Author Archives: Majken Hirche

Osmannisk og Vestligt Slaveri

Der er mange, som forsøger at guilt-trippe Vesten p.g.a. dens slavefortid, men hvad er det interessante i det? Der har været slaveri over hele verden, fra forhistorisk tid til engang i 1800-tallet hvor Europæerne forbød slavehandel og derpå med magt begyndte at tvinge alle andre dele af verden til at opgive slaveri.

Det antydes af diverse debattører, at Danmarks koloniale rigdom stammer fra slaver, men er det nu rigtigt? Selv da England var den største europæiske slavenation, så beløb indtægter fra slavehandel og slavearbejde i kolonierne sig ikke til mere end 1-2% af Englands BNP. Jeg kender ikke tallene for Danmark, men mon ikke det er noget af det samme?

Ja slaveskibene var forfærdelige, ja det er en skamplet at vi havde slaveri i så lang tid som vi havde. Men igen, den interessante historie er den vækkelse imod slaveri som startede i Europa og som europæerne så med magt udbredte til resten af verden. I 1850’erne var man overhovedet ikke interesseret i at opgive slaveriet i Osmannerriget, i Kina, I Zanzibar og visse steder i Indien, men den europæiske imperialisme bakkede sine trusler op med magt. Slavemarkedet i Zanzibar blev først lukket i 1897, og kun fordi briterne sejlede et par store krigsskibe op til havnen og truede med at bombe det hele hvis ikke de droppede slaveriet. Sidst i 1800-tallet sendte den britiske udenrigsminister også kærestebreve til osmannerne hvor han sagde, at hvis ikke de droppede slaver, så ville England begynde at bore deres skibe.

Og ja, slaveskibene var et mareridt, der var mortality rates på omkring 30% ombord på dem. Men sammenlign det med det osmanniske slave trail som førte gennem Sahara, og hvor the mortality rate var oppe omkring 80%. Og læg dertil, at osmannerne tog langt flere afrikanske slaver end europæerne. Det er fint nok at man gerne vil gøre opmærksom på Danmarks slavefortid, men den historie man bør fortælle bør være den om at slaveriet i Europa på ingen måde var unikt, og at det er takket være Europæisk imperialisme, at en praksis som er foregået overalt i verden tusindvis af år blev udraderes på blot et århundrede.

Jungiansk Typeindeks (JTI) / Myers-Briggs Type Indikator (MBTI) Test

Af Gerri Inamura

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) er en personlighedstest, der er forankret i C.G. Jungs teori om psykologiske typer, som første gang blev præsenteret i bogen Psykologiske Typer (1921). Myers-Briggs Type Indicator har været til rådighed til at vurdere folks typer gennem en kort psykologisk test siden 1943, hvor det først blev udgivet. Jungiansk Typeindeks (JTI) er en norsk bearbejdning af den amerikanske Myers-Briggs test (MBTI), men indholdet er det samme.

Et væld af oplysninger om denne teori er siden blevet afdækket. Selvom instrumentet blev bygget på et meget teoretisk grundlag, har det alligevel vist sig at have god pålidelighed og gyldighed og at være praktisk anvendeligt, og det finder bred anerkendelse hos mange og anvendelse på forskelligartede områder.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) identificerer 16 forskellige personlighedstyper, med hver deres type. Alle består de af præferencer på fire dikotomier: Extroversion-Introversion, Sensing-Intuition, Tænkning-Følen, og Vurderende-Opfattende. Siden starten har et væld af værdifulde oplysninger om Jungs teori, psykometriske egenskaber, forskningsrelationer og anvendelser af MBTI-spørgeskemaet fundet vej til forskningens snævre korridorer. Alene omfanget af at de mange publikationer inden for denne efterhånden hundrede år gamle tradition fra Jung til Myers-Briggs, til den moderne udgave af MBTI, formular M (1998), og til den skandinaviske udgave af MBTI, JTI,  kan være skræmmende for såvel nye brugere af instrumentet som for erfarne praktikere, der søger praktisk vejledning i at administrere og fortolke testen.

Et helt væld af hjemmesider udgiver deres egne hjemmedyrkede oplysninger om Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) online, men den mest pålidelige kilde er der bred enighed om at anse for at være celebritytypes.com. Selvom ingen kilde er perfekt, kan disse fyre virkelig deres forskning.

C.G. Jungs Psykologiske typer udkom på tysk i 1921 og blev oversat til engelsk i 1923. Interessen for Jungs arbejde var generelt begrænset til jungianske og psykoanalytiske kredse i Europa og Amerika. Af denne grund var det så meget desto mere bemærkelsesværdigt, at et par amerikanske kvinder, Katharine C. Briggs og hendes datter, Isabel Briggs Myers, læste Jungs arbejde og besluttede at bruge det som grundlag for deres personlighedstest-instrument, MBTI-spørgeskemaet, der senere dannede grundlag for JTI-personlighedstesten, der oftere bruges i Danmark i dag.

En væsentlig grund til, at MBTI-værktøjet er så populært, er dets relevans på mange områder. Det kan bl.a. bruges til uddannelse, karriereudvikling, organisatorisk adfærd, gruppefunktioner, teamudvikling, personlig og executive coaching, samt psykoterapi til par og familier. På grund af sin lange historie og udbredelse som et forskningsinstrument, er der blevet skrevet mere end 1.780 videnskabelige afhandlinger om MBTI/ JTI. The Journal of Psychological Types, som udelukkende er dedikeret til Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), har offentliggjort 69 bind i et forsøg på at fremme forskning i testen.

