Category Archives: Politik

Humanioraspiralen

Med en række indlæg i engelsksprogede aviser har humanistiske forskere igen fået striden om humaniora til at blusse op. Hvorfor skal skatteyderne fortsat poste millioner i de humanistiske uddannelser? I hvilket omfang skal markedets logik styre humaniora? I hvilket omfang skal statens? Og kan humaniora overhovedet bruges til noget?

Humaniora plages af både interne og eksterne problemer. Udefra presses man af den særegne blanding af erhvervshensyn og administratorvælde, som staten påtvinger de offentlige universiteter. Det er således ikke kun i Danmark, at refrænet om forskning og faktura har lydt. ”Humaniora skal være mere erhvervsvenligt,” får fakulteterne at vide. Et notat fra den britiske regering konkluderede sågar, at universiteterne skulle minde om en art konsulenthuse, der havde til opgave at hjælpe nystartede virksomheder på fode.

Staten fortæller også de humanistiske fakulteter, at de skal ”hæve produktionen.” På dansk betyder det, at de skal få flere studerende gennem systemet, og gerne hurtigere. Således presses de humanistiske undervisere til at lade håbløse studerende bestå. Resultatet er, at der med tiden bliver flere og flere diplombærende humanister, hvis faglighed til gengæld er mindre og mindre.

På forskningssiden betyder kravet om øget produktion, at der skal publiceres mere forskning, og gerne i de tidsskrifter staten har udvalgt. Med den amerikanske filosof Rebecca Goldsteins ord produceres der ”mere og mere om mindre og mindre” – der zoomes obskønt tæt ind på det enkelte træ, men ingen har længere tid til at opmåle skoven. Ifølge den britiske professor i litteraturvidenskab Terry Eagleton er det sågar så grelt, at meget af samtidens humanistiske forskning slet og ret er ligegyldig. Ifølge Eagleton skrives der bunkevis af publikationer, der udelukkende skrives for at score point i embedsmændenes statiske systemer. I mange lande er det nemlig denne overflødighedsforskning, der afgør, hvor mange penge staten tildeler det enkelte fakultet.

Humaniora har således rigeligt med udefrakommende problemer. Men på indersiden melder flere forskere også om fallit. I mange tilfælde er de humanistiske fakulteter ikke længere kulturbærende. Ifølge den amerikanske professor i uddannelsespolitik David Steiner er den fælles kerne af kulturarv, som humaniora burde oppebære, ikke længere fælles og dermed ej heller en kerne. For at behage de studerende undervises der mange steder i Fifty Shades frem for Friedrich Nietzsche og i vampyrfiktion frem for Virgil. Det populære har erstattet det svære.

Til humanioras problemer skal også lægges den politiske ekspertise, som mange humanistiske forskere selv mener, de besidder. Således rapporterer den amerikanske professor David Clemens fra et nyligt møde i verdens største organisation for sprog- og litteraturforskere, at deltagerne havde mere travlt med at fælde moralsk dom over Israel end med at diskutere deres fag. Ligeledes konkluderede en nylig rapport fra Harvard Universitet, at humanioras rolle nu reelt ikke længere er at videreføre og forske i klassisk kulturarv, men at afdække ”skjulte magtstrukturer,” som offentligheden ikke selv er i stand til at begribe.

En udvækst af denne selvforståelse kan ses i både danske og udenlandske aviser, hvor humanistiske forskere jævnligt forsøger at belære økonomer om økonomi. Dette foregår som regel under den belejlige antagelse, at kun humanister kan ”tænke kritisk” og i dybden. Belejligheden er ikke altid til at skelne fra magelighed, da humanisten har det med at afsløre, at han ikke har sat sig ind i grundlæggende neoklassiske principper, før han fremturede med sin kritik af dem.

Ironisk nok tyder erfaringerne fra udlandet på, at jo mere humaniora forfladiger sit emnevalg og gør sig til arnested for venstreekstreme ”magtkritiske” holdninger, des mere svinder offentlighedens lyst til at finansiere de humanistiske discipliner ind. Og logisk svarer staten igen med øgede krav om ensretning og uniformering. Der må jo styr på galskaben.

