Category Archives: Historie

Sørine Gotfredsen og root causery

af Pernille Sørensen, cand.mag.

Den britiske journalist Nick Cohen har advaret mod det, han kalder ‘root causery’, hvilket den danske journalist Søren K. Villemoes giver en glimrende opsummering af begrebet i nyhedsmagasinet Ræson:

[Root causery er en praksis] hvor man automatisk læser sine egne politiske mærkesager ind i terroristens gerninger. Da al Qaeda sprængte bomber på Bali, var flere debattører i England ude og tale om, at det også skyldtes vestens uansvarlige turisme i fjernøsten – som om at al Qaeda kæmpede for bæredygtig turisme. Da bomberne sprang i Madrid i 2004, var mange ude og give Spaniens deltagelse i Irak-krigen skylden – som om al Qaeda var en slags antikrigsaktivister. Da Westergaard blev overfaldet i sit hjem, bebrejdede flere hans tegning – som om terroristen kæmpede for den gode tone i debatten. Forklaringerne har det med at minde mistænkeligt meget om folks egne politiske holdninger.
     Man har ofte en tendens til at læse egne aversioner, idiosynkrasier og politiske holdninger ind i terrorismen. Men det er en fælde – det siger altid mere om den, der fremkommer med analysen end om terroren og terroristen.

Her vil jeg blot tilføje, at netop ‘root causery’ også er hvad den danske sognepræst Sørine Gotfredsen gjorde sig skyldig i, da hun i sin (dunkelt tænkte og dunkelt skrevede) kronik ‘Lad os bruge Anders Breivik rigtigt‘ gjorde Breiviks terrorhandlinger til et spørgsmål om den muslimske indvandring til Europa.

Ifølge Gotfredsen så skal Breiviks terrorangreb forklares med, at ”volden vil bryde ud, når islam og kristendom støder sammen”; og – fordi indvandringen og multikulturalismen ”presser menneskene mere end hvad klogt er.” Men her gør Gotfredsen sig skyldig i root causery, for efter retssagen mod Breivik er overstået kan vi se, at Anders Breivik er et svært forstyrret menneske; en identitetsforstyrret ”rebel without a cause”, der (som han selv har indrømmet) lige så gerne ville have slået til mod Obama, som mod det norske socialdemokrati. En mand, der før han blev terrorist prøvede at gøre sig gældende i politik, men opgav da det viste sig for møjsommeligt. En langt bedre forklaring på Breivik er derfor, at manden er narcissist, og at han ville have kastet sig over hvad som helst, som kunne give ham berømmelse og beundring i ekstremistiske kredse.

Og sådan kan vi også forklare hvorfor Breivik lige så gerne ville have slået til mod Obama. I en tid uden muslimsk indvandring var der stadig folk, som skød på John Lennon, JFK og Ronald Reagan. Fordi det gav berømmelse og beundring.

Gotfredsen på gyngende grund

I sin kronik ’Kampen mod det tomme rum’ (Berlingske 2. august) skriver sognepræst Sørine Gotfredsen sig ind i en række postulater, som i bedste fald er uunderbyggede, og som i værste fald er forkerte.  Her vil jeg forklare hvorfor.

For det første skriver Gotfredsen, at grundlaget for den menneskelige erkendelse af sig selv er, at der er en ”intention bag det skabte.” Dog er det sådan, at mennesket i Gotfredsens og min levetid har kigget længere ud i rummet, og dybere ind i kvanter og kvarker end nogensinde før i historien. Man har kortlagt det menneskelige genom og lokaliseret Higgs’ boson. Men uanset hvor vi har kigget, så har vi kun fundet mønstre – millioner af mønstre, men absolut ingen beviser på en hensigt.

***

Hos Gotfredsen hedder det også, at selvom vi opløser kønssyn og normer, så ”findes de på sin vis stadigvæk. Blot i mere diffus og dermed mere barsk form.” Men det er der intet, der tyder på. Ser man tilbage på de sidste 50 års historie i Danmark, så er det tydeligt, at samfundet som helhed, og manderollen i særdeleshed, har gennemgået en massiv opløsning: Hvor det dengang forventedes af mænd, at de satte sig i respekt og løste deres konflikter med vold, så er det i dag i langt højere grad et mere åbent spørgsmål, hvordan den typiske mand skal agere. Men over hele linjen, så er manderollen blevet mere og mere adskilt fra brugen af vold. Hustruvold var f.eks. langt mere almindeligt i Danmark for 50 år siden, end det er i dag, og hvis Gotfredsen mener, at hustruvold i dag findes i en ”mere diffus og barsk form” end i 1962, ja, så kunne jeg som læser i hvert fald godt tænke mig at få noget bevis for den påstand.

***

Gotfredsens måde at tænke på er nærmest en slags åndelig marxisme; et historisk nulsumsspil, hvor kapitalejerens brød kun kan komme fra arbejdernes sved. I Sørines version er det blot sådan, at en norm ikke for alvor kan forsvinde fra samfundet, men at den altid må vedblive at eksistere iblandt os på en hemmelighedsfuld spøgelsesmåde, som vi godt nok ikke kan sætte en finger på, men som Sørine bare ved, eksisterer.

Politikere kan tage fejl

af Ryan Smith

Jakob Lau Holst, vicedirektør i Vindmølleindustrien, nævner i Børsen d. 13. juli tallet 2,3 % som den faktiske andel af verdens energiforsyning, der kommer fra vind. Det modsiger mit estimat, som lød på 0,5 % eller mindre. Men Holsts beregning antager imidlertid, at vinden altid blæser perfekt, og at vindmøllerne således kan køre på fuld kapacitet året rundt. I virkelighedens verden blæser vinden dogn med varierende styrke, og ifølge det amerikanske Massachusetts Maritime Academy, så anslås årsgennemsnittet for vindmøller at ligge omkring 20 % af vindmøllernes maksimalkapacitet, og 20 % af 2,3 er 0,46, hvilket som bekendt mindre end 0,5.

Men Holst har endnu et slående argument i ærmet: “Verdens politikere tager ikke fejl,” samt desuden at “den brede politiske opbakning er et utvetydigt udtryk for, at vindkraftens business case for samfundet er ualmindeligt god.”

Har Holst ret? Det kan enhver afgøre med sig selv på 20 sekunder. Man behøver blot spørge sig selv, hvor stor en rolle interaktivt tv og virtual reality-simulatorer spiller for ens hverdag, sammenlignet med trådløst internet og mobiltelefoner.