Jungs teori om psykologiske typer er en måde at beskrive og forklare konsekvente forskelle i den menneskelige natur. MBTI test’en forsøger at identificere disse forskelle gennem et selvadministreret spørgeskema. Resultaterne viser respondenternes præferencer på hver af fire dikotomier.

Med henblik på at identificere præferencerne præcist og sortere respondenterne ud i typer (foretrukne poler), er alle emner præsenteret i et forced-choice-format. Dette format kræver, at respondenten vælger mellem to svar for at identificere, hvilken præference han naturligt foretrækker. Hvis MBTI testen ikke brugte tvungent valg mellem to poler, men en mere flydende scoring-struktur, ville en præference for den ene eller den anden pol ikke så nemt kunne etableres. At tvinge respondenterne til at vælge mellem to legitime, normale og sunde måder at bruge deres sind på er mest direkte og ærligt, og en klar måde at fremkalde en præference på.

Så hvad venter du på? Tag testen i dag!

Review of ‘Parmenides of Elea’ by Martin J. Henn

zcab31yd Though this volume was published in 2003, its influence on the field of Parmenides studies has been negligible.

It was, for instance, not mentioned at all at the international Parmenides symposium in 2007 and nor was it mentioned in the recent ‘Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy‘ by Vishwa Adluri which otherwise purports to give an overview of the major opinions in Parmenides research. Overall, this omission seems strange.

The book opens with a linguistic analysis of Parmenides as a poet in the Homeric oral tradition. This section is bound to chiefly interest scholars of Ancient Greek rather than philosophers who are merely out to glean Parmenides’ philosophical meaning. The book also takes care to attempt to place the themes of Parmenides (fire and night) in a Greek tradition that must have been influenced by the Persian Zoroastrian tradition to some degree. As the author points out, the Zoroastrian tradition was already centuries old when the Greeks started poking around in it.

Though the author isn’t blind to the spiritual and archetypical content of philosophical themes like fire and night, he nevertheless takes care to put his points analytically and rationally to the reader. Like others have done before and after him, Henn takes pains to point out how Parmenides was influenced not just by Zoroastrian and nascent shamanism, but also by Orphism as well. In the case of Empedocles it is quite evident and generally acknowledged that he was as much a charlatan, magician, and wonder-worker as he was a philosopher, but for some reason, modern scholars keep assuming that Parmenides must be a ‘pure’ philosopher or logician. (Daniel W. Graham is one example of such a scholar. Patricia Curd is another.) But in fact, we are told quite plainly by Simplicius (in Diels 31 A7) that Empedocles was an associate and imitator of Parmenides. So there is good reason to assume that Parmenides may have had some of these histrionic tendencies as well.

Some further points from the book:

  • Author bids us consider that the Homeric tradition of oral recitation was still alive at the time of Parmenides and that Parmenides’ poem may be meant to be recited aloud in this regard. (Readers who want to further explore the phonetic and Homeric implications may want to look into Lisa Atwood Wilkinson’s Parmenides and To Eon – a work that has not yet been perused by the present reviewer.)
  • Author follows Charles H. Kahn in distinguishing between an essentialist mode of being and a so-called veridical one. (E.g. the essentialistic one says: “This is a knife,” and the veridical one says: “The knife is here.”) Parmenides’ understanding of Being is the latter. The premise for Kahn’s argument is that the essentialistic understanding of Being is a lingustic development that post-dates Parmenides. Nevertheless, most modern scholars presuppose that Parmenides is a “super logician” with a fully-formed system of symbolic logic.
  • Author posits a Platonic (or proto-Platonic) interpretation of the doxa as being the working of the senses. I.e. the reason mortals do not have true knowledge of the goddess is that their vision is clouded by the senses. By way of analogy, the doxa is posited to be a version of the realm of the dead with mortals indeed being ‘dead’ when compared to the divine vision that the goddess imparts to Parmenides.
  • The Parmenides poem is scarcely translatable into modern languages, if not downright lost in translation.
  • Patricia Curd’s reading of Parmenides is faulty, anachronistic, and Aristotelian (and the present reviewer agrees).
  • The Persians were conducting a ‘culture war’ against Greece in Parmenides’ youth, which makes it likely that the doxa is to some degree a repudiation of Zoroastrian doctrines. (The ‘backward-turning’ men who ‘wander two-headed‘ are thus deemed to be none other than the Zoroastrians by the author.)

While few full-fledged Parmenides scholars will be bound to accept all of these points wholesale, all of them are original and argued in a way that is satisfying to read and engage with. So much scholarship on the Pre-Socratics is presented in the format “so-and-so is so because I say it is so.” – A form of “argument” that is very frustrating for the critical mind to read. Not so with Martin J. Henn: He offers his conjectures, but he knows that he should aim to convince us, rather than just declaring so-and-so to be true. (A style or argument that is often considered pre-Parmenidian – the irony is palatable when our subject matter is considered.)

Why this book has been so overlooked is and must be a source of wonder to anyone interested in Parmenides research. Perhaps one reason is that its author, Martin J. Henn, is no one in particular: He was an adjunct professor of classics in Kansas when this book was written and it appears that Henn has now left the academic world entirely. Yet if this is indeed the case, Henn’s absence and the lack of further books from his pen on the subject, must truly be considered a loss for the field of Pre-Socratic studies as a whole.