I løbet af de sidste 50 år er humaniora konstant blevet omtalt som kriseplaget. Men med humanioraspiralens seneste rotation mener flere universitetsfolk, at humaniora måske vil forsvinde helt fra en række universiteter i løbet af de kommende år. Alligevel er det dog svært at tegne et entydigt billede af fremtiden: I Storbritannien og USA bløder flere humanistiske fakulteter med frafaldsrater på op til 60% i løbet af de første to år. Til gengæld konkluderer en ny rapport, at humaniora tilsyneladende har undgået krisen i Australien.

Og løsningen på humanioras krise? I den nylige runde af indlæg er det Eagleton, der kommer det nærmest. Han udpeger bureaukraternes kontrol med universiteterne som den store slyngel og slår til lyd for decentralisering og et universitært selvstyre, der ikke står til regnskab for staten. Hvem der skulle have interesse i at finansiere dét, kommer han dog ikke ind på.

America Universalis: A Republic in Concord with Nature and a Model for all Mankind

The title of this chapter is an allusion to the feeling of exceptionalism that seems to have permeated the Founding Fathers as they laid down the foundations of the American constitution. Sentiments that have been outlined in Isaac Kramnick’s essay on the Federalist Papers (Kramnick 1987). It was thought that the establishment of the American republic would finally free man from the “long shadows of feudalism” and permit him to live in accordance with himself and nature. Thus it was thought that America would be a Republic in Concord with Nature and Model for all Mankind.[1]

The view of the American Revolution taught to me as an undergraduate student of History was that the American Revolution was the philosophy of liberalism brought to political fruition. However the study of republicanist sources and the writings of professional historians, Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment above all, have made it clear to me that republicanism had just as big a part to play in the discussion surrounding the founding of the American state.[2]

Early republicanism in the United States drew heavily on the ancient Roman precedence as well as on the discussion from seventeenth century England.[3] As such, it can be said that there was a common educational and philosophical frame inside which the discussions of the founding fathers took place. The contents of this shared intellectual baggage were, of course, the precedence of the Greco-Roman world, Machiavelli, and the political philosophers of seventeenth century England.[4] To this end, we shall hopefully have made the case for the intellectual continuities outlined in the present paper. But even beyond the Federalist Papers it would be no exaggeration to say that the republican views studied in the following chapters would be representative of figures such as Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, George Washington, Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson.[5]

The American Constitution and the Federalist Papers

Since the time of the Roman Republic itself, no state has come as close to the ideal set fourth by republicanists as the United States of America. Even the framing surrounding the discussion about the American discussion is teeming with references to Roman history. Indeed the United States of America was the first realization of a large republic since the time of Rome itself and it is hard to overlook the symbolism of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay writing under the pseudonym of Publius Valerus, the founder of the Ancient Roman Republic,[6] or the iconography of America having a “Senate” on “Capitol” hill overlooking the “Tiber”,[7] just as there are numerous mentions of Rome in the Federalist Papers.[8]

The American Constitution: A Victory for “Checks & Balances”

In the overall design of the American republic the American federalists did not follow Machiavelli’s call for regal power to any notable extent (the presidency was endowed with only very few political powers). Conversely, in their on rigid insistence of checks and balances, no doubt a contributing factor to the 200 years life span of the American constitution, the American federalists not only emphasize but break with Machievalli’s notion of adaptability and dynamism.[9] As such, they were far sterner in their attitude towards the (lack of) flexibility they would permit with regards to checks and balances, certainly sterner than Machiavelli.[10] Thus the consecutive presidencies of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe were characterized by a championing and an understanding of the principle of checks and balances as an instance that served to limit the nature of government. – In regards to the historical precedence, we may thus note, that John Adams felt that while Greeks may have thought of the principle of checks & balances they had never mastered it. [11] Likewise, the founding fathers disagree with Machiavelli that the framing of a Republic’s constitution should be determined by checks and balances, rather than by the political dynamism generated by a conflict of the orders. Thus the apex of this spirit of checks and balances might be said to be embodied in the Tenth Amendment of the American Constitution:

“The powers not delegated to the United States [i.e. Federal Government] by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”[12]

The introduction of a Senate as well as a house of congress reflects the conflict of orders as it was explicitly stated to represent an aristocracy, albeit not one bestowed by birth but by merit. Thus Thomas Jefferson made his voice known saying they there existed a ‘Natural Aristocracy’.[13] This was thought to be an aristocracy of the spirit, rather than one of heredity which they – along with Machiavelli and others – condemned as harmful. Instead, the image of this ‘natural aristocracy’ seems to have been shaped by another antique idea, namely the humourism of Hippocrates and Galen.[14] Jefferson and Madison wanted for their senators men who could deliberate coolly on matter of state and act as a check against the ‘heated’ mass of public opinion that would surely gain access to the house of representatives.

