When I call Machiavelli Polybius I am alluding to the fact that there was a practice amongst the learned men of the Renaissance that each learned man adopted the name and role of an antique writer whom he resembled; While, for example, Erasmus ‘was’ Lucian, Machiavelli ‘was’ Polybius.[i]

I will now establish the central themes in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy in so far as they are relevant to the tradition of republicanism.

One theme that is central to Machiavelli’s Discourses, and to pre-19^th century political thought in general is the Aristotelian taxonomy of stately constitutions found in Aristotle’s Politics. (This taxonomy is to a lesser degree also Platonic, to be found in The Republic.)[ii]

Aristotle (and Machiavelli) distinguishes between three basic forms of government: The tyranny, or dictatorship, the oligarchy, or rule of the aristocracy, and the democracy, or the rule of the people.[iii] The viewpoint inherent in this taxonomy is, that either type of government could be good, but also that it could manifest itself in a corrupted version under unfortunate circumstances (e.g. a bad tyrant in a monarchical state, an obnoxious aristocracy in an ‘ottimanical’ state and so on).

What Machiavelli contributes to the discussions of this taxonomy is to introduce a certain political dynamism, or a wish for it, into his ideal of a great republic; where previous political philosophers had stressed the mixture of the best elements of oligarchy and democracy, or Medieval thinkers reconciled themselves to simply trumpeting the excellence of a solemnly monarchical state, or ‘Sacred Empire’, Machiavelli looks back on the Roman Republic and finds there what he views as a truly Mixed Government: Machiavelli introduces the last of the three forms of government, that of monarchy, into the conception of his ideal republic, which initially seems paradoxical as republics are supposed to stand in opposition to kings and tyrants.

But to Machiavelli, ‘regal power’ does not have to equal kingship and hereditary political power; instead one may find such power in public institutions, such as that of the consuls of the Roman Republic.[iv] According to Machiavelli, including ‘regal power’ in the constitution of a republic will strengthen the republic by adding adaptability and dynamism, which are sorely needed qualities in the face of an emergency.[v]

Thus we recognize one of Machiavelli’s contributions to republicanism to be his expansion and development of the doctrine of mixed government, and the introduction and elevation of political dynamism into the ideal state. These contributions were to be hugely influential to later writers, both Anglo-American and Continental.[vi] Another contribution, related to political dynamism, which we shall attribute to Machiavelli is that of the desirability of conflict which we shall now discuss.

With the possible exception of Socrates and his “Athenian Gadly”, every political thinker up until Machiavelli had traditionally held the view that cohesion and order within states was the desirable ideal. In medieval times, political philosophy naturally revered around the benefits of aristocratic/feudalistic political structures, but even in antiquity with its somewhat more mixed political landscape we find Cicero’s dictum, that nations should stick together “like bands of robbers”.

In short, we may say that Machiavelli was profoundly original in not just accepting, but also in putting himself in favour of a conflict of the orders.[vii] This terminology is derived from the historical Roman Republic with its Patrician, Equestrian, and Plebeian ‘orders’, amongst others, but the pure principle, derived of historical context could be said to be a view that stresses the diversion and de-centralization of power within the Republic as well as a valuing the dialectic between the elite/masses and the people in general.

To attain a sense of the idiosyncrasy of this view, we may note that it puts Machiavelli in direct opposition his friend and contemporary political theorist Guicciardini as well as to the Medicis. Instead these other renaissance voices tended believe that politics would be easier if only the people ‘stayed out’; i.e. exercised no political power.

In the face of this, Machiavelli stressed the contrary; importance of involving the people in the governing process: For while the people may be labile and frivolous, the people have no wish to oppress and thus the involvement of the people can be seen as a political safeguard by which to guarantee the freedom of the republic. Thus we writes:

“The feud between plebs and senate what was made this Republic [Rome] both free and mighty.”[viii]

And further:

“Those who condemn the feud between rich and poor attack the very instance that makes a state free. They see the clamour but not its beneficial effects. All legislature that serves Liberty is produced out of the conflict between the different orders of the state.”[ix]

While these observations introduce the principle of checks and balances into Republican government, to “watch and keep each other reciprocally in check”, the principle of checks and balances is actually open to the ebb and flow of political conflict (as opposed to the more static limits set fourth by the American constitution).[x] Generally, this room for a modification of the checks and balances echoed the actually leeway allowed in the historical Roman Republic, but to Machiavelli this flexibility regarding would also allow active competence (virtù) to rise to the surface of republican politics, so that the republic may align itself with fortune and prudence (Fortuna).[xi] Thus, the tenet of republican government themselves may be allowed to wax and wane over time so long as this process does not permanently debase the relationship between the orders.