Forskellen er nemlig som følger: Interaktivt tv og virtual reality-simulatorer er teknologier, som verdens politikere engang så som fremtidens store markeder, mens trådløst internet og kommerciel mobiltelefoni blev introduceret af private koncerner, mens politikerne kiggede den anden vej.

De teknologier, som politikerne engang var så glade for, var altså dem, som senere viste sig at være blindgyder. Men før den indsigt stod klar for enhver, så havde politikerne nået af hælde millioner og atter millioner af skattekroner i dem. For “det var jo det, vi skulle leve af i fremtiden.”

Så jo: Verdens politikere tager undertiden fejl. De er blot mennesker, ligesom os andre.

Hvorfor socialisme må slå fejl

Af Hans-Hermann Hoppe, professor i økonomi

Socialisme og kapitalisme tilbyder markant forskellige løsninger til det problem, der udgøres af knaphed: enhver kan ikke få alting, de ønsker, når de ønsker det, så hvordan kan vi effektivt beslutte hvem, der skal eje og kontrollere de resurser, vi har? Den valgte løsning har omfattende konsekvenser. Den kan betyde forskellen mellem velstand og forringelse, frivillig bytning og politisk tvang, sågar totalitarisme og frihed.

Det kapitalistiske system løser knaphedsproblemet ved at anerkende retten til privat ejendom. Den første til at bruge en vare, er dens ejer. Andre kan kun tilegne sig den gennem handel og frivillige kontrakter. Men indtil ejeren af ejendommen vælger at lave en kontrakt eller bytte sin ejendom, kan han gøre hvad han vil med den, så længe han ikke blander sig i eller fysisk skader andres ejendom.

Det socialistiske system forsøger at løse ejerskabsproblemet på en helt anden måde. Ligesom under kapitalisme kan folk eje forbrugsvarer. Men under socialisme er ejendom, der tjener som produktionsmiddel, kollektivt ejet. Ingen person er i stand til at eje maskinerne og andre resurser, der går til at producere forbrugsvarer. Menneskeheden ejer dem, så at sige. Hvis folk benytter produktionsmidlerne, kan de kun gøre det som opsynsmænd for hele samfundet.

Økonomisk lov garanterer, at skadelige økonomiske og sociologiske effekter altid vil følge socialiseringen af produktionsmidlerne. Det socialistiske eksperiment vil altid resultere i fiasko.

For det første: socialisme resulterer i mindre investering, mindre opsparing og lavere levestandarder. Når socialisme i første omgang indføres, skal ejendom omfordeles. Produktionsmidlerne er frataget dets nuværende brugere og producenter og givet til samfundet bestående af opsynsmænd. Selvom ejerne og brugerne af produktionsmidlerne erhvervede sig dem gennem fælles samtykke fra de tidligere ejere, bliver de overført til folk, som i bedste fald bliver brugere og producenter af ting, de ikke ejede tidligere.

I dette system straffes tidligere ejere til fordel for nye ejere. Produktionsmidlernes ikke-brugere, ikke-producenter og ikke-kontrahenter favoriseres ved at blive udnævnt til opsynsmands-ranken over ejendom, de tidligere ikke havde brugt, produceret eller kontraheret til at bruge. Således stiger ikke-brugerens, ikke-producentens og ikke-kontrahentens indkomst. Det er det samme for ikke-opspareren, som nyder godt af det på bekostning af opspareren, hvis opsparede ejendom konfiskeres.

Så, tydeligvis, hvis socialisme favoriserer ikke-brugeren, ikke-producenten, ikke-kontrahenten og ikke-opspareren, stiger omkostningerne der skal bæres af brugere, producenter, kontrahenter og dem, som sparer op. Det er nemt at få øje på hvorfor, der vil være færre folk i de sidstnævnte roller. Der vil være mindre original tilegnelse af naturlige resurser, mindre produktion af nye produktionsfaktorer og mindre kontraktindgåelse. Der vil være meget mindre forberedelse for fremtiden, eftersom alles investeringsudmundinger tørrer ud. Der vil være mindre opsparing og mere forbrug, mindre arbejde og mere fritid.

Dette beløber sig til, at der vil være færre forbrugsvarer tilgængelige for bytning, hvilket reducerer alles levestandard. Hvis folk er villige til at løbe risikoen, vil de blive nødt til at gå under jorden for at kompensere for disse tab.

For det andet: socialisme resulterer i ineffektivitet, mangel og enormt spild. Dette er Ludwig von Mises’ indsigt, som opdagede at rationel økonomisk beregning er umulig under socialisme. Han viste, at kapitalgoder under socialisme i bedste fald bruges til produktion af andenrangs behov, og i værste fald til produktion, der tilfredsstiller intet behov overhovedet.

Mises’ indsigt er enkel, men ekstremt vigtig: fordi produktionsmidlerne under socialisme ikke kan sælges, er der ingen markedspriser for dem. Den socialistiske opsynsmand kan ikke fastslå de monetære omkostninger involveret i at bruge resurserne, eller i at foretage ændringer i produktionsprocessers længde. Ej heller kan han sammenligne disse omkostninger med den monetære indkomst fra salg. Han er ikke tilladt at tage imod tilbud fra andre, der ønsker at bruge hans produktionsmidler, så han kan ikke vide, hvad hans tidligere muligheder er. Uden at kende til de tidligere muligheder, kan han ikke kende til sine omkostninger. Han kan ikke engang vide om den måde, hvorpå han producerer, er effektiv eller ineffektiv, ønsket eller uønsket, rationel eller irrationel. Han kan ikke vide, hvorvidt han tilfredsstiller mindre eller mere presserende kundebehov.

Under kapitalisme forsyner pengepriser og frie markeder producenten med denne information. Men under socialisme er der ingen priser for kapitalgoder og ingen muligheder for bytning. Opsynsmanden er efterladt i mørket. Og fordi han ikke kan vide sin nuværende produktionsstrategis status, kan han ikke vide, hvordan den kan forbedres. Jo mindre producenter er i stand til at beregne og engagere sig i forbedring, desto større chancer er der for spild og manglers opståen. I en økonomi, hvor forbrugermarkedet for hans produkter er meget stort, er producentens dilemma endda værre. Det behøver næsten ikke blive pointeret: Når der er ingen rationel økonomisk beregning, vil samfundet synke ind i progressivt forværrende forringelse.

For det tredje: socialisme resulterer i overforbrug af produktionsfaktorerne, indtil de udsættes for dårlig vedligeholdelse og vandaliseres. En privat ejer har under kapitalisme retten til, når som helst, at sælge sin produktionsfaktor og beholde indtægten udledt fra salget. Så det er til hans fordel at undgå at mindske dens kapitalværdi. Fordi han ejer den, er hans mål at maksimere værdien af den faktor, der er ansvarlig for produktionen af de varer og services, han sælger.