The Ideal of the Yeoman

Early republicanism in the United States had a strong, somewhat idealistic focus on the Yeoman as the political citizen-ideal. This idea permeated the minds of even great thinkers like Thomas Jefferson who has been called the “philosopher sphinx” of America.[15] The Yeoman was defined as a self-owning farmer, in possession of practical common sense, and perhaps armed as the Roman farmers had been under the Republic, and as Machiavelli had envisioned it for his ideal Republic. In stressing this, the founding fathers aligned themselves clearly with both Harrington’s Oceana as well as with the historical Roman Republic.[16] The self-ownership was seen as the anti-thesis to the oppressing feudalism of the Old World, and as a bulwark against unrestrained majority rule, the maxim being that if the citizens risked loosing their personal property they would naturally be conservatively inclined politically and think twice before enforcing the political oppression of their neighbours.[17] – Thus political theorists such as Thomas Jefferson feared that American political virtue would run out along with the supply of land on the western frontier and that the eventual urbanization of the United States would ultimately lead to a strengthening of the democratic element, on behalf of the more aristocratically-aligned republicanism, as did in fact happen. But these developments could not be regarded as finalized until somewhere in the 20th century and the Yeoman-voter would remain the dominant ideal political discourse throughout the entire debate surrounding the constitution.

To this end we can compare the position of civic virtue as envision by Madison, mostly a reflection of Machiavelli’s vivere civile to the tenets of the French revolution:[18] As the latter was more of an urbanized phenomena it naturally downplayed the republican yeoman-ideal and with it the expectations of common sensical, conservative civic virtue and favoured solidarity and (attempted) fiscal equality instead; – ideals truly foreign to America’s founding fathers. In fact, Jefferson, Madison and others tended to view the American Republic as founded on Nature and thereby as constituting a break away from the artificial, inherited, feudalistic state of the Old World. To them the Republic functioned in accordance with natural law and the nature of man, whereas the French revolution set out to create a better version of man.[19] The Aristotelean/Machiavellian equality of the republic is understood as equality before the law or equality before the republic. Machiavelli recognized the dangers inherent in the extrapolation of a political mindset where the people believe that men should be equal in all respects.[20] This is undesirable as it ultimately leads to a despotism of the opinion of the majority which was also clearly recognized by Tocqueville.[21]

In relation to this view we may note that also Tocqueville observed the brisk aggression of the westward farmers. As has been described by Fernard Braudel and others, these men were not truly farmers but entrepreneurs living on the harsh frontier.[22] They did not wait for the state to approve of their fiscal aggression and lonesome ventures but took their chances and risked everything in pursuit of happiness. This, amongst other things, was what fostered American Exceptionalism.[23]

[1] Kramnick, Isaac: Commentary on The Federalist Papers, Penguin 1987 p. 13

[2] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 507

[3] Ibid.

[4] Also of course the Founding Fathers shared a common background of deism and Puritanism, knowledge of French thinkers such as Montesquieu and so on.

[5] Shalhope, Robert E.: Toward a Republican Synthesis, William and Mary Quaterly, 29

[6] Hansen, Mogens Herman: Den moderne republicanisme og dens kritik af det liberale demokrati p. 76

[7] Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic p. 347

[8] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers: Federalist V, VI, XVIII, XXXIV, XXXVIII, XLI, LXIII, LXX, LXXV

[9] For a discussion of Machiavelli’s flexibility regarding checks and balances, see Discourse III.9

[10] Harrington does not as much deliberate on the issue of the optimum degree of rigidity regarding checks and balances as he simply over-expounds every detail of the republic’s workings.