Political Dynamism and the Citizen Army

Within the broader political thinking of Machiavelli, he had several reasons to pursue this goal of political dynamism through republicanism, or as he says in his own words: “A Degree of popular government [in the Republic].”

One reason Machiavelli stresses the importance of popular government would be the fact that Machiavelli, himself a military theoretician and an infantry captain, held a firm belief in schooled citizen armies as opposed to mercenaries whom he criticizes in all of his major works.[xii] As such, a republic is necessary for the establishment and proper maintenance of such a citizen army, as is of course the citizens themselves, as the military republic par excellence is of course the Roman Republic.

In a continuation of this line of reasoning, Machiavelli establishes the following argument: Since untrained soldiers cannot be relied on, and since the training and courage of mercenaries in unknown and unreliable, the army of a state must be composed of loyal subject so that it is possible to continually train the army. The best way to ensure the loyalty of the subjects is to let them partake in the government to some degree (i.e. republicanism) and – contrary to popular conception – only second best is to be in the service of a competent (possessing virtue) and feared prince.[xiii]

This partiality on behalf of the armed citizen was to be found again in both Harrington and amongst the American founding fathers. However, while the existence of armed citizens within the state might serve to guarantee the liberty of the people that would be no guarantee that the people would not abuse these liberties, given the wrong circumstances. That is why the founding fathers would later oppose the Machiavellian/Roman institution of allowing the people to exercise their will directly upon the political process by virtue of majority vote. Similarly, that is also why Machiavelli wrote, that while and armed citizen certainly possesses liberty, he does not certainly possess the political wisdom to do good and thus may all too easily vote to oppress the liberties of another, or – ultimately – vote in support of a Caesar or a Sulla, which did in fact seem to be the historical reality of the Roman past.

The republic was in many ways a multi-faceted political system that stretches back into an archaic, semi-mythological past. The exact lifespan of the Roman Republic is also a matter of dispute,  though most accounts stretch from the expulsion of the last Roman kings in 510 BCE. to ca. 49 BCE when Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

The Roman Republic was governed by an ancestral constitution known as the Mos maiorum. The constitution was unwritten and subject to continuous evolution through the centuries.[ii] The constitution of the Roman Republic is notable for mixing the three predominant forms of government known to antiquity (democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy known from Athens, Sparta and Rome’s past), thus creating a separation of powers where the democratic element was represented by legislative assemblies, the aristocratic by the Senate, and the monarchical by executive political offices, most notably those of the consuls. The political life of the Roman Republic was increasingly plagued by tumults between the aristocratic and democratic elements of government and the traditional modern historical account of the fall of the Roman Republic often stresses this tension as the chief cause of the eventual fall of the Roman Republic (along with Tacitus’ standard claim that the Republic’s territory had simply become too large to be efficiently managed by infighting political entities.).

The Division of Powers

Briefly stated, the senate was nominally responsible for military and foreign policy, and for advising the executive political magistrates of the republic. However, the Senate could not legislate directly. This was the privilege of the people’s assemblies, along with that of electing political magistrates.

Finally the Republic’s elected magistrates were responsible for commanding the military (Imperium), appointing new senators, collecting taxes, arranging public entertainment and games, and so on. Upon this constitutional foundation, an intricate set of veto’s, checks and balances were in place all serving the purpose of limiting the accumulation of political power, thus securing the liberties of the Roman people.

In regards to the liberties enjoyed by the Roman citizens of antiquity we might note the individual’s right to enter legal contracts, right to fair trial and appeal, right to vote, right to migrate, and the right not be exposed to torture. These rights jointly embodied the republican virtue known as rule of law: A theme explicitly found in Cicero’s In Defense of Cluentius where it is argued, that is it through the existence of the law that Roman citizen can enjoy equality and liberty. As Cicero says: “We are all the slaves of the laws in order that we may be free.”.[iii]

Military and Warfare

It is of interest to us to note, that in regards to the division of powers under the Roman Republic, only the centurion assembly could declare war, a move later mirrored in the United States Constitution, which states, that only the House of Representatives can declare war.