Den socialistiske opsynsmands status er helt anderledes. Han kan ikke sælge sin produktionsfaktor, så han har lidt eller ingen tilskyndelse til at sikre, at den bevarer sin værdi. Hans tilskyndelse vil i stedet være at forøge sin produktionsfaktors ydeevne, uden hensyntagen til dens svindende værdi. Der er også den chance, at hvis opsynsmanden fornemmer muligheder ved at bruge produktionsmidlet til private hensigter, – ligesom at lave varer til det sorte marked – vil han blive tilskyndet til at forøge ydeevnen på bekostning af kapitalværdier. Uanset hvilken måde, hvorpå du kigger på det, vil producenter, under socialisme uden privat ejerskab og frie markeder, være tilbøjelige til at fortære kapitalværdier ved at overbruge dem. Fortæring af kapital leder til forringelse.

For det fjerde: socialisme leder til en reduktion i kvaliteten af de varer og services, der er forbrugeren tilgængelige. Under kapitalisme kan en individuel forretningsmand kun opretholde og udvide sit firma, hvis han generhverver sine produktionsomkostninger. Og eftersom efterspørgslen for firmaets produkter afhænger af forbrugervurderinger af pris og kvalitet (pris, som er et kriterium for kvalitet), må produktkvaliteten være en konstant bekymring for producenterne. Dette er kun muligt med privat ejerskab og udveksling på markedet.

Ting er fuldstændig anderledes under socialisme. Ikke mindst er produktionsmidlerne kollektivt ejet, men således er også indkomsten udledt fra salget af ydelsen. Dette er en anden måde at sige, at producentens indkomst har lille eller ingen forbindelse med forbrugervurderingen af producentens arbejde. Dette faktum er selvfølgelig kendt af enhver producent.

Producenten har ingen grund til at yde en speciel indsats for at forbedre kvaliteten af sit produkt. Han vil i stedet hellige relativt mindre tid og flid på at producere, hvad kunderne ønsker, og bruge mere tid på, hvad han ønsker. Socialisme er et system, der tilskynder producenten til at være doven.

For det femte: socialisme leder til politiseringen af samfundet. Noget kan næppe være værre for produktionen af velstand.

Socialisme, i det mindste dens marxistiske version, siger, at dens mål er komplet lighed. Marxisterne observerer, at når først du tillader privat ejendom i produktionsmidlerne, så tillader du forskelle. Hvis jeg ejer resurse A, så ejer du den ikke, og vores forhold til resurse A bliver anderledes og ulige. Ved i ét hug at afskaffe privat ejendomsret i produktionsmidlerne, siger marxisterne, bliver alle medejere af alting. Dette reflekterer alles lige stilling som mennesker.

Virkeligheden er meget anderledes. At erklære alle medejere af alting løser kun af navn forskelle i ejerskab. Det løser ikke det virkelige, grundlæggende problem: der forbliver forskelle i magten til at kontrollere, hvad der skal ske med resurserne.

Under kapitalisme kan personen, som ejer en resurse, også kontrollere, hvad der skal ske med den. I en socialiseret økonomi gør dette sig ikke gældende, da der ikke længere er nogen ejer. Ikke desto mindre eksisterer kontrolproblemet fortsat. Hvem skal bestemme, hvad der skal ske med hvad? Under socialisme findes der kun en udvej: folk afgør deres uenigheder vedrørende kontrol af ejendom ved at lægge en vilje ovenpå en andens. Så længe der er forskelle, vil folk ordne dem med politiske midler.

Hvis folk ønsker at forbedre deres indkomst under socialisme, er de nødt til at bevæge sig mod en højere værdsat position i opsynsmandshierarkiet. Det kræver politisk talent. Under et sådant system vil folk være nødt til at bruge mindre tid og flid på at udvikle deres produktive færdigheder, og mere tid og flid på at forbedre deres politiske talenter.

Som folk udskifter deres roller som producenter og brugere af resurser, finder vi ud af, at deres personligheder ændrer sig. De dyrker ikke længere evnen til at forudse knaphedssituationer, til at benytte produktive muligheder, til at være opmærksomme på teknologiske muligheder, til at forudse ændringer i kundeefterspørgslen og til at udvikle marketingsstrategier. De har ikke længere brug for at kunne tage initiativ, at kunne arbejde og at kunne møde andres behov.

I stedet udvikler folk evnen til at samle offentlig opbakning bag deres egen position og holdning ved hjælp af midler som overtalelse, demagogi og intrige, gennem løfter, bestikkelser og trusler. Andre folk når toppen under socialisme end under kapitalisme. Jo højere du kigger i det socialistiske hierarki, desto mere vil du finde folk, som er for inkompetente til at udføre arbejdet, det var meningen, de skulle udføre. Det er ingen hindring i en opsynsmand-politikers karriere at være dum, doven, ineffektiv eller ligeglad. Han behøver blot have overlegne politiske evner. Dette bidrager også til forringelse af samfundet.

USA er ikke fuldt socialiseret, men vi ser allerede de katastrofale effekter af et politiseret samfund, idet vores egne politikere fortsætter med at gøre indgreb i private ejendomsejeres rettigheder. Alle af socialismens forringende effekter er med os i USA: reducerede niveauer af investering og opsparing, fejlfordelingen af resurser, overforbruget og vandaliseringen af produktionsfaktorer og den ringe kvalitet af produkter og services. Og disse er kun smagsprøver på livet under total socialisme.

Oversat af Andreas Persson

The American Broom – an essay on exceptionalism, part 2

Continued from part 1 of this essay.

Essay by Majken Hirche, part 2 of 2.

Conquering the World

Since George Washington there has been a belief in the U.S. that the ‘impression of others’ matter.[1] This is quite spectacular for a nation, and can only be understood in terms of an exceptionalist promise to the future: that the “empire of liberty”, which itself had struggled so much for independence and democracy, now wants to be a role model for the rest of the world. According to literary critic Sacvan Bercovitch, a great deal of New England Puritanism was part of this ideological mix, reframing and transforming narratives from the Old Testament into a new historical mission of the ‘American Jeremiad’[2] who “has the power to begin the world all over again,”[3] and build a “new Jerusalem in the wilderness.”[4]

In order to make such a self-definition work, the non-Americans – the ‘others’ – needed to be less civilized. Or they needed to be evil. Thus, “Manichean categories of New World versus Old or free world versus slave”[5] were the most easy concepts to deploy in public, and luckily for the U.S. there were plenty of candidates around the world which in fact did fit this description – the two most notorious being Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Parallel to the biggest battles in the 20th century, the Second World War and the Cold War against Communism, America emerged as a Superpower, not only in terms of its military and economic might, but also in its irresistible confidence of moral and cultural superiority. Not only did USA build better missiles and invent supermarkets, it also created Hollywood and superheroes such as Superman and Captain America, who became immensely popular icons of the American spirit. They did – and still do – all the necessary cleaning, just like a very cool broom, and they have even been exported successfully to the whole world.