[11] Although it lies outside the scope of this paper an interesting observation for the reader interested in the American revolution would be the parallel of the French revolution and its disregard for the principle of checks and balances and the consequences that such a republican attitude spawned. See also: Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic p. 347

[12] Various Authors: The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)

[13] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) p. 21

[14] Kramnick, Isaac: Commentary on The Federalist Papers, Penguin 1987 pp. 45-55

[15] Amongst others see, Joseph J. Ellis, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997: ‘American Sphinx’ as well as Kelley L. Ross, 2006: ‘The Great Republic: Presidents and States of the United States of America, and Comments on American History’ in The Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series.

[16] The Romans of Antiquity appear to have honoured the rural castes and their imagined unspoiled rural past and mistrusted civilization and urbanization which they saw as the root of Rome’s political corruption.  See Millar, Fergus: The Roman Republic in Political Thought p. 89 – Furthermore, the alignment with Harrington is no accident as American politicians, such as John Adams, had read Harrington and were familiar with his thoughts. See: Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic pp. 348-349

[17] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers: Federalist X See also: Pocock, J.G.A.: Journal of Modern History 1981

[18] Hansen, Mogens Herman: Den moderne republikanisme og dens kritik af det liberale demokrati p. 43

[19] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 537

[20] Machiavelli, Niccolò: The Discourses I.34

[21] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 538

[22] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 537

[23] See Schmidt, Regin: American Exceptionalism. Nationale Myter, historiografi og virkelighed og Braudel, Fernand: A History of Civilizations pp. 458-480

Roger Scruton om Lighed og Sindelagskontrol

“Det er et ejendommeligt faktum, at et samfund, som er meget optaget af at gøre sine borgere ens, meget hurtigt giver anledning til en kaste, der flyder ovenpå, og som består af de af dets indbyggere, hvis anliggende det er at påføre det øvrige samfund denne enshed,” skriver den konservative britiske filosof Roger Scruton i en af sine bøger. I en konservativ optik har socialisme, socialdemokratisme og socialliberalisme alle det til fælles, at lighed i et vist omfang også er lig med enshed, og at enshed har det med at medføre sindelagskontrol.

Dette ses f.eks. på arbejdsmarkedet, hvor man forsøger at udskamme og kontrollere de parter, der fuldt ud lovligt når til aftale uden om de retningslinjer, som visse parter synes bør gælde for andre. Men det ses også i værdipolitikken, hvor man forsøger at udskamme og udstøde eks. islamkritikere og modstandere af indvandringen.

I sin yderste konsekvens medfører denne tilgang til politik, at det er illegitimt for individet at have holdninger, der går mod fællesskabets. Skulle en arbejdstager hellere ville tage et job hos RyanAir end sidde derhjemme på kontanthjælp, så må han regne med repressalier fra fagbevægelsen. Og skulle en offentlig intellektuel eller kommunalt ansat afsky islam som idé eller modsætte sig ikke-vestlig indvandring (men i øvrigt opføre sig pænt over for muslimer og medborgere af anden etnisk oprindelse), kan vedkommende ligeledes se frem til en opsang fra dem, hvis anliggende det er at påføre andre de rette holdninger.

Det konservative svar er i dette henseende at træde et skridt tilbage og holde en national kernekultur i hævd, som alle kan være fælles om, og som derved danner et fundament for al videre uenighed inden for landets grænser. Sagt på en anden måde: I en konservativ optik er nationalkulturen selve det fundament, der tillader individer at have modsatrettede interesser.

TTIP og frihandel

Hvem kender ikke følgende hændelse: Man har sat næsen op efter en specialgenstand, som man længe har ønsket at erhverve sig. Man klikker rundt på internettet og finder en forhandler, som tilbyder produktet til en markant billigere pris end de øvrige udbydere. Man placerer ordren og glæder sig over det kommunikations- og samarbejdsmæssige vidunder, som internettet er. Men da dagen, hvor genstanden burde ankomme, oprinder, modtager man i stedet en utydeligt skrevet seddel fra Post Danmark, som beder en afhænde 12% af varens værdi i told, 25% af varens værdi i moms, samt et ”importgebyr” på 160 kr., der af kritikere anses som en ren pengemaskine for Post Danmark.

Scenariet har været til almindelig gene for Danmarks indbyggere, så lang tid tilbage som nogen kan huske. Men det har opnået ny relevans i kraft af den transatlantiske frihandelsaftale, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), der netop nu er ved at blive forhandlet på plads mellem Amerikas Forenede Stater og den Europæiske Union. Frihandelsaftaler har altid været kontroversielle, og deres kritikere har sjældent holdt sig tilbage fra at imødegå dem med misinformation.