In regards to later republicanists, the Roman military was chiefly an inspiration in the form it had prior to the Marian reforms in 107 BCE. Under this “archaic doctrine” members of the Roman citizen army had to possess a personal fortune of at least 3000 sesterces and to own and supply his own weapons and armour. As such, the citizen-soldiers under the archaic doctrine were mostly landowners.

The Marian reforms have traditionally been commended by military historians for dramatically bolstering Roman manpower but in regards to Republicanism, including the landless citizens in the army posed a domestic and political (rather than foreign and military thread) in that it was perceived that the landowners and those in possession of some fiscal strength would be uninterested in ever turning their arms on the state itself. As such, it is ironic that one of the most notable side effect of the Marian reforms was that the Legions eventually became loyal to their commanders rather than to the Roman state. These political complications are grist for the Republicanists’ mill and quite rightly so.

Harrington, apparently a man of great learning, about whom not much is otherwise known, is responsible for one of the most defining voices of the republicanism of seventeenth century England. While they all acknowledge the Oceana to be an original work, scholars have called it both ‘tedious’ and ‘baroque’ and in as such it might be tempting to ignore Harrington’s thought. However, for the thinker interested in the republican tradition, Harrington cannot be ignored for not only does he rely heavily on the Roman Republic in his work, he had also certainly read Machiavelli’s Discourses, and Hobbes’ Leviathan.[i]

The First Principles of The Ocena

The primary pivot, around most of which the Oceana’s political philosophy reverts is that of the ownership of agrarian lands (a common thought until humanity finally escaped Malthus’ trap somewhere in the 19th century CE). In Harrington’s ideal republic, the agrarian lands are somewhat evenly distributed amongst a  non-hereditary gentry-aristocracy which should constitute the middle-class of the republic. As such, Harrington’s political vision is strangely idiosyncratic as Harrington casts aristocracy in the role of both the wealthy landowner that Machiavelli praised before him, and of the common-sensical Yeoman whom the founding fathers of America would praise after him.[ii] Whether such a mixture of psychological qualities is possible in the same person is, however, a good question and one that Harrington neglects to answer, giving his writings a heavily utopian character.

Never the less, as we have noted above, Harrington does draw upon the Roman Republican past, and in doing so Harrington asserts that a strong agrarian middle class is the best way of ensuring the political stability of a Republic and argues – somewhat bizarrely – that England should ensure the cultivation of Wales and Scotland in the same manner as the Roman eventually ensured the cultivation of all of Italy.[iii]

Likewise, in reading the Oceana, one is continuously struck by the paradoxical nature of Harrington’s thought. Thus he at once appears to be pitted very strongly against the ‘regal power’ (i.e. monarchical elements) of mixed government that Machiavelli and the Romans of antiquity had adhered to, yet on the other hand he is also mistrustful of the democratic elements of such an order. And so, Harrington appears to instate a compromise class in his gentry-aristocracy to form the middle class of his ideal republic. Yet this simply appears to beg the question: Why and how is Harrington a republicanist, rather than an oligarch endorsing some minor correctives to the oligarchy?

Harrington’s Legitimate Use of the Roman Past

In spite ofHarrington’s excentricities, however, it would be foolish of us to simply reject Harrington’s contribution to the political philosophy of republicanism as he – in spite of his many idiosyncrasies – also manages to draw upon the Roman past with a mixture of competent understanding and insightful originality. As such, Harrington seems to call for the establishment of a Senate-like political body of greater aristocrats to preside over the middle-class of gentry-aristocrats. Yet at the same time the Senate should not have legislative powers, and the gentry should have the privilege of electing two “Knights”; executive political magistrates who are to serve for three-year terms and who are able to plead and reason with the Senate on behold of the gentry-aristocratic middle-class.

In his fiscal elevation of the middle class (i.e. to the status of small aristocrats, at least in theory) Harrington simultaneously also manages to provide his republic with a well-trained citizen army of landowners a la Machiavelli; – one that he wishes to divide into soldiers fighting on foot and soldiers fighting from horseback, a la Rome. Thus the Roman Marian reforms which facilitated the transition of the Roman military from landowners, loyal to the existing political order, to professional soldiers, loyal to their immediate commanders; – these reforms are largely seen as something to avoid which is wholly in line with sound republican thinking. Importantly, Harrington’s ideas regarding the armed classes and their loyalties were to play a crucial role in the education and later political deliberation of America’s founding fathers, particularly with regards to the thought of Thomas Jefferson.[v]

Harrington, Jefferson and Direct Democracy

Another point where Harrington would exert great influence over America’s founding fathers was in his distrust of direct democracy. Harrington posits, that his ideal republic is too large for the people to effectively assemble like the Romans did (and which in fact even the Roman republic was), but even this congent argument cannot hide Harrington’s generally disfavourable attitude towards the direct exertion of power by the people.[vi] Harrington’s solution is straightforward: It is for the people to elect sound-minded representatives to handle their political affairs for them.