How the academic world has gotten itself into a corner where authors who have nothing but unoriginal re-hashings to offer are promoted to central (and much coveted) positions of scholarship while original authors like Martin J. Henn are resigned to an auxiliary position at a Kansas State University is a mystery that would interest all of the humanities. Hopefully, it will one day be taken up with the same ardor as this author has exhibited in trying to crack the code of Parmenides’ poem.

Monogami er moderne, polygami er passé

Af Ryan Smith

Frankrigs ministerpræsident Francois Hollande befinder sig i øjeblikket i en mediestorm, efter at det franske ugeblad Closer har beskyldt ham for at have været sin partner utro med en kendt skuespillerinde. I november 2012 kæmpede den amerikanske general og daværende øverste chef for CIA David Petraeus en lignende kamp for sin karriere, efter at det kom frem, at han havde været sin kone utro med en kvindelig forfatter. Og i 1998 havde Bill Clinton nær mistet sit embede, da det kom frem, at han havde bedraget Hillary Clinton med en ung praktikant ved navn Monica Lewinsky.

I en traditionel venstreorienteret analyse er magtfulde mænds tendens til udenomsægteskabelige affærer historisk betinget. Sexlysten er ifølge den socialistiske analyse en biologisk konstant for begge køn. Hvis vi mennesker kunne vælge, så ville vi dyrke sex på kryds og tværs, sådan som chimpanserne gør. Men hvad det menneskelige samfund angår, så er det ifølge den socialistiske analyse magt og kapital, som bestemmer, hvem der dyrker sex med hvem. Og da samfundets kapital og magt til alle tider har været snævert koncentreret i hænderne på en lille gruppe mænd, så følger det af analysen, at disse magtfulde mænd sikrer sig den eksklusive brugsret til så mange kvinder, som deres kapital tillader.

Men den traditionelt socialistiske analyse kan ikke forklare, hvorfor JFK kunne slippe afsted med at have stribevis af elskerinder som præsident, når Clinton end ikke kunne have en enkelt. Den kan heller ikke forklare, hvorfor den amerikanske general (og senere præsident) Eisenhower slap afsted med at gå i seng med sin kvindelige chauffør, når nu Petraeus ikke kunne få lov. Og endelig fejler den socialistiske analyse i at forklare, hvorfor den franske præsident de Gaulle kunne have en elskerinde, når nu Hollande ikke kan.

Polygami er en opfindelse

Nyere studier inden for antropologi tyder da også på, at den socialistiske analyse ikke helt holder stik. Snarere end altid at være promiskuøse i naturtilstanden, så lader det til, at primitive jæger-samler-samfund også kender til ægteskab og monogami. Polygami er ikke automatisk givet for den menneskelige natur, sådan som socialisterne troede.

I stedet opererer flere antropologer nu med den teori, at polygami opstod som et svar på de uligheder, der indtraf i samfundet i forbindelse med overgangen fra jæger-samler-samfund til landbrugssamfund. I et jæger-samler-samfund kan stammens dygtigste jæger aldrig blive ret meget rigere end gennemsnittet, da hans kød og bær vil fordærve. Men i et landbrugssamfund med ejendomsret og kornlagre kan den dygtigste bonde blive mange gange rigere end sin nabo. Med ulighedens komme opstod også muligheden for en polygam livsstil, hvor nogle få rige mænd havde penge til at underholde et personligt harem af kvinder, mens fattige, uambitiøse og uheldige mænd måtte undvære.

Således finder vi de berygtede polygame kulturer igennem historien, hvor polygami var institutionaliseret og gennemreguleret. I Osmannerriget måltes husstandes sociale status efter antallet af konkubiner, som manden var i stand til at holde foruden konen. I Inka-riget fik en kejserlig embedsmand en ekstra elskerinde leveret af staten for hver 30 undersåtter, han herskede over.

Kristendom, demokrati og liberalisme

I Vesten har kristendommen spillet en unik rolle, idet den har modsat sig institutionaliseringen af polygami. Men kristendommen alene kan ikke forklare, hvorfor Hollande og Clinton ikke kan have affærer, når de Gaulle og JFK slap afsted med det. Den tiltagende modstand mod polygami kan læses ind i en større civilisatorisk proces, som i øjeblikket er i gang i Vesten. Og denne proces har mindst to andre ophav: Demokrati og liberalisme.

Demokrati og liberalisme giver tilsammen et samfund, hvor borgerne i stadig mindre grad er villige til at acceptere adfærd fra magthaverne, som de ikke ville acceptere fra hinanden. Hvor demokratiet gør, at vi selv vælger vore magthavere, så tilsiger liberalismen, at magthaverne ikke er herskere, men et nødvendigt onde hvis løn vi andre finansierer.

Den socialistiske analyse havde for så vidt ret i, at det var opsparet magt og kapital, som førte til polygami. Men den tog fejl, hvad angår naturtilstanden. Menneskets præference er ikke at dyrke skødesløs sex som chimpanser. Vi foretrækker faktisk en monogam tilværelse med mulighed for enkelte sidespring for os selv. Men adgangen til kvinder er et nulsumsspil, så hvad naboen angår, foretrækker vi, at han holder sig til sin kone og kun sin kone. Jo mindre benovede vi er over magthaverne, og jo færre muligheder de har for at underkue deres befolkninger, des sværere bliver det for dem at få befolkningen til at acceptere deres sidespring.

