindske urimeligheden, men det ville også skabe en ny urimelighed over for de mænd og kvinder, der faktisk foretrækker at lade kvinden tage hele barslen, mens manden koncentrerer sig om sin karriere. En bedre løsning ville være at lovliggøre barselsklausuler i ansættelseskontrakter, så kvinder (og for den sags skyld mænd) kan forpligte sig til ikke at gå på barsel i en bestemt tidsperiode. (Dvs. hvis de går på barsel alligevel, vil de skulle kompensere virksomheden for omkostningerne, som jo kan være en sekscifret størrelse). Det kan måske virke urimeligt over for de kvinder, der ikke vil acceptere denne klausul – men hvis en kvinde ikke vil garantere, at hun ikke går på barsel i løbet af eksempelvis de første to år, er det så virkelig en god idé for det lille konsulentfirma, der er dybt afhængig af den enkelte medarbejders indsats, at satse på hende? Det kan virke barsk at tænke på en fødsel som et problem, som medarbejderen påfører virksomheden, men sådan er virkeligheden for selv den mest velmenende arbejdsgiver.

Tilbage til Elisabeth Rygård. Når nu hun tillader sig at spekulere i vores motiver, må det være tilladt at spekulere i hendes. Hun er filminstruktør, og et af de tiltag, Albright-gruppen ønsker sig, er at »Se på, om der virkelig er nok kvinder på museumsvægge, dagbladssider, TV-skærme, scenegulve og i de filmproduktioner, vi støtter som samfund.« Kan det tænkes, at Rygård mener selv at være blandt de kvinder, hvis film burde have mere støtte – og hvem er det i så fald så lige, der er ude i ’at mele sin egen økonomiske kage’?

Måske mener Rygård ikke selv at være i målgruppen for Albrightgruppens forslag. Men det bringer mig til et andet spørgsmål: Hvor er egentlig ofrene for den manglende ligestilling? Hvorfor hører man aldrig noget i debatten fra de kvalificerede kvinder, der mener at være overset til bestyrelsesposterne og forbigået til professoraterne? Hvis det skyldes frygt for repressalier, kan de jo udtale sig anonymt, hvor identiteten er redaktionen bekendt. Og hvis mænd så gerne vil tage lang barsel, men bare hver især ikke tør være den første på arbejdspladsen til at gøre det, hvorfor har de så ikke forstået at organisere sig? Man kan jo også støtte interesseorganisationer ganske anonymt.

Jeg kender kvinder, som siger, at det er for dårligt, at der ikke er flere kvinder i virksomhedsledelserne, men de har godt nok selv ikke tænkt sig at arbejde så meget, som der er nødvendigt for at nå dertil. Og de mænd, jeg kender, der ikke allerede i dag tager længere barsel end de 14 dage, længes mig bekendt ikke efter en god undskyldning for at gøre det.

Kan det tænkes, at ofrene simpelthen ikke findes? At ligestillingen for længst er opnået, og at feministerne bare mangler at komme videre og forstå, at mænd og kvinder nok er lige – men også er forskellige?

Erhvervsledere i politik

Af Ryan Smith, journalist og forfatter

Tirsdag nat dansk tid tørnede Romney og Obama sammen i den anden af de tre debatter, der skal afgøre, hvem der bliver USA’s næste præsident. Og ganske som i den første debat, så blev Romneys erfaringer som jobskaber i den private sektor fremhævet som en kvalifikation for hans fremtidige politiske virke.

At erhvervsledere skulle ligge inde med et sæt særlige kompetencer, som uden videre kan overføres til politik, er en påstand, som med jævne mellemrum dukker op i den offentlige debat. Ideen kendes også herhjemme, eksempelvis i form af forretningsmanden Lars Kolind, der med ”Kolind-Kuren” søger at revolutionere politik ved at levere ”en ny måde at drive [offentlig] virksomhed på.” (Sådan, hvis han selv skal sige det.)

Stilgrebet er ikke grundløst: Kigger man i forskningen, så har succesfulde erhvervsledere vitterligt en lang række træk til fælles med dygtige politikere. Eksempelvis har de højere abstraktionsevne og en højere intelligens (IQ) end den gennemsnitlige indbygger. De er i gennemsnit mere udholdende i at forfølge deres mål end den øvrige befolkning, og så lærer de typisk af den modgang, de møder, frem for at lade sig slå ud af den. Ligeledes er de i gennemsnit mere assertive og ambitiøse end den øvrige befolkning, og så orienterer de sig efter praktiske resultater og tallene på bundlinjen frem for at fortabe sig i ideologiske abstraktioner.

Der er altså sigende og markant fællestræk mellem dygtige politikere og dygtige erhvervsledere. Men betyder det så, at alting ville blive bedre, hvis storinvestoren Warren Buffet flyttede ind i det Hvide Hus, eller hvis Saxo Bank-stifteren Lars Seier Christensen rykkede ind på Marienborg? Svaret er både ja og nej.

Ifølge Deniz S. Ones, der er professor i psykologi ved University of Minnesota, og som har forsket i forskelle og ligheder mellem politikere og erhvervsledere, er der flere signifikante træk, som de to grupper har til fælles. Men samtidig er der også en afgørende forskel på de to grupper: Erhvervsledere styrer direkte efter målet. Og det er en kæmpe ulempe i politik.

Alle har ret (til godbidder)

Ifølge Deniz S. Ones, så fungerer en succesfuld virksomhed i den private sektor dybest set som følger: En grundlægger har en idé om et mål, som vil gøre virksomheden profitabel. Vedkommende opbygger så en organisation, som er designet til at realisere det mål. Ansatte, som laver ballade eller som ikke leverer varen, bliver fyret eller parkeres på uvæsentlige stillinger langt nede i organisationen. Og den virksomhed, der med størst succes formår at følge denne formel, vinder så konkurrencen på det frie marked.

Helt anderledes er det med politik. I politik er der ikke en chef, som kan hyre og fyre, og som kan belønne folk på baggrund af deres performance. Nej, i politik kan enhver gruppe mennesker, som formår at organisere sig, gøre krav på repræsentation, uanset kompetencer og uanset performance. Og med politisk repræsentation følger også muligheden for at gøre krav på skattekroner til at tilgodese sin personlige særinteresser (tænk blot på Venstres Ellen Trane Nørbys 696 forsøg på at sikre statsstøtte til sin mors museum i Lemvig). Derfor kan politik nemt ende med, at en statsminister sidder tilbage med nogle inkompetente eller illoyale ”ansatte”, som ikke kan fyres, selvom de modarbejder regeringens overordnede mål.

Politik handler således ikke kun om at få den bedste løsning for hele butikken. Politik handler også om forsvare forskellige gruppers fastgroede interesser, uden at skele til hvad der er bedst for samfundet som helhed. Under et parlamentarisk system skal alle fløje spises af med godbidder, og ifølge Deniz S. Ones er det på netop dette træk – at styre direkte efter målet versus at spise alle af med godbidder for selv at opnå magten – at succesfulde erhvervsledere adskiller sig mest fra succesfulde politikere.

Kort sagt så er erhvervslederne altså mere direkte og resultatorienterede, mens politikerne er mere indirekte og fokuserede på processen omkring magten. For erhvervslederne gælder det om at være effektive, og for politikerne, så er det, som den amerikanske præsident Harry Truman engang har sagt: ”Hvor end du har en effektiv regering, der har du et diktatur.”