Thus, while Harrington remains a bizarre figure in the history of republican thought, he was at the time time an important precursor for some of the most important ideas of the American Revolution.

Leviathan. While this work is considered central to any discussion of European political philosophy. Hobbes occupied a very notable role in seventeenth-century England, in that he contrasted with many of his contemporaries who were more favourably inclined towards republicanism.

The central tenet of Leviathan, is well-known: As the natural state of man is to be as a wolf towards his fellow man [homo homini lupus est / bellum omnium contra omnes], this necessitates a state ruled by a universally recognized sovereign. Only through this Leviathan-king’s complete political power and sovereignty can man’s individual liberties be guaranteed and preserved.[i]

In a sense, this argument can be regarded as an early version of the Social Contract, a thought that was the subject of much scrutiny from the continental political philosophers of early-modern Europe, and which Machiavelli had implicitly rejected. Throughout the period, varying stances towards this social contract were developed and defined, though they need not concern us overmuch here. What is important is rather that, given Hobbes’ argument that individual liberties can only be guaranteed by the sovereign, all forms of rebellion or political dissent opposing the universal authority of the sovereign, and by extent also opposing the social contract of the sovereign is seen as undesirable.[ii] We note here, the complete disagreement with Machiavelli and his progenies who stressed the importance of disconcert within the state as a prerequisite for political dynamism and innovation.[iii]

In reading the Leviathan it is interesting that one finds no explicit means by which Hobbes would ensure the  political dynamism and innovation of Machiavelli. Hobbes’ solution to the problem of how to rule may render stability, but his state will soon fossilize, like that of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries CE.

In other words, the Leviathan-state aims to achieve and provide security for man against his fellow man, peace from the bellum omnium contra omnes. But peace at the cost of a centralized and inviolatable authority will lead to stagnation, says Machiavelli.

Hobbes’ Concept of Liberty is too Narrow

So the Leviathan is concerned first and foremost with stability and only then with the dynamics of civil life within the state. Perhaps that is also why the Leviathan defines Liberty rather narrowly; both in relation to other political philosophies, contemporary and otherwise, but also narrow in relation to the earlier works of Hobbes himself. The concept of liberty in Leviathan is almost narrowed down to mean the freedom, or non-restriction of physical movement and motion.[iv]

Another interesting difference, is that were Machiavelli saw his political theory as a continuation of the Roman Republican tradition, and based himself on the annals of the Roman historian Livy, Hobbes argued that too much value had been placed on the political precedents found in the chronicles of Greece and Rome:

“In these Western parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning institution, and rights of commonwealths, from Arisotle, Cicero and other men, Greeks and Romans, that living under popular states, derived those rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of practice of their own commonwealths which were popular… And so Aristotle, so Cicero, and other writers have grounded their civil doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans who were taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome; and afterwards by their successors. And by reading of these Greek and Latin authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false show of liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns; and again; and again of controlling these controllers; with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so dearly bought, as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.”[v]

So Hobbes is saying that his philosophy is a doctrine that is more adequately equipped to protect man from his own bestial nature (“…not from the principles of nature…”). And so Hobbes turns away from earlier conceptions of Liberty – from Antiquity as well as from the Renaissance – and also turns away from Liberty as it was concieved by his contemporaries (“under a false show of liberty”). And finally, Hobbes stresses political stability and individual security over the political dynamism of Machiavelli (“…with the effusion of so much blood”).

The conclusion is that Hobbes is actually encouraging his contemporary political philosophers to shun away from the precedents set by Greece and Rome, amongst other things because the notion of classical Antiquity that it is acceptable to kill a tyrant is anathema to the idea of the inviolatable Leviathan-king. One could perhaps wonder why this break from tradition is not more expounded upon in general histories of political philosophy.