The reference to the Christian tradition and the idea of an American Jeremiad is important in yet another respect: namely in its missionizing techniques by which to convert infidels. Just as it was the case with Paul the Apostle, the belief in an exceptional idea slowly became second to the mission to communicate the idea and make people believe in it. From solely being defenders of an exceptional idea, certain members of the American intelligentsia became crusaders of Americanism endorsing ‘noble lies’ as formulated in Plato’s Republic, by which “myths used by political leaders” should be employed in order to “maintain a cohesive society.”[6] With the publication of books such as ‘The City and Man’ (1964) by Leo Strauss and especially the early ‘Public Opinion’ (1922) by Walter Lippmann, a journalist and political adviser to President Woodrow Wilson, the mission of the apostles and crusaders had gotten a philosophical license to use “stereotypes”[7], myths and noble lies in order to “manufacture consent”[8] – a term later used by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in their highly critical book, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), on modern manipulation of the public by the mass media.

After World War II the idea of the U.S. having inherited a global responsibility to promote freedom was more or less endorsed by the mainstream press.[9] According to vice president Henry A. Wallace the United States should promote “freedom not merely by example or occasional international intervention but via an unending involvement in the affairs of other nations.”[10] This double edged political program of unilateral military interventions had a few successful moments, especially with the airlift into West Berlin in 1948, the Invasion of Grenada (1983) and the intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1995 (via NATO). But most of them were more dubious, and did not necessarily have the promotion of democracy in mind. On the contrary, in 1953 the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, was overthrown with the help of CIA and MI6. One year later the same happened for President Árbenz Guzmán in Guatemala, and in 1961 the U.S. backed the assassination of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem. During the Vietnam War the democratically elected President of Chile, Salvador Allende, was overthrown in 1973. The U.S. also backed the military rulers of El Salvador, and the contras of Nicaragua, beginning in 1981. In 1982 U.S. backed Saddam Hussein in order to fight Iran, and during the 1980’s they supported the Mujaheddin and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in order to fight the Soviets.[11]

Many of these military interventions were seen by the international community as imperialistic crimes, not as exceptional enablers of freedom and democracy. Only by name (“Operation Just Cause”, “Operation Fortune”, “Operation Success” etc.) and by the ‘manufacturing of consent’ they kept a hint of the American spirit – e.g. Captain America’s defence of liberty and democracy from tyranny. In reality, they had everything to do with the communist containment policy of the Truman Doctrine,[12] with controlling ‘America’s backyard’ and, if opportune, with keeping (tyrannical) friends in power.

All these double standards became truly exposed after the unfortunate September 11 attacks in 2001, when a confused and furious American leadership invaded Iraq (“Operation Iraqi Freedom”) on false pretences. To many people inside and outside of the U.S., the 50 year old image of USA as a superhero changed in 2003 from being Captain America to becoming The Incredible Hulk: uncontrollable rage befell the New World, and anybody who just once had said hello to a ‘terrorist’ would by definition be suspected of being a terrorist himself. Even more disturbingly, some of the Civil Rights achievements during the last 200 years started to be annulled. The Patriot Act of 2001 gave the police powers to “arrest suspects, snoop, secretly enter people’s homes without notice and freeze bank assets […] indefinitely, in secret and without legal remedy.”[13] Bush approved the use of torture in secret prisons worldwide, and the defence and intelligence agencies were allowed to gather information on any person at any time.[14] The Obama administration proved different, but only in style. Instead of abiding to Habeas Corpus as a central principle in the Rule of Law, Obama choose to detain a solider accused for leaking classified material to wikileaks (Bradley Manning) indefinitely, and break him psychologically as deterrence for others. And instead of throwing ‘terrorists’ into Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons, as Bush did, Obama prefers to kill them. The Obama administration even keeps a secret and updated “kill list”[15] of which some are American citizens, and the only justification for this conduct is repetition of the words “just trust me”.[16]

Many critics ask today: where is the judicial review; where are the checks and balances; where is the American spirit, and what has become of the idea of ‘American exceptionalism’? One line of thought for finding an answer to these conundrums is that the introduction of manufactured lies and manipulations by the neoconservative movement in the 1920s and 1930s have become perceived as reality by the very same people,[17] and that they, unfortunately, came into power during the Reagan administration and later in the Bush administrations. This group of people had become so blinded by their Manichean world view of good and evil that they were convinced that the Soviet Union had been defeated by their arming of the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, and not because the centrally planned Soviet Union had become an economic paper tiger deemed to collapse by itself.[18]

The beacon of liberty, freedom and democracy, exemplified by a suspended Columbia had slowly but surely evolved into missionizing, forced guidance, manufacturing of opinions and lying to oneself and to the people. The Obama administration might not be accused of deliberate deception, but according to some commentators[19] [20] it has accepted and deployed the “confidence multiplier”, a concept developed by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller,[21] in order to repair public trust in the government. A ‘confidence multiplier’ is the same as saying “just trust me”. It can be an important tool for calming the markets, giving people “hope”, and ensuring stability in foreign relation, but it can equally well be a convenient excuse for lying and deceiving.