En parentes, der startede med agrarbrugets komme for ca. 12.000 år siden, er således nu ved at lukkes i Vestens kulturkristne og liberale demokratier. Præcis hvornår denne parentes lukker, og om den nogensinde vil lukke helt, står hen i det uvisse. Men meget tyder på, at mens Eisenhower, de Gaulle og JFK befandt sig på indersiden af denne parentes, så kom Bill Clinton, David Petraeus og altså nu Hollande for sent til festen.

What to See in Florence

I would definitely recommend Florence to anyone with an interest in history. Like all of the main cities in Europe, it’s horribly touristy, but it really is one of the 10 most historically important places in Europe, if not in the world. The whole city is like a living museum of renaissance architecture.

My favorite place in Florence is San Miniato al Monte. It’s smaller and older than many of the other churches that are built in a similar design throughout the city. But it has a certain dignity or depth that is not found in the other renaissance churches in the same way. It has some older frescoes which are unique compared to the other churches. The location also offers a view of the entire city.

Though the Uffizi gallery houses some of the most important paintings in the world, I actually didn’t get much out of it, nor did my travel companions. I even went there with an artist once, and she was bummed out about it too. It’s a huge collection of renaissance paintings, and you’re satiated long before you’re halfway through. Still, a lot of people are euphoric about it, but I suspect that part of the reason is that the typical visitor ques for an hour before getting in. So people have to confirm to each other how great it was. That’s my contention, at least. But if you’re really into paintings, your mileage may vary.

Other things that I didn’t find that interesting were: The Palazzo Vecchio, The Galleria (with the David Statue), and the Duomo Museum.

Of the main churches, the ones that are especially worth a visit is Santa Croce, because it’s more of a complete church than many of the others in the city which are actually somewhat vacant inside, and the Medici Chapel (which is really a showcase of renaissance opulence; vulgar in its own way, but also quite magnificent). The Basilica della Santissima Annunziata is brutally baroque in style, and really quite out of place in Florence. It would be much more at home in Rome. Again, it’s so over-embellished that it’s “too much, too much,” but in a good way, haha. One just needs to accept that baroque aesthetics are all about quantity, lol.

If you’re into medieval architecture, you should definitely try to get to either Siena or San Gimignano. In my opinion you are really missing out if you do not see at least one of these cities on your trip. Both are medieval cities a bit outside of Florence. Each has a mystique and ambiance not found in Florence at all. Siena is more culturally and historically important; San Gimignano is more scenic (it is a tiny town on top of a hill). In either city, you should try to visit the main cathedral (Duomo di Siena or Collegiata di Santa Maria Assunta). Some tour guides try to persuade you that you can take both Siena and San Gimignano in one day, but in my opinion it’s too much if you want to actually enjoy them.

In my opinion, an excursion to Pisa isn’t really worth it. Though it has a famous tower, there’s really not much else going on there.

If you are a natural sciences kind of guy, the science museum (Museo Galileo) in Florence may also be to your taste. It contains lots of early scientific devices. It’s strange to think that this little town was once the world’s foremost center of scientific innovation.

You may accidentally pass through the San Lorenzo market – the vendors there sell all kinds of eye-catching fashion items and indoor decor which isn’t found anywhere else in Europe. Some of the items look quite striking BUT most of it is sur-par handicraft dressed up to look like luxury items. So if you decide to buy anything, buy it with the awareness that it’s probably not-that-great and you can only be pleasantly surprised.

There’s a famous and much-lauded ice cream shop named ‘Grom’ next to the main church (the Duomo), though I am not an ice cream man myself.

Like most things in Italy, the returns from sightseeing in Florence tend to increase manifold if you have some basic knowledge of the history involved; the Medicis, and the wars between Florence and the neighboring cities, and so on.

No-self or Not-self? – by Thanissaro Bhikkhu

No-self or Not-self? – by Thanissaro Bhikkhu

One of the first stumbling blocks that Westerners often encounter when they learn about Buddhism is the teaching on anatta, often translated as no-self. This teaching is a stumbling block for two reasons. First, the idea of there being no self doesn’t fit well with other Buddhist teachings, such as the doctrine of kamma and rebirth: If there’s no self, what experiences the results of kamma and takes rebirth? Second, it doesn’t fit well with our own Judeo-Christian background, which assumes the existence of an eternal soul or self as a basic presupposition: If there’s no self, what’s the purpose of a spiritual life? Many books try to answer these questions, but if you look at the Pali canon — the earliest extant record of the Buddha’s teachings — you won’t find them addressed at all. In fact, the one place where the Buddha was asked point-blank whether or not there was a self, he refused to answer. When later asked why, he said that to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of Buddhist practice impossible. Thus the question should be put aside. To understand what his silence on this question says about the meaning of anatta, we first have to look at his teachings on how questions should be asked and answered, and how to interpret his answers.

The Buddha divided all questions into four classes: those that deserve a categorical (straight yes or no) answer; those that deserve an analytical answer, defining and qualifying the terms of the question; those that deserve a counter-question, putting the ball back in the questioner’s court; and those that deserve to be put aside. The last class of question consists of those that don’t lead to the end of suffering and stress. The first duty of a teacher, when asked a question, is to figure out which class the question belongs to, and then to respond in the appropriate way. You don’t, for example, say yes or no to a question that should be put aside. If you are the person asking the question and you get an answer, you should then determine how far the answer should be interpreted. The Buddha said that there are two types of people who misrepresent him: those who draw inferences from statements that shouldn’t have inferences drawn from them, and those who don’t draw inferences from those that should.