In fact, Hobbes is quite a proto-totalitarian: For he also advises us that looking at Liberty through the prism of Greek and Roman politics is to confuse the Liberty of the state with the Liberty of the individual.[vi] While Hobbes maintains that individual freedom is strongest when it is least threatened (i.e. guaranteed by a universally recognized sovereign), other republicanists, such as Machiavelli, protest, that even if such a sovereign was to provide perfect political liberty of justice to his subjects, it would never the less only be possible to be free in a state where one has the possibility of participating in the political process.[vii] What such republicanists posit, in other words, is that it is only possible to be free in a free state.[viii]

In conclusion, Hobbes calls for a state that leaves the citizen with no political avenues open to him. From a republican or liberal point of view, this is grave, and especially so if the citizen should happen to differ with his monarch in the perseverance and execution of his civil liberties. Furthermore, being subordinated and bound to the will of another, the citizen of the Leviathan state stands in stark contrast to both the vigourous, public persona of Machiavelli’s homo republicus as well as to the self-trusting, self-owning Yeoman that was Thomas Jefferson’s later ideal and in many ways formed the basis of revolutionary American thought.

Nyt storværk af den amerikanske arkitekturautoritet Michael Sheridan kigger tilbage på 1950’ernes Danmark og stiller skarpt på periodens arkitektoniske perler.

af Ryan Smith

Pyramiderne, Kolossen på Rhodos og Babylons hængende haver: Når vi snakker arkitektur, henviser ’vidundere’ og ’mesterværker’ altid til de altoverskyggende konstruktioner. Men hvad nu, hvis der også kunne være skønhed i det diminutive, det simple – hvis mesterværker også kunne være små og subtile? Det er, hvad den amerikanske arkitekt Michael Sheridan har sat sig for at finde ud af med nyudgivelsen Mesterværker – enfamiliehuset i dansk arkitekturs guldalder.

For de fleste er dansk arkitekturs guldalder noget med københavner-klassicismen i det nittende århundrede, dvs. Domhuset, Christiansborg Slotskirke og Thorvaldsens Museum. For Sheridan, der er international anerkendt ekspert i dansk arkitektur, er dansk guldalderarkitektur imidlertid noget ganske andet: Flot som den er, så er klassicismen i Danmark nemlig blot en afskrift af bredere strømninger på det europæiske kontinent og derfor intet særligt. Nej, ifølge Sheridan skal dansk arkitekturs guldalder findes et ganske andet sted, nemlig i 1950’ernes uprætentiøse modernisme, der i en international sammenhæng er noget helt unikt.

50’er-bevægelsen er kendetegnet ved navne som Jørn Utzon, Arne Jacobsen, Halldor Gunnløgson og Vilhelm Wohlert og ved hovedværker som det epokegørende Utzon hus i Hellebæk, det innovativt intime Varmings hus i Gentofte, og det gådefuldt dragende Bohrs hus i Tisvildeleje. Og i Mesterværker får vi både en stribe detaljerede og rigt illustrerede portrætter af disse hovedværker såvel som baggrund og biografier af navnene, der byggede dem.

Med Sverige som mellemstation

Men hvad vi også får er en grunding indføring i, hvordan den danske fortolkning af modernismen tager sig ud i en international kontekst. Vi lærer, at udviklingen væk fra det stålsatte og upersonlige og frem mod det hjemlige og det naturlige startede i Sverige med arkitekten Gunnar Asplunds fornyelse af offentlige og private bygninger op igennem 20’erne og 30’erne. Svenskerne såede kimen til, hvad danskerne skulle høste, men svenskerne svøbte stadig deres bygninger i traditionens gevandter: Et stilgreb fra Grækenland her, en romersk portal der, og perfekte geometriske former går igen som det gennemvævede nik til oplysningstiden, der endnu kan skimtes i Stockholms bylandskaber den dag i dag.

Hvis de svenske arkitekter stod i arv til oplysningstiden, så var danskerne børn af romantikken. Det var danskernes forkærlighed for det simple og hverdagsagtige – det uprætentiøse – der for alvor fik menneskeliggjort modernismen og blødt op på dens kolde facade. Derved tillod de danske arkitekter modernismen at være en medspiller snarere end en modspiller til den natur, der omgiver mesterværkerne, såvel som til de mennesker, der skulle bo i dem.