From dust to dust

Much can be said about the differences between words and deeds. What is important is that the distance between them does not get too big, and when it does, realignment through a crisis or maybe even a Civil War will lead to the awareness that you have to learn from the mistakes and hopefully grow stronger. American exceptionalism, as exemplified by a hovering Columbia in Gast’s picture, has throughout this thesis been described as having all the qualities of a sweeping broom. This might (rightfully) be seen as a too simplistic analogy, but the hope was that it also could illustrate something important, namely the idea of exceptionalism as a dynamical process, where, borrowing from an expression by Lewis Carroll, it takes all the sweeping you can do, just to keep the same level of cleanness. When the real sweeping is replaced by forlorn handwaving and blatant lies, the basic premise for the United States of America as a ‘beacon of light’ disappears. Because of this, many commentators believe that America’s supremacy has suffered a dramatic decline in influence during the last 20 years. According to a prominent defender of exceptionalism, Joseph Loconte, some critics even have started to despise this diminished light as the quintessence of darkness when they “express their gloomy outlook: ‘The only city on a hill we resemble today is Mordor!’”[22]

In spite of all these grievances the United States of America has had an unprecedented effect on the liberation of the human imagination. It has inspired millions if not billions of people who have been raised by the preconception of the Old World, saying that the masses – the people – cannot govern themselves. This, above all, has been proven wrong by the American way. It IS possible to create your own life, to search for happiness and to decide for yourself, what is best for you. No other country had done that before. And bad for them, because the social, economical and political benefits that spring from an emancipated and self-determining population are still underestimated by the misanthropic rulers of the Old World. Therefore, for a foreseeable future, the United States will most likely continue to be an economic, military and cultural superpower, and the only thing that eventually will bring the U.S. down is a deterioration from within: getting devoured by the contradictions between ideas and actions, getting hijacked by old misanthropes, lost in chauvinist grime and complacency about the challenges ahead – like a broom that does not work anymore.

Bibliography

Aikin, R. C. (2000). Paintings of Manifest Destiny: Mapping the Nation. American Art, 14(3): 78-89.

Akerlof, G. A. & Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Economy. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Becker, J. & Shane, S. (2012). Secret ‘Kill List’ Tests Obama’s Principles. The New York Times, online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

Bercovitch, S. (1978). The American Jeremiad. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.

Chaplin, J. E. (2003) Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History. The Journal of American History, 89(4): 1431-1455.

Clemons, S. (2010). McChrystal’s ”Confidence Job” on Carl Levin and Al Franken. The Huffington Post, online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-clemons/mcchrystals-confidence-jo_b_425936.html

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1992). The Psychological Foundations of Culture. In: The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the generation of Culture. Oxford University Press, New York.

Curtis, A. (2004). In: The Power of Nightmares. Documentary series, BBC Two on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOlwbaPe2os

Davis, D. B. (1986). American Jeremiah. The New York Review of Books, online: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/feb/13/american-jeremiah/?pagination=false

Duncan, R. & Goddard, J. (2009). Contemporary America. 3rd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Foner, E. (2001). American Freedom in a Global Age. The American Historical Review, 106(1): 1-16.

Foner, E. (2003). Who owns History? Hill and Wang, New York.

Gelfert, H.-D. (2006). Typisch amerikanisch. Wie die Amerikaner wurden, was sie sind. 3rd ed., C. H. Beck, München.

Heiskanen, B. (2009). A Day Without Immigrants. European Journal of America Studies, Special issue on Immigration, 3: 1-14.

Hersh, S. M. (2003). Selective Intelligence. The New Yorker, online: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact

Jefferson, T. (1774/1998). Notes on the State of Virginia: Query XIV. Penguin Classics, London.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA.

(LC-DIG-ppmsca-09855, digital file from original print: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ppmsca.09855)

Lippmann, W. (1922/2008). Public Opinion. BN Publishing.

Loconte, J. (2010). Two Cheers for American Exceptionalism. The American, online: http://www.american.com/archive/2010/march/two-cheers-for-american-exceptionalism

Madsen, D. L. (1998). American Exceptionalism. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Rosenthal, A. (2012). President Obama’s Kill List. The New York Times, The Opinion Pages, online: http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/president-obamas-kill-list/?ref=world

Soros, G. (2010). The Soros Lectures: At The Central European University. Public Affairs™, New York.

Tucker, R.W. & Hendrickson, D.C. (1992). Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson. Oxford University Press, New York.

U.S. Government Printing Office: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action

U.S. intervention timeline. Global Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/26024.html

Winthrop, J. (1630).  A Model of Christian Charity, online: http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html

[1]    Foner, E. (2001). American Freedom in a Global Age. The American Historical Review, 106(1): 8.

[2]    Bercovitch, S. (1978). In: The American Jeremiad. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 81.

[3]    Thomas Paine, in: Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 251.

[4]    Davis, D. B. (1986). American Jeremiah. The New York Review of Books, online: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/feb/13/american-jeremiah/?pagination=false

[5]    Foner, American freedom in a Global Age, 6.

[6]    Hersh, S. M. (2003). Selective Intelligence. The New Yorker. Online: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact

[7]    Lippmann, W. (1922/2008). Public Opinion. BN Publishing, 74.

[8]    Ibid., 190.

[9]    Foner, American Freedom in a Global Age, 11.

[10]  Ibid., 2.

[11]  U.S. intervention timeline, in: Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/26024.html

[12]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 259.

[13]  Ibid., 272-273.

[14]  Ibid., 274.

[15]  Becker, J. & Shane, S. (2012). Secret ‘Kill List’ Tests Obama’s Principles. The New York Times, online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

[16]  Rosenthal, A. (2012). President Obama’s Kill List. The New York Times, The Opinion Pages, online: http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/president-obamas-kill-list/?ref=world

[17]  Curtis, A. (2004). In: The Power of Nightmares. Documentary series, BBC Two on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOlwbaPe2os

[18]  Ibid..

[19]  Soros, G. (2010). The Soros Lectures: At The Central European University. Public Affairs™, New York, 67.

[20]  Clemons, S. (2010). McChrystal’s ”Confidence Job” on Carl Levin and Al Franken. The Huffington Post, online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-clemons/mcchrystals-confidence-jo_b_425936.html

[21]  Akerlof, G. A. & Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Economy. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

[22]  Loconte, J. (2010) Two Cheers for American Exceptionalism. The American, online: http://www.american.com/archive/2010/march/two-cheers-for-american-exceptionalism

The American Broom – an essay on exceptionalism, part 1

by Majken Hirche

The great heyday of national romantic expression in American arts took place in the later decades of the 19th century as part of an extensive nostalgic celebration of the 1840s and 1850s America.[1] Embedded in this national romantic spirit the German-American painter John Gast was hired to paint a picture for a travel guide. The picture, called American Progress (Ill.1), has become one of the most famous allegories of Manifest Destiny, a concept that was implied in the expansive colonial period, and more evidently expressed in the profound rhetoric of politicians and writers from the 1830s and onward.[2] In all its simplicity, this ‘original myth’ of Manifest Destiny was the belief that America and the American people, led by God, were destined to expand the American territory from the Atlantic Ocean in east to the Pacific Ocean in the West.[3]

Picture: 1. John Gast, American Progress.[4]

The original picture from 1872 was named Westward Ho/Manifest Destiny.[5]

What strikes at first glance is an oversize Columbia[6] dressed in white with a bright star in her hair. She carries a school book in her arm,[7] and hovers the plains of America while unrolling a telegraph wire, and although the picture is painted from bird’s-eye view, Columbia seems to permit the spectator only to look at her from below. The heavy symbolism makes the picture almost didactic in nature: this is the American spirit. Raised above ground to be gazed upon, shining and shedding light on its path, bringing with it the great idea of freedom, liberty and democracy. The school book symbolizes the belief in education and learning as the best path to a successful life,[8] and the telegraph wire points the direction for the hard working and self-reliant American people, and for the technological progress and enlightenment. At Columbia’s feet the movement of things and people go from right to left, or East to West, from a bright and sunlit landscape inhabited by people and machines, to an obscure and almost empty landscape. The settlers, cowboys, wagons and trains move forward, pushing in front of them darkness, hordes of wild animals and marginalized Indians, who look back and up in terror as they almost flee off the canvas.