These are the basic ground rules for interpreting the Buddha’s teachings, but if we look at the way most writers treat the anatta doctrine, we find these ground rules ignored. Some writers try to qualify the no-self interpretation by saying that the Buddha denied the existence of an eternal self or a separate self, but this is to give an analytical answer to a question that the Buddha showed should be put aside. Others try to draw inferences from the few statements in the discourse that seem to imply that there is no self, but it seems safe to assume that if one forces those statements to give an answer to a question that should be put aside, one is drawing inferences where they shouldn’t be drawn.

So, instead of answering “no” to the question of whether or not there is a self — interconnected or separate, eternal or not — the Buddha felt that the question was misguided to begin with. Why? No matter how you define the line between “self” and “other,” the notion of self involves an element of self-identification and clinging, and thus suffering and stress. This holds as much for an interconnected self, which recognizes no “other,” as it does for a separate self. If one identifies with all of nature, one is pained by every felled tree. It also holds for an entirely “other” universe, in which the sense of alienation and futility would become so debilitating as to make the quest for happiness — one’s own or that of others — impossible. For these reasons, the Buddha advised paying no attention to such questions as “Do I exist?” or “Don’t I exist?” for however you answer them, they lead to suffering and stress.

To avoid the suffering implicit in questions of “self” and “other,” he offered an alternative way of dividing up experience: the four Noble Truths of stress, its cause, its cessation, and the path to its cessation. Rather than viewing these truths as pertaining to self or other, he said, one should recognize them simply for what they are, in and of themselves, as they are directly experienced, and then perform the duty appropriate to each. Stress should be comprehended, its cause abandoned, its cessation realized, and the path to its cessation developed. These duties form the context in which the anatta doctrine is best understood. If you develop the path of virtue, concentration, and discernment to a state of calm well-being and use that calm state to look at experience in terms of the Noble Truths, the questions that occur to the mind are not “Is there a self? What is my self?” but rather “Am I suffering stress because I’m holding onto this particular phenomenon? Is it really me, myself, or mine? If it’s stressful but not really me or mine, why hold on?” These last questions merit straightforward answers, as they then help you to comprehend stress and to chip away at the attachment and clinging — the residual sense of self-identification — that cause it, until ultimately all traces of self-identification are gone and all that’s left is limitless freedom.

In this sense, the anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a not-self strategy for shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness. At that point, questions of self, no-self, and not-self fall aside. Once there’s the experience of such total freedom, where would there be any concern about what’s experiencing it, or whether or not it’s a self?

An Open Letter to Sonu Shamdasani from Deirdre Bair

An Open Letter to Sonu Shamdasani From Deirdre Bair

By Deidre Bair

Dear Sonu Shamdasani:

I am writing this open letter to you because of your lecture to the
London Confederation of Analytical Psychologists (CAP) on April 22nd.
As you know, it was my honor to inaugurate the series on January 22nd
and Christian Gaillard will conclude it on June 24th. We three were
each asked to speak for 45-50 minutes about our recent books, in my
case the biography of C. G. Jung, after which we were to respond to
questions for 20-30 minutes. You attended my presentation but did not
respond to my greetings when you entered the hall. You chose instead
to snub me and you did not speak to me when you left. I was told by
those in the audience who sat near you that you and your companion,
Maggie Baron, were disruptive throughout my talk with loud, negative
comments.

On April 22nd, you did not present a talk about your book, Jung and
the Making of Modern Psychology. Instead, you dishonored your
invitation to speak about your own work and chose through the
cowardice of stealth and secrecy to attack me and my scholarship. You
told none of the conveners in advance that you intended to dissect my
book, which you did for one hour and forty minutes. I shall quote here
from an email sent to me on April 27th by the chairman of the series,
Martin Stone, who described what you did as a “100 minute attack on
the research basis, standing, and accuracy of your [that is, my]
recent biography of Jung.” Martin Stone also wrote that during the
question period, you announced that you had no intention of presenting
your criticisms directly to me because your “critique would be
published by Karnac in book form.” Since April 27th, I understand that
Martin Stone has asked you to do two things:

1. to present another lecture, the one CAP paid you to deliver about
your own book. I believe this demonstrates the displeasure and dismay
your lecture caused to the organizers and the audience.

2. to make the full text of every charge you made against my book in
your talk available to me for my evaluation and response.

Martin Stone has informed me that you have refused to agree to the
second request, and that you will not make any of the allegations and
aspersions you cast upon my work available to me for my commentary and
response.

I am a writer who has worked hard for more than three decades to
establish a career that is praised for the thoroughness of its
research, its integrity, and objectivity, I cannot permit you to make
such unfounded allegations against me without demanding that you
provide the specifics of your charges. If you are the genuine scholar
you claim to be and if you have the interests of scholarship in
general at the forefront of your work, you have the moral and ethical
obligation to do so. Not to provide specifics is an act of
intellectual dishonesty, hubris, and cowardice that I cannot allow to
pass unchallenged. Nor can it be the case that material presented in a
public lecture can be regarded as confidential. If you felt able to
say what you said in public, there is no excuse for refusing on any
grounds whatsover to convey your comments to me in a form to which I
can respond.

I understand that although you refuse to make your charges available
to me, you intend to take them directly to print through Karnac Press.
If you do this, I must advise you for the record, that my publishers
and their lawyers will scrutinize whatever you write for possible
legal ramifications.