Fra de første store offentlige debatter om frihandelsaftaler i 1800-tallet og frem til i dag er en række faste stilfigurer gået igen i frihandelsmodstandernes argumentation. Lad os se nærmere på et par af disse.

Ét argument er det nationalistiske: I frihandelsmodstanderens eget hjemland har man angiveligt højere standarder og en overlegen produktionskultur ift. den, der hersker i udlandet. Da det britiske parlament diskuterede en lempelse af restriktionerne på kornimport i 1840’erne, lød argumentationen f.eks., at man ikke kunne stole på, at udenlandske bønder ville høste kornet med samme omhyggelighed og opbevare det med samme ansvarlighed som den retskafne britiske bonde. Det ville således være helt utilstedeligt at lade udenlandsk korn komme ind på det britiske hjemmemarked.

I sin moderne variant lyder argumentet blandt andet, at amerikanerne har ”lavere sundhedsstandarder” end os europæere, og at vi af helbredsmæssige hensyn derfor må holde visse amerikanske landbrugsprodukter fra døren. Ikke kun i tilfælde som med de amerikanske EDC-kemikalier, hvor der måske nok er grund til at være bekymret, men også hvad angår genmodificerede fødevarer, som uafhængige laboratorier for længst har dokumenteret er uskadelige.

Mærkværdigt nok anvendes det nationalistiske argument gerne af de parter, der sædvanligvis har travlt med at lægge afstand til Dansk Folkepartis nationalisme. Disse frihandelsmodstandere ser åbenbart ikke selv, hvordan deres argumentation svarer til økonomisk dansk-folkepartisme.

Et beslægtet argument er det kulturelle: Udlandets kultur er underlødig, mens vor egen er langt bedre. Således har europæiske kræfter været fremme med anmodninger om at få spillefilm pillet ud af TTIP-aftalen. Frygten er, at amerikanske spillefilm helt vil udkonkurrere små europæiske kunstfilm. Men hvis ens ønske om at berige andre menneskers liv med sit kulturprojekt kun kan opretholdes ved, at man straffer folk for at vælge en fra, så skulle man måske spørge sig selv, hvorvidt man befinder sig i den rette branche.

Eksemplet med spillefilm bringer os tilbage til scenariet med glæden ved at modtage en pakke fra udlandet, der erstattes af misfornøjelsen ved at modtage en seddel med opkrævninger fra Post Danmark. Enhver frihandelsaftale kan anskues fra to sider: Forbruger og producent. Når frihandelsmodstanderne taler om udlandets lavere standarder eller appellerer til frygten for, at de hjemlige producenter bliver udkonkurreret, så anskuer de anliggendet fra producenternes side. Men eksisterende producenter har sjældent gavn af en frihandelsaftale, hvis ikke de i forvejen leverer den bedste ydelse. Det er således helt naturligt, at frihandelsaftaler vil tage sig ilde ud, når de anskues fra producentens synsvinkel. Men hvad med forbrugeren?

Hvor producenten må være evigt nervøs for, at forbrugeren skal fravælge hans produkt, så er det entydigt til forbrugerens fordel, at der nu er større konkurrence om at tilfredsstille hans behov. I tilfælde, hvor to produkter er sammenlignelige, vil forbrugeren oftere kunne spare penge i et frihandelsområde. Tillige har empiriske studier vist, at flertallet af forbrugere oplever glæde ved det øgede udbud af produkter og serviceydelser, der ligeledes hersker i et frihandelsområde.

I langt de fleste tilfælde vil forbrugeren stort set ikke have noget at tabe. For det meste vil  han nemlig stadig have mulighed for at vælge de nytilkomne produkter fra. Skulle han personligt være enig i, at amerikanske landbrugsprodukter udgør en sundhedsrisiko, så kan han fortsætte med at købe danske og europæiske fødevarer, der næppe vil forsvinde fra det lokale supermarked som følge af TTIP. Og skulle han personligt være enig i, at amerikanske landmænd er særligt nederdrægtige i forhold til de græske og italienske landmænd, som han allerede samhandler med i dag, så kan også det problem løses ved at fravælge amerikanske produkter.