It is as if the very movement is created by Columbia herself, who, like a broom, seems to sweep off the barbarism and wilderness, all the ignorance and darkness, as if it was dust on a floor that needs to be swept. At the frontier of dust and cleanness dark clouds rise from the process, but they slowly disappear and become ever more white, never leaving behind any residue of dust and grime. It may sound profane to interpret Columbia as a sweeping broom, but that is what Gast’s picture is suggesting in its most basic and iconic form: an entity hovering above earth, progressively wiping the ground in a non-violent way, making all incivility flee and all darkness enlightened. Moreover, she embodies the work ethics of a protestant, relentlessly working and pushing forward, creating plentiful intellectual and material rewards on her way.

Within the picture is also implied the idea of American exceptionalism, a concept frequently used to characterize the American national identity, and its “development from Puritan origin to the present”.[9] In its most simple form, exceptionalism is the belief that you are something special, and probably also a tiny bit better than everybody else. Thus, exceptionalism needs to be contrasted in order to exist, and therefore you like to be exceptional in a group where you can compare. Psychologically speaking, exceptionalism is a dynamical phenomenon, much like group dynamics in school yards, social associations or platoons of soldiers. If you are a member of the group, you enjoy all the benefits, and if not, you don’t. If you aspire towards membership there may be strong barriers, people who oppose you, tease you, bully you and try to throw you out again. Especially the oldest members might find you suspicious or even hate you, while the newest members might help you. Only with time, persistence and a lot of adaptability you will eventually become a full member.

The American variation of exceptionalism contains the model of a society with some very specific values and ideals, first of all the idea of a society build on freedom, liberty and democracy, and the belief that ”all men are created equal […] and with certain unalienable rights”.[10] American exceptionalism also contains the idea that ”America and the Americans are special, exceptional, because they are charged with saving the world from itself and, at the same time, America and Americans must sustain a high level of spiritual, political and moral commitment to this exceptional destiny”.[11] America must be a “city upon a hill”,[12] an exemplary nation to lead and to be watched by the world.

Of course, for an idea like exceptionalism to survive and thrive through hundreds of years in a nation, it needs not only to contain a core idea full of important truths and insights. It also needs to be adaptable and open for new interpretations in order to accommodate for contradictions and changes within. It is therefore the intent in the next few pages of this thesis to track down some important manifestations of American exceptionalism, and look at how American exceptionalism as national identity is interpreted, and more importantly how American exceptionalism may have been reinterpreted and changed in the light of contradictory facts and historical changes.

The first and most glaring example that will be looked at is America’s long history of slavery. In the eyes of a 21st century American citizen, slavery might seem like a strange barbaric relic in stark contrast to national ideology and self-understanding, but in the time of Jefferson, slavery was a most natural thing and in no obvious way in opposition to the ideals of the Constitution and American exceptionalism.

Following, this thesis will look at how the later waves of immigrants have been seen as both an opportunity and a problem, and how the continuing debates about who is allowed to be an American have shaped the ideas of citizenship and civil rights.

Finally this thesis will look at how American exceptionalism has transformed itself into a global mission: to spread the great idea of freedom, liberty and democracy to the whole world through military, economic and cultural might, and how America in the process has come to be seen as both an inspiration and a corrupting Superpower.

The Slavery Question

“All men are created equal” says the Declaration of Independence,[13] but dust is dust, and black is black, and it cannot be brushed white. Such was Jefferson’s stance on slavery, and he was not alone in his view. Most Americans at that time believed that non-whites were deficient by nature and therefore not eligible for naturalization as republican citizens.[14] This racist argument is the well known naturalistic fallacy of ‘is equals ought’, with roots deep into historical time, and with continuous reformulations into present day. But Jefferson enumerated even more arguments: “It will probably be asked,” he said in his Notes on the State of Virginia,[15] “why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the state, and thus save the expense of supplying, by importation of white settlers, the vacancies they will leave? Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race. – To these objections, which are political, may be added others, which are physical and moral.”

Apart from the ‘real distinctions nature has made’, Jefferson uses pragmatic objections of prejudice, possible revenge and a bit of aesthetic and ethic handwaving, showing a man who has in mind the practical task of nation building, and not so much the defence of American exceptionalism as it was understood in Jefferson’s time, namely as an “empire of liberty”[16] and a model of democracy from hence some day “it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence.“[17]

Later during the 19th century, such lazy arguments defending racism were more difficult to hold. But only in relation to black slaves, not the Indians. In contrast to slaves, the exclusion of Indians was a confirmation of the ‘original myth’ because it was the Indian wars which helped to form the myth of the expanding and exceptional ‘American broom’ in the first place: by sweeping away Indians and taking their land, colonists and settlers “developed a national mythology in which ‘American’ technological and logistic superiority in warfare became culturally transmitted as signs of cultural-moral superiority”, says Deborah. L. Madsen.[18] As previously noted, the idea of Manifest Destiny held that the Americans were ‘exceptional’ and blessed by God with a divine mission to claim and inhabit the West. According to Madsen, “European and ‘American’ ‘civilisation’ morally deserved to defeat Indian ‘savagery’ – Might made right and each victory recharged the culture and justified expansion.”[19] Joyce E. Chaplin further explains that in its old form American exceptionalism “stressed the positive achievements of white residents of North America” and “shunned whatever might have been tragic and ambiguous about their handiwork.”[20]

While Indians were the dust and grime at the frontier of civilization, slavery was an impurity from within. And while the inherent contradictions of the existence of slavery grew during the end of the 18th century and the early 19th century, so did the political divide between abolitionists in North, who wanted to set the slaves free, and the American South which depended heavily on imported slave labour from Africa.[21] Abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison used their high moral ground to argue their case, saying that slavery contradicted the principles on which the country was build. As a counter move the Southern states sought legal means to keep slavery working, and to insulate it from outside influence,[22] that is, from Congress and the government. This was not difficult because the Bill of Rights only protected individuals against infringements by the national government but not the states,[23] and several court cases, of which the Dred-Scott decision in 1857 is the most famous,[24] supported their efforts in this regard.