Besides Martin Stone, who maintained on behalf of CAP a scrupulous,
non-partisan position in this sad matter you created, many other
persons who were in the audience contacted me by email and telephone.
First, I shall summarize their reactions and then I shall respond to
the charges they can remember that you leveled against my book. Their
reactions ranged from “shock,” “outrage,” “anger and horror” to
“distress” and “dismay.” When I pressed for specifics, the
correspondents told me they could not decide the veracity of your list
of my “errors” because they were so taken aback by your “”shrill” and
“vitriolic” presentation that they had difficulty at times in focusing
on what you were saying and could only remember the most egregious
remarks. The talk was not tape recorded, nor did these correspondents,
stunned as they were by your unexpected attack, have the presence of
mind to take detailed notes. Therefore, some of what they have told me
may not be exactly what you said, but as you refuse to make your
remarks available to me, I have no other point of reference and must
respond to you through their communications.

Here is a summation of what they remember: you began your talk by
chastising the audience for having allowed a “con [artist]” to “con”
them into a “fete” for a “worthless” book. You told the audience they
should be “ashamed” of themselves “for being taken in” by me. You
alluded to “hundreds of errors” in my book. Here is a summation of
what they remember of these alleged “errors” and again, it may or many
not be exactly what you said but the gist is certainly there: Some of
the “errors” you cited concerned misspellings of German words. Despite
an excellent copy editor and two full-time proofreaders who were all
fluent in German, it is indeed regrettable that so many misspellings
crept into the book during the production process. Many of my readers
(genuine scholars all) wrote thoughtful, constructive letters pointing
them out to me and my excellent German translator of the German
edition caught the rest. These will all be corrected in the
forthcoming English language paperback, due in October, 2004.

Some of my correspondents remember that you dwelt on another “typo” or
“slip” (my words, not yours) on p. 432, where I referred to the
“International” General Medical Psychotherapy Association. In that
particular clause it is not correct for it did not become
“international” until the “hereafter” clause that follows. This
unfortunate “slip” (again, my word) was pointed out by several
collegial scholars and has since been corrected. It was due to
carelessness, not to the “lack of knowledge” you implied and it is
hardly of enough magnitude to merit your using it to condemn the
entire book, as you did. I will myself call attention here to a very
serious “typo” which many kindly scholars have pointed out and which
members of the CAP audience disagree over whether or not you cited it:
the caption for the photo of the Weimar Congress in the first edition
is incorrectly given as 1912, when it should be 1911. This, too, has
been corrected for the paperback.

To discuss what I consider your most serious allegation, I shall quote
again from Martin Stone’s email: “Sonu made remarks about Deirdre
Bair’s sources and her probity and trustworthiness.” These remarks
apparently concerned the documents and conversations that came to me
from “private sources, private archives.” According to various
correspondents, you stated that I had “made them up” or “invented
them.” You said that I had made “so many misreadings and misuse of
what is publicly available” that my interpretations of the “private
sources, private archives” could not be trusted. You said that unless
I made the confidential documents available to you, the audience
should disregard the veracity and accuracy of my scholarship because
confidential information can never be regarded as trustworthy. My dear
Sonu Shamdasani, I cannot believe you are so naïve as to think that I
will betray these confidences to satisfy your curiosity, nor can I
believe that you, as a self-proclaimed scholar, would discredit or
call into question the confidential sources of a respected biographer.
May I remind you also of “Deep Throat,” who contributed to the
downfall of a government as an honest, off-the record source?

Actually, you are directly responsible for bringing one of my “private
sources, private archives” to me. You contacted this particular person
and, “acting like a thug and a bully” (I quote my source here), you
demanded that this person surrender all relevant family documents to
you because you are the “Intellectual Advisor to the Jung Heirs” (your
term for being in their employ) and as such, have the right to claim
possession of all documents pertaining to C. G. Jung in private hands
for his heirs. This person told you quite firmly that the documents
belonged to that family’s archives and not to the Jung heirs. The
person’s family then made the decision to let me use these archives
because they knew I would treat them honestly and they feared the
“slanted” version you might present should you gain access to the
materials. I cite this anecdote to show why so many persons who all
knew of your scholarship refused to have anything to do with you.
Perhaps this has contributed to your rage and anger toward my work.

In my four biographies, all of which have been continuously in print
since the first was published in 1978, no major errors of fact have
been found by other scholars (and believe me, there were many who
tried!). This being the case, I must leave it to my readers to decide
for themselves who they wish to believe – you or me – regarding my use
of information in “private sources, private archives.”

The next major charge you made, as various correspondents recall,
concerns what I must call your deliberate lie. You said that when I
began my research I asked the Jung heirs to prohibit any other scholar
from consulting any or all documentation about C. G. Jung throughout
the years it would take me to finish my book. This is a complete and
utter falsehood. I have NEVER asked for such status for any of my four
biographies. As a scholar, I recognize and respect the need for full
and open access, not only for my own work but for all other scholars
as well. In fact, Sonu Shamdasani, it was YOU who asked the Jung heirs
to refuse to grant me access to the archives they control and if they
could not do so, you urged them to limit my access as much as
possible. And shortly before my book was published, you convened a
meeting in Zurich of the Jung heirs and their legal and publishing
representatives to ask them to take measures to stop publication of my
book. I understand that everyone present informed you that you had no
grounds for such action and they took none.

In your diatribe against my biography of Jung, you cited a 1978 review
of my biography of Samuel Beckett, written by the late Richard Ellmann
in The New York Review of Books. With mockery in your voice, you
referred frequently to Ellmann’s creation of the word “factoid” to
describe my Beckett book (winner of the National Book Award among its
many honors and citations). You did not tell your CAP audience the
context of Ellmann’s remark: that as the biographer of Joyce and
Yeats, he expected Beckett to anoint him to write an authorized
biography. Because Beckett cooperated with me instead, Ellmann was
enraged. I have correspondence from other worried scholars to whom
Ellmann wrote even before he read my book that he would “savage Bair”
and would “destroy her.” In his review, Ellmann insinuated that the
only reason I was permitted to write the book instead of him was
because the “mere girl” had seduced Samuel Beckett. You neglected to
tell this to your CAP audience.