Maskiner til at bo i

”Huse er maskiner til at bo i,” lød det standhaftige motto fra den schweizisk-franske funktionalist Le Corbusier, der også populært kaldes den moderne arkitekturs fader. Mennesket måtte forlige sig med at have et forhold til sin bolig, der hverken var dybere eller mere følelsesbetonet end det forhold, det havde til sin brødrister eller sin tandbørste, og den dag i dag klager indbyggerne i visse af hans projekter over, at det upersonlige udtryk får dem til at føle sig utrygge. Anderledes gik det med den danske modernisme: De danske arkitekter tænkte nemlig først som sidst på de mennesker, der skulle bo i deres bygninger. Opbrudte grundflader og asymmetriske rum kan accepteres, hvis de får bygningen til at gå i ét med naturen, sådan at både hus og have smelter sammen til et trygt og intimt helle. Et godt eksempel er Eva og Niels Koppels berømte Varmings hus i Gentofte, hvor rum glider grænseløst ind i hinanden, og etagerne ikke er opdelt, men åbner sig for hinanden, sådan at husets indre landskab udfolder en abstrakt spejling af naturen udenfor. Skråninger bliver til trapper, forhøjninger bliver til alkover, og overgangen mellem ude og inde blødes op med terrasser, der ruller ud i naturstenpergola’er for til sidst at rinde ud i havens dybgrønne, frodige græsstrå.

Ud over arkitektur og historie stiller Mesterværker også skarpt på de politiske forhold, der prægede perioden. Her bliver det klart, hvordan selv store arkitekter konstant måtte sno sig omkring den såkaldte statslånsordning, hvor den danske stat stillede lån til rådighed for til gengæld at lægge restriktioner på byggestile og -materialer. Bogen præsenterer statslånsordningen i neutrale vendinger som en foranstaltning, der både begrænsede og virkede som en katalysator med sine evindelige krav om konservatisme. Mellem linjerne læses der dog et vist vemod, eksempelvis over Jørn Utzons skelsættende hus nær Hellebæk, der oprindeligt skulle være helt anderledes nytænkende inden for den modernistiske stilretning, men hvis oprindelige tegninger blev afvist af magistraterne i staten, hvorfor bygningen endte som en noget mere konservativ (måske endda kedelig) konstruktion.

Når der først går politik i processen, er forfaldet ofte lige om hjørnet, og ved udgangen af Mesterværker ser vi, hvordan 1950’ernes guldalder ebbede ud i 1960’erne, da staten prioriterede kvantitet over kvalitet og derved tippede balancen mellem funktion og variation. Staten og industrien tog gradvist over fra arkitekterne og på visse stræk af 60’erne blev der bygget op imod 50 standardiserede (og i Sheridans øjne; sjæleløse) parcelhuse om dagen. Og således gik det til, at den danske modernismes konstruktioner, der fra begyndelsen havde haft mennesket i højsædet, alligevel endte som ”maskiner til at bo i” fra 60’erne og frem.

Skulle man afslutningsvis nævne en svaghed ved Sheridans ellers fortræffelige bog, så er bogen trykt i et enormt format, der besværliggør håndteringen og sløver læsehastigheden. Her kunne bogen med fordel være blevet delt op i to-tre mindre bind, sådan som Arkitektakademiets nylige Tiden med Utzon blev det.

Vi tænker normalt på dansk arkitektur som havende en særlig affinitet for romantikken. Efter Mesterværker står det imidlertid klart, hvordan nyere dansk arkitektur og æstetik primært er formet af modernismen. Men idet vi lod os omforme af modernismen, omformede vi også den, og derved skabtes den unikt danske, menneskelige modernisme.

Michael Sheridan
Mesterværker – enfamiliehuset i dansk arkitekturs guldalder
336 sider, 450 kroner
Strandberg Publishing, 2011

I denne spændende debat søger to borgerlige debattører at afdække de væsentlige brudflader mellem konservatisme og liberalisme. Mange væsentlige punkter bliver berørt, såsom religionens rolle i samfundet, det amerikanske eksempel, samt hvilken rolle en fremtidig velfærdsstat skal spille, om nogen.

Liberalisme: Christopher Arzrouni
Konservatisme: Kasper Støvring
Ordstyrer: Jacob Mchangama

Optaget engang under Fogh-årene, men lige så relevant i dag som dengang. Vi ejer ikke rettighederne til podcasten, men bringer den alene som en hosting-service. Benyt afspilleren nedenfor til at lytte til podcast’en. God fornøjelse:

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