Raising the stakes, Garrison “branded the Constitution as pro-slavery, and called for its abrogation.”[25] Not much happened, though, except a continuous deterioration of the political union and of the discriminatory conditions under which the slaves had to live both in the South and the North. Only in 1860, when Abraham Lincoln became president, things changed. Lincoln was against the spread of slavery into the Western territories. Faced with the threat of anti-slavery laws, the Southern states seceded from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America, which ultimately led to the Civil War.[26]

What Jefferson feared would “divide us into parties” finally had happened, not because slavery had been abolished, but because it had not. After the Civil War the inclusion of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments abolished slavery, enforced the powers of the federal government and created a national citizenship, making it a protected right to vote for black men. “These measures altered the definition of American citizenship, transformed the federal system, and engrafted into the Constitution a principle of racial equality entirely unprecedented in both jurisprudence and political reality before 1860.”[27]

Widening the Circle

The ‘American broom’ had swept clean the land from coast to coast, and had paved the way for millions of immigrants so that they could achieve their dreams of building a new life in a free, democratic and bountiful country. Its defenders had even abolished slavery which had become a most disfiguring stain on the grand display of exceptionalism. But of course, virtue requires vigilance, and what looks good under a reading lamp does not necessarily look as well under street lights.

Although slavery had been removed, its racist roots and practices had not. Slowly slavery transformed into a system of suppressed and cheap labour force that not only consisted of black people but increasingly of Italian, Greek, Polish, Hungarian, Russian and middle eastern immigrants who were mostly unlettered, poor, religiously different and politically unwanted in their home country.[28] These people came mainly between 1890-1924, and were confronted with suspicion, hatred and fear among the “old immigrants”.[29]

One thing to remember about racism is that it is a confused and ad hoc emotion. In fact, modern evolutionary theory suggests that racism itself is not a natural instinct rooted in genetic predispositions as such. Through most of history humans almost never encountered members of other races, which meant that natural selection could not have developed any genetically coded instinct against other races. Instead, the researchers believe that the use of ‘race’ is a proxy indicator of coalition membership, so that one can make a quick and dirty guess about ‘which side’ another person is on. In this sense, racism has the same roots as sexism, chauvinism and other kinds of prejudiced xenophobia.[30]

The United States of America is one of the biggest social experiments in history. An experiment where millions of very different people meet in order to build a common home. It is no surprise then that some of the most persistent and important social indicators of group identification become a powerful political force. Thus, the most important challenges for American exceptionalism during the period after the Civil War – and in fact until this day – are centred on conflicts about who should get citizenship, and who should have the benefit of civil rights, such as equal protection under the law, the right to vote, property rights, non-segregation etc.

Accordingly, policies about who was allowed to be an American were both “inclusive and discriminatory”[31] depending on how much prejudice was in power. Mainly, it has been a positive story: the Chinese Exclusion Act from 1882 prohibited Chinese naturalization.[32] Women got the right to vote in 1920. The National Origin Act of 1924 limited immigration to a quota system based on country of origin, and reduced total immigration from over 800.000 to 164.000 a year.[33] Eisenhower’s ‘Operation Wetback’ dampened immigration from Mexico In 1954.[34] In 1965 the quota system was repealed, and a visa system for family reunification and skills was put in place. In 1971 the Twenty-sixth Amendment gave all citizens above 18 years of age the right to vote. In 1986 the Immigration Act “granted general amnesty and, sometimes, citizenship” to those who could pass a test, and in 1990 Congress raised the total number of legal immigrants to 700.000 a year.[35]

Generally, Heiskanen writes that “a racialized labour force without citizenship rights was allowed into the nation during political stability and economic prosperity; but once a downward tide seemed imminent, legal measures were taken to extradite them.”[36] This shows how a double standard always emerges when exceptionalist ideas clash with economic reality. When push comes to shove, the Broom is a tool for power, not a guard of values.

Movements against immigration have popped up strongly in the last 20 years, especially because of Mexicans and ‘terrorists’, resulting in the Illegal Immigration Act (1996), the USA Patriot Act (2001), the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Form Act (2002) and the Real ID Act (2005).[37] But cheap labour force is also needed, which makes the whole situation even more toxic. Illegal immigrants now have to accept less than minimum pay and all kinds of abuses because they are too afraid to complain. If they did, they just would be sent back. America has two signs at the border: “’help wanted’ and ‘keep out’”, Heiskanen quotes – leading in her eyes to an “unsustainable contradiction between economic and immigration policy.”[38]

Just as it was the case with the deterioration of the condition of slaves in the mid 19th century the principles of reduced production costs trump the rights of immigrants today. The idealistic ‘American broom’ has obviously lost to the ‘Überbroom’ of power und Realpolitik. And even this one believes it has lost because the dust continues to creep into the country from all sides, and that is why it has emigrated in recent decades in order to clean up some other places.

End of part 1.
This essay continues in part 2.
For the list of references, please see part 2.

[1]    Aikin, R.C. (2000). Paintings of Manifest Destiny: Mapping the Nation. American Art, 14 (3), 83.

[2]    Ibid., 79.

[3]    Ibid., 79.

[4]    Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-09855 (digital file from original print: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ppmsca.09855).

[5]    Gelfert, H.D. (2006). Typisch Amerikanisch. Wie die Amerikaner wurden, was sie sind. 3rd ed., C. H. Beck, München, 14.

[6]    Duncan, R. & Goddard, J. (2009). Contemporary America. 3rd  ed., Palgrave Macmillan, London, 13.

[7]    Gelfert, Typisch Amerikanisch, 14.

[8]    Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 7.

[9]    Madsen, D.L. (1998). American Exceptionalism. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2.

[10]  From the Declaration of Independence, in: Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 9.

[11]  Madsen, American Exceptionalism, 3.

[12]  Winthrop, J. (1630). A Model of Christian Charity. http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html

[13]  From The Declaration of Independence, in: Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 9.

[14]  Foner, E. (2003). Who is an American? In: Who owns History? Hill and Wang, New York, 154.

[15]  Jefferson, T. (1774/1998). Notes on the State of Virginia: Query XIV. Penguin Classics, London, 138.