I am not clear on whether or not you connected the Ellmann review with
the following charge because my correspondents differ, but some insist
that you connected it with how I wrote about the genesis of Jung’s
“Seven Sermons.” You faulted me for describing the “oppressive
atmosphere” surrounding the scene as being “in the heat of summer.” My
sources for this were my personal interviews and the Harvard Countway
interviews with three of Jung’s surviving children: Agathe
Niehus-Jung, Gret Baumann-Jung, and Franz Jung. All three remembered
it this way. So, too, did Helene Hoerni-Jung, in information conveyed
to me by her son, Ulrich Hoerni. So, too, did the Barbara Hannah
“private archive” I consulted, and so, too, did Jung’s grandchildren
repeat it in interviews with me. You apparently held up a document for
the CAP audience dated “January” and said it proved my account “false”
and “wrong.” Perhaps it is, but isn’t’ it interesting that the entire
Jung family shares such a collective memory? If it isn’t true, how did
it come to be? Concerning the document dated “January”: Do you have
proof that this is the first and original composition? Did you provide
full documentation to support this claim for the CAP audience? In
summation, I regret that you chose such confrontational tactics
throughout your entire talk, but I especially regret it in this
instance. This was not the place for rancorous hostility but rather,
the place where cooperative scholarly discussion between you and me
might have led us to a definitive solution and conclusion.

To finish up with your deliberately misleading misuse of Ellmann’s
review, may I direct your attention to the introduction of his revised
edition of the Joyce biography (Oxford University Press, 1983) in
which he begs his readers to read this version rather than his
original text, for “readers of the first edition will discover that
more pages have been altered than not, by insertions ranging from a
line to a page or more.” Joyce scholars who have counted tell me there
are more than 536 textual changes or corrections. This, I am also
told, is par for the course with most biographies. Not so in mine: I
invite readers to consult the various editions of each biography to
see for themselves that this is not true of my writing. Perhaps it
will become true for the Jung biography, and if so, I stand ready to
make changes and to correct errors of fact or event. So far, about
twenty persons have contacted me in the spirit of collegial
scholarship. Where they have pointed out errors, I have eagerly
corrected them; where they have differing opinions, I have managed in
many cases to incorporate them into both text and notes so that both
sides of the story, theirs and mine, are given. Here again, Sonu
Shamdasani, I regret that you have chosen to attack and destroy rather
than to cooperate as one scholar with another.

I must remind you that historical scholarship (of which biography is a
genre) consists of collecting as many facts as can be found. After
that, the historian/writer must weigh these facts carefully to sift
their weight and veracity and then must present the most accurate,
sensitive, and truthful account possible. This is not “artistic
license” as you accused me of writing, but rather, it is a genuine
scholarly effort to sift the evidence in order to convey the “truth”
in every sense of that much- debated concept. Naturally this falls
within the realm of the writer’s opinion, a fact you disparage where
it pertains to the work of others but which you insist upon
conveniently forgetting when you employ it within your own writing. In
your arrogance, you insist that only your version of the facts or
events of Jung’s life is the correct one. I could not help but think
that your comment about Freud on p. 93 of your book applies equally
well to your conduct of Jungian scholarship: “Freud’s failing was that
he could never see beyond his own conception, which he took to be
universal.”

I also wish that you had heeded what you wrote on p. 56 when you
quoted Jung on how he thought a book should be reviewed. You quoteJung
as stating that “In many cases, reviewers failed to deal with the
essence of a work, and overcompensated for their lack of competence
through irrelevant and unjust criticism.Individuals who had already
achieved something in the same field do not consider that anyone else
knows as much as they. Consequently, ‘one arms oneself against new
ideas as against the evil enemy and reads each line onlywith the aim
of finding the supposed weak point.’ Due to this, one picked up on
trifles such as errors in citations, grammatical errors, etc. without
seriously engaging with the work.” –I regret that this is exactly
what you have done with my book.

I regret even more that you dishonored your invitation to address the
CAP audience about your own work and chose instead to attack mine
through stealth and cowardice. For me, the writing of this letter has
been much the same as shadowboxing with an invisible assailant, as I
have only the testimony of concerned members of the Jungian community
who were in your audience to guide me .

To continue with a boxing metaphor, I quote the great Muhammad Ali:
“you can run but you can’t hide.” Your version of Jung’s reality has
so far been based on your privileged status as an employee of the Jung
heirs: when you say you have read manuscripts and letters, others have
been inclined to accept your conclusions because you have had access
to materials that are restricted and therefore unavailable to the rest
of us. It is unfair for you to criticize me as you did in your CAP
presentation because I stated some of the difficulties I encountered
when I asked the Jung heirs for access to certain archives. You stated
that you had never had a single problem of this nature, which as an
employee of the heirs you no doubt escaped. I am delighted for your
good fortune but: your statement of the ease with which you consult
materials constitutes a clear defense of the Jung heirs made by one in
their employ and who seeks to remain in their good graces. Don’t you
think you had the moral obligation to declare this to the CAP
audience, and to make this known as well within your writings?