Endelig er der spørgsmålet om nettogevinsten ved en frihandelsaftale som TTIP. Når kritikerne ser isoleret på spørgsmål om landbrugsprodukter og spillefilm, så forsømmer de som oftest at nævne, at TTIP ifølge uafhængig forskning står til at ville kunne forøge den Europæiske Unions økonomi med ca. 895 mia. kroner, den amerikanske økonomi med ca. 670 mia. kroner, og resten af verdens økonomi med ca. 700 mia. kroner. Til sammenligning anslås den totale værdi af de produkter og ydelser, der produceres inden for Danmarks grænser i løbet af et år, at være ca. 2.230 mia. kroner – altså ville TTIP økonomisk set svare til at vågne op en morgen og erfare, at et nyt Danmark var opstået ud af det blå.

Når vi har mulighed for at lade én teknologi erstatte en anden, så er det misvisende at fokusere på den uprøvede løsnings eventuelle ulemper uden at holde sig bundlinjen for øje. Da vi lod biler erstatte hestevogne, spurgte vi ikke, hvorvidt biler havde ulemper (det havde de), men hvorvidt de udgjorde en netto forbedring over hestevogne (det gjorde de).

Det omtålelige ved frihandelsaftaler som TTIP er, at de fungerer per gensidig aftale. Ønsker man spillefilm fjernet fra aftalen, så er det oplagte forhandlingsinstrument at give amerikanerne et lignende veto, som de kan håndhæve i forhold til aftalen – kan amerikanske øl og vinproducenter f.eks. regne med deres kunder, hvis amerikanske forbrugere pludselig kan købe belgisk øl og franske rødvine til markant billigere priser?

Når først én gruppe producenter begunstiges med særlige vilkår, hvor netop deres forretning afskærmes for den fri og lige konkurrence, så bliver det alt andet lige sværere for politikerne at afvise den næste gruppe producenter, der også ønsker deres forretning beskyttet fra forbrugerens frie valg. Dermed kommer TTIP’s kritikere meget nemt til at sætte gang i et omvendt våbenkapløb, hvor flere og flere brancher tages af bordet, og gevinsten udhules mest muligt. Alle vil naturligvis gerne have, at alle andre bliver tvunget til at konkurrere på fri og lige vilkår. Det vil bare ikke opgive netop deres særlige privilegier og begunstigede markedsposition.

Så lad os håbe, at der ikke lægges for mange sten i vejen for, at TTIP forhandles på plads til gensidig glæde for forbrugere på begge sider af Atlanten. Så vil de hårdt pressede europæiske økonomier også omsider få et skub i den rigtige retning. Og så vil man måske omsider en dag kunne åbne sin postkasse og finde den vare, man har bestilt, frem for en seddel fra Post Danmark.

Western Quotes on Islam

“It is a misfortune to human nature, when religion is given by a conqueror. The Mahometan religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.” – Montesquieu (1689-1755), Fransk oplysningsfilosof

***

“But that a camel-merchant [Muhammad] should stir up insurrection in his village; that in league with some miserable followers he persuades them that he talks with the angel Gabriel; that he boasts of having been carried to heaven, where he received in part this unintelligible book, each page of which makes common sense shudder; that, to pay homage to this book, he delivers his country to iron and flame; that he cuts the throats of fathers and kidnaps daughters; that he gives to the defeated the choice of his religion or death: this is assuredly nothing any man can excuse, at least if he was not born a Turk, or if superstition has not extinguished all natural light in him.” – Voltaire (1694-1778), Fransk oplysningsfilosof og forfatter

***

“Consider the Koran, for example; this wretched book was sufficient to start a world-religion, to satisfy the metaphysical need of countless millions for twelve hundred years, to become the basis of their morality and of a remarkable contempt for death, and also to inspire them to bloody wars and the most extensive conquests. In this book we find the saddest and poorest form of theism. Much may be lost in translation, but I have not been able to discover in it one single idea of value.” – Arthur Shopenhauer, tysk filosof (1788-1830)

***

“We do not know whether Hitler is going to found a new Islam. He is already on the way; he is like Muhammad. The emotion in Germany is Islamic; warlike and Islamic. They are all drunk with a wild god.” – Carl Jung (1875-1961), Schweizisk psykoanalytiker