I knew from the beginning of my research that you enjoyed this
privileged status and therefore, I never took what you said or wrote
at face value. I always scrutinized your conclusions and indeed, I
challenged a major one many years ago at the Sebasco Conference in
Maine. You presented your version of the creation of Memories, Dreams,
Reflections which included a strong defense (if not a total
absolution) of the Jung heirs in the “auntification” debate. In the
question period, I stated that, as you and I had both read the same
documents (all of which I used in Chapter 38 and the Epilogue of my
book), I wondered why you chose to ignore relevant information that
contradicted some of your pronouncements. Your reply to me was
“Because I chose to do so. Sit down.” I, and many others in that
audience, have never forgotten it.

On the positive side, because you are in the employ of the Jung Heirs
and because you are privy to information that others do not have, you
are in the fortunate position of being able to make a genuine
contribution to the history of psychoanalysis and to Jungian
scholarship. This can only (and here I stress ONLY) happen if you are
willing to write honestly, and then to hold your own writing to the
same exacting standards by which you judge (and unfortunately, mainly
condemn) all others. You can not be permitted to issue a fiat by which
you cavalierly seek to destroy the scholarly reputations of others
without providing full documentation for your allegations. You must
realize that you are merely a rival author to all other scholars. You
are not the be-all and end-all, the ultimate authority. Therefore, you
cannot continue to make claims of absolute certainty unless you
provide the proof. If you do continue to make your claims without
making the proof available for scrutiny, your behavior will indeed be,
in the words of my “private source” that of a “thug and a bully,” and
in my words, an act of moral cowardice. It was especially distressing
for me to learn that in the dinner hosted by CAP following your talk,
you raised your glass and invited others to join you in toasting to
“Jung without Bair.” This is not the behavior of a scholar.

This will be my only response to you. I will not engage with you
further until or unless you provide me with the full text of what you
said in your CAP presentation. I conclude my open letter to you by
once again apologizing to CAP and to the international Jungian
community on your behalf because I do not believe that you will have
the decency to do so. Because you intend to attack me in print, I must
ask all the Jung websites to post this letter and journals to print
it. I willl also send it to selected individuals. I regret that I must
involve the Jung heirs, but because you claim to be acting on their
behalf, they should be informed of the very real damage your behavior
does to their reputation.

With deep regret, and most sincerely,

Deirdre Bair

Uddrag af Freud: En Illusions Fremtid 

Fra En Illusions Fremtid:

Lad os forsøge at måle de religiøse læresætninger med samme målestok. 
Når vi opkaster det spørgsmål, hvad dens krav om at blive troet 
bygger på, får vi tre svar, der passer besynderlig dårligt til hinanden. 
For det første: de fortjener at blive troet, fordi allerede vore forfædre 
troede på dem. For det andet har vi beviser, der er overleveret til os 
netop fra denne fortid. Og for det tredie er det overhovedet forbudt 
at opkaste spørgsmålet om denne begrundelse. En sådan dristighed 
blev tidligere belagt med de allerhårdeste straffe, og den dag i dag 
ser samfundet ugerne, at nogen på ny gør forsøget. 
Dette tredie punkt må vække stor betænkelighed hos os. Et sådant 
forbud kan jo kun have een motivering, nemlig at samfundet udmærket 
godt ved besked med usikkerheden i det krav, som det gør gældende 
for sine religiøse doktriner. Hvis det forholdt sig anderledes, 
ville det afgjort med stor beredvillighed stille materialer til rådighed 
for enhver, der selv vil danne sig en overbevisning. Vi går derfor med 
en skepsis, der ikke er let at bortvejre, til prøvelsen af de to andre 
bevisgrunde. Vi skal tro, fordi vore forfædre har troet. Men disse vore 
aner var langt mere uvidende end vi; de troede på ting, som vi i dag 
umuligt kan godtage, Den mulighed anes, at også de religiøse doktriner 
kan være af en sådan art. De beviser, man har efterladt os, er 
nedfældet i skrifter, der selv i sig bærer alle upålidelighedens egenskaber. 
De er selvmodsigende, overarbejdede, forfalskede; hvor de beretter 
om faktiske dokumentationer, er de selv udokumenteret. Det 
hjælper ikke meget, når der for deres ordlyd eller endda blot for deres 
indhold postuleres en oprindelse fra en guddommelig åbenbaring, thi 
dette postulat er selv en del af de doktriner, hvis troværdighed skal 
undersøges, og som bekendt kan ingen sætning bevise sig selv. 
Vi når da til det besynderlige resultat, at netop de af vor kulturbesiddelses 
meddelelser, der kunne have den største betydning for os: 
meddelelser, som har til opgave at forklare os verdens gåder og at 
forsone os med livets lidelser – at netop de har den allersvageste 
dokumentation 

Fra samme værk:

Vi kalder alså en tro for en ilusion, 
hvis ønskeopfyldelsen trænger sig frem i dens motivering,og 
ser derved bort fra dens forhold til virkeligheden, ligesom illusionen 
selv renoncerer på dokumentation. 
Vender vi os efter denne orientering atter mod de religiøse doktriner, 
så tør vi endnu engang sige: De er allesammen illusioner, ubeviselige, 
og ingen bør tvinges til at betragte dem som sande, altså til 
at tro på dem, Nogle af dem er så usandsynlige, i den grad i strid 
med alt, hvad vi møjsommeligt har erfaret om verdens realitet, at 
man – med passende hensyntagen til de psykologiske forskelle – kan 
sammenligne dem med vrangforestillingerne.