***

“[E]xamine the Koran, I know that beyond any question every Mohammedan is insane; not in all things, but in religious matters.” – Mark Twain, amerikansk forfatter (1835-1910)

***

“The fact that in Mohammedan law every woman must belong to some man as his absolute property, either as a child, a wife, or a concubine, must delay the final extinction of slavery until the faith of Islam has ceased to be a great power among men. Individual Moslems may show splendid qualities – but the influence of the religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it. No stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith.” – Winston Churchiill (1874-1965), Britisk statsmand

***

“Qur’an… an accursed book… So long as there is this book there will be no peace in the world.” – William Gladstone (1809-1898), Britisk statsmand

***

“The ambassador answered us that [the right] was founded on the Laws of the Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have answered their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise.” – Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), Amerikansk præsident og forfatter til den amerikanske uafhængighedserklæring

***

“…he [Muhammad] declared undistinguishing and exterminating war, as a part of his religion, against all the rest of mankind…The precept of the Koran is, perpetual war against all who deny, that Mahomet is the prophet of God.” – John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), USAs sjette præsident

***

“The civilization of Europe, American and Australia exists today at all only because of the victories of civilized man over the enemies of civilization because of victories through the centuries from Charles Martel in the eighth century and those of John Sobieski in the seventeenth century…There are such “social values” today in Europe, America and Australia only because during those thousand years, the Christians of Europe possessed the warlike power to do what the Christians of Asia and Africa had failed to do — that is, to beat back the Moslem invader.” – Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), Amerikansk præsident

***

“Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam… Those who accept Bolshevism become impervious to scientific evidence, and commit intellectual suicide. Even if all the doctrines of Bolshevism were true, this would still be the case, since no unbiased examination of them is tolerated…Among religions, Bolshevism is to be reckoned with Mohammedanism rather than with Christianity and Buddhism. Christianity and Buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation. Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of the world.” – Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Britisk filosof

***

“The pope gets ridiculed every day, but you don’t see Catholics organizing terrorist attacks around the world.” – Salman Rushdie (1947-), Britisk-indisk forfatter

***

“I must [translate the Qur’an] into German so that every man may see what a foul and shameful book it is. … One is able to do nothing more grievous to Muhammad … than to [translate his] Qur’an … [so] that people may see how entirely cursed, abominable, and desperate a book it is.” – Martin Luther, tysk reformator

***

“It has been our misfortune to have the wrong religion. … The religion of … Muhammad would have been much more compatible with us [than] Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness.” – Adolf Hitler

Beskytter myndighederne forsamlingsfriheden?

Der tegner sig et noget bizart billede af de danske myndigheders ageren i forhold til ytrings- og forsamlingsfriheden.

1. Kort efter attentatet på Lars Hedegaard afholdt Trykkefrihedsselskabet et debatmøde. Her havde myndighederne afvist at involvere sig i sikkerhedsforanstaltningerne. Man overlod sikkerheden til amatører – frivillige fra TFS, som i kølvandet på attentatet mod Hedegaard var overforsigtige med, hvem de lukkede ind. Som følge heraf fik TFS et søgsmål på halsen, og Politiken udnyttede kynisk episoden til at male TFS som racister, fordi de ikke formåede at varetage sikkerhedsarbejdet med samme professionalisme som en efterretningstjeneste.

2. Den jødiske menighed i København har i årevis bedt myndighederne om professionel beskyttelse af Carolineskolen og synagogen i Krystalgade. Men intet er det blevet til, og den frivillige vagt foran synagogen er nu død.

3. Dansk PEN, som har været alt for længe om at anerkende, at vi har et problem med ytringsfriheden, er nu omsider ved at vågne op til dåd. Men det siger sig selv, at der stadig hersker uenighed internt i de pæne ånders klub. Derfor afholder de nu et debatmøde, så de to lejre kan få afprøvet styrken af deres respektive argumenter. Nogle ved dette møde frygter for deres sikkerhed (rationelt, kunne man mene, da en af dem har udgivet en bog med Muhammed-tegninger i). Men dette møde vil myndighederne altså heller ikke beskytte, og mødet må nu aflyses af sikkerhedshensyn.

I politisk teori siger man, at statens opgave med at varetage borgernes sikkerhed, ytringsfrihed og forsamlingsfrihed hører til det helt basale. Kun i anden række kommer så alt det andet, vi gerne vil: Overførselsindkomster, grøn energi og cyklende julemænd på Frederiksberg. Måske myndighederne bør omprioritere?

What would Ayn Rand have said about climate change?

The growing problem of climate change is seen not just in the atmosphere, but in the minds of men as well. It is easy to see how in the olden days, men smoked cigarettes; man was at one with his creator aspect, embellishing himself with an example of the fire he had tamed (and the lung cancer he was seeding) wherever he went.

But today, non-creators and second-handers do not want man to be creative. They want him to be a slave. This is why they oppose smoking. They oppose climate change too, of course, but climate change is just a red herring; the real issue is smoking as will be obvious from anyone who dares to discern the matter through the power of reason, making no excuses for himself and his reliance on man’s highest faculties.
 
The people who oppose climate change may tell you that they want you to ride trains and live in skyscrapers. I, of course, also like trains and skyscrapers (in general, I seem to have something about large and imposing inanimate objects that inspire peculiarly submissive sentiments in my otherwise domineering personality – however, it is very rational since skyscrapers and trains are less emotional than human males).
 
Rational. It is important to use that word when discussing climate change (as it is everywhere else). When people show you charts and statistics and talk about Co2 they are not empowering man’s individual agency. That is irrational. When they smoke cigarettes and live in skyscrapers they are rational. It is good to be rational. And that is how we solve climate change.

A Discussion on Hayek’s Epistemology

A: What do you think about F.A. Hayek’s criticism that economic models can never “exhaust” societal problems and therefore that we cannot rely on them overmuch?

B: Well, Hayek does allow for what he calls “pattern predictions” in some cases, but it’s true that his epistemology often leads him into the position that “we can never say anything about anything.” Overall, I actually agree with him that there’s a lot that we cannot know, but on the other hand, I also think he goes too far sometimes. See, if you’re really a die-hard Hayekian, you would say that thinks that were have evolved “bottom-up”; by having been discovered over time should not be tampered with. – Since we cannot know their full epistemological import, we cannot know that society won’t collapse if we start altering them too radically. But slavery and racism also fit these criteria – they were also discovered over time and evolved “bottom-up.” Personally, I think we can say something about these things and that, no, society won’t collapse because they are abolished. That’s where things can get a bit precarious and I think that Hayek loses himself in his own skepticism.

A: On the other hand, though, isn’t it true that unquestioning faith in economic modelling has caused considerable society damage over the years?

B: Oh yes, it’s very true. Economists have done a lot of damage over the years. But I think it has gotten better. I actually think that modern economics has absorbed a lot of Hayek’s thought, even though his name is rarely mentioned in the textbooks.

A: That may be so, but then again, modern economics has also absorbed some of Keynes’ thought, so couldn’t you argue that the two balance each other out?

B: No, I don’t think so. Intellectually, there’s very little left of Keynesianism in mainstream economics. Even modern Keynesians openly tend to say that they have no theory; no intellectual leg to stand on. Why, last December, one of them wrote a piece entitled “Try Anything”! – it’s not so much that they are Keynesians, as that they simply don’t believe in the present course.

A: That is not my impression. When you had the huge stimulus packages under Obama, and when certain European countries try to “kick the economy into gear” through short term spending increases, isn’t that in the spirit of Keynes?

B: Well, the stimulus packages in the USA could be regarded as a series of gigantic experiments in Keynesianism. And most economists I talk to say that the lesson from those moves was that it didn’t work and that monetary policy is far more important when it comes to handling a depression. It is true that some European countries have followed suit, even after it was clear that the American stimulus did not work, but that has far more to with the way laypeople perceive economics than what economists think: A lot of people approach economic crises with an unfortunate mixture of amateur philosophy, amateur psychology, and amateur economics where they think that public spending will raise everyone’s faith in the economy and get the wheels rolling again. Most of the really high-ranking economists I talk to know that it doesn’t work that way. But on the other hand, the politicians and central bankers can’t be seen “doing nothing” while people are hit by a crises that puts them out of a job, so they tend to throw some “stimulus” out there, even though they know it won’t work. In a way you could say that stimulus spending is like the bright lights and window dressing that people think is the heart of economics while monetary policy is the greasy engine room that really runs the ship.