[16]  Tucker, R.W. & Hendrickson, D.C. (1992). Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson. Oxford University Press, New York, ix.

[17]  Ibid, 7.

[18]  Madsen, American Exceptionalism, 157.

[19]  Madsen, American Exceptionalism,157.

[20]  Chaplin, J.E. (2003). Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History. The Journal of American History, 89(4): 1432-33.

[21]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 14-15.

[22]  Foner, E. (2003).Blacks and the U.S. Constitution. In: Who owns history? Hill and Wang, New York, 174.

[23]  Ibid., 174.

[24]  Ibid., 176-177.

[25]  Ibid., 174.

[26]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 14-15.

[27]  Foner, Blacks and the U.S. Constitution, 178.

[28]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 66.

[29]  Ibid., 66.

[30]  Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1992). The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in: The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the generation of Culture. Oxford University Press, New York, 19-136.

[31]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 66.

[32]  Heiskanen, B. (2009). A Day Without Immigrants. European journal of American studies, Special Issue on Immigration, 3: 3.

[33]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 68.

[34]  Heiskanen, A Day Without Immigrants, 3.

[35]  Duncan & Goddard, Contemporary America, 68.

[36]  Heiskanen, A Day Without Immigrants, 4.

[37]  U.S. Government Printing Office: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action

[38]  Heiskanen, A Day Without Immigrants, 5.

8 Philosophical Quotes

1

Plato: “Now beauty shone bright among the visions, and in this world below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear and resplendent. For sight is the keenest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it — how passionate would be our desire for it, if such a clear image of wisdom were granted as would come through sight — and the same is true of the other beloved objects; but beauty alone has this privilege, to be most clearly seen and most lovely of them all.”

2

Edmund Burke: “Curiosity … quickly runs over the greatest part of its objects, and soon exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature. … The occurrences of life, by the time we come to know it a little, would be incapable of affecting the mind with any other sensations than those of loathing and weariness [if we did not develop] other passions besides curiosity in ourselves.”

3

Jimmy Wales (founder of Wikipedia): “One of the core things [in Ayn Rand’s work] is the virtue of independence … [A character] is given a choice … to compromise his integrity or to essentially go out of business. And he [takes] a job working in a quarry. And for me that model has a lot of resonance. What I’m doing and the way I’m doing it is more important to me than any amount of money.”

4

Friedrich Nietzsche: “I claimed that art, rather than ethics, constituted the essential metaphysical activity of man … I made several suggestive statements to the effect that existence could be justified only in esthetic terms.”

5

Huang Po (Zen Master): “Do not permit the events of your daily lives to bind you, but never withdraw yourselves from them. Only by acting thus can you earn the title of ‘A Liberated One’.”

6

Karl Popper: “I appeal to the philosophers of all countries to unite and never again mention Heidegger or talk to another philosopher who defends Heidegger. This man was a devil. I mean, he behaved like a devil … and he has a devilish influence on Germany.”

7

Parmenides: “For never shall this be proved: that things that are not are; but hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let custom, born of much experience, force you to let wander along this road your aimless eye, your echoing ear or your tongue; but do judge by reason that ONE way only is left to be spoken of, that IT IS; and on this way are full many signs that WHAT IS is uncreated and imperishable; entire, immovable and without end. It was not in the past, nor shall it be in the future, since it is now, all at once, ONE.”

8

Kant: “There was a time when I … despised the mob, which knows nothing. [But] I learned to honor men, and would consider myself much less useful than common laborers if I did not believe that [my work] could give all [men] a value.”

Politikens appeller til dumhed

Politiken var engang en avis, som uddelte gennemtænkte tæsk fra et oplyst udgangspunkt. Nu om dage er det snarere held end forstand, når Politikens journalister forfatter lødige indlæg.

af Ryan Smith

Politiken var engang et seriøst medie. Sådan er det desværre ikke længere. Faktisk skal man helt tilbage til midten af 1990’erne, før man med god samvittighed kan tale om, at Politiken konsistent formåede at holde et samfundsoplysende niveau i sine meningsartikler. Nu om dage er det snarere sådan, at Politikens holdningsjournalistik mest udmærker sig ved sine fordrejninger og ved den sløsede (eller uetiske?) omgang med fakta.

De glædelige minder om Politikens storhedstid har for mange fortabt sig i historiens tåger. Men i midt-90’erne var Politiken faktisk en intellektuelt respektabel avis, der fra et socialliberalt udgangspunkt delte velovervejede og fortjente tæsk ud både rød og blå. En avis, hvor man balancerede på en knivsæg mellem liberalismen som vækstmotor i et frit samfund på den ene side, og så de sociale hensyn i samfundet på den anden. En avis, hvor lederskribenter som Tøger Seidenfaden ikke var bange for at tale dunder mod de radikale islamister, når de truede Salman Rushdie på livet, og hvor samme islamisters formørkede fantasier blev mødt med en oplyst religionskritik fra Politikens spalter.

Jeg er godt klar over, at mit indlæg kommer til at virke som et ensidigt angreb på Politiken, og det beklager jeg. Men som gammel læser er det svært at begribe, hvor fortvivlende langt Politiken er faldet i løbet af de sidste 15 år. For at vise hvad jeg mener, vil jeg her gennemgå fire indlæg fra Politikens fastansatte skribenter, som alle er forfattet i nyere tid, og som jeg mener, dokumenterer Politikens forfald ned fra den journalistiske elites tinde. De fire indlæg benytter sig alle af det, som jeg her vil kalde ”appeller til dumhed”: Argumentation, hvor Politikens skribenter med vilje taler til de laveste instinkter i mennesket. Hvor man fra Politikens side angriber mennesker i stedet for at angribe argumenter, og hvor man svigter sin arv som et organ for oplysning ved at appellere til gruppedannelse, holdpsykologi og slet og ret dumhed. Politiken er på mange måder selv blevet til det, som avisen engang blev grundlagt for at bekæmpe.

Per Michael Jeppesen: ”Røde vælgere er bare hamrende kritiske” Politiken 16.05.12

I dette indlæg slår Politikens opinionsredaktør fast, at man simpelthen bare har en bedre debatkultur på venstrefløjen. Derefter vender han blikket mod højrefløjen og peger så fingre af blå vælgere, som han udstiller som ”stillestående”, ”kedsommelige” og servile autoritetstro lakajer. Ja, skal man tro Per Michael Jeppesen, så er den blå debatkultur så godt som ikke-eksisterende og præges først og fremmest af stilhed og ”manglende debat”.

Men sandheden om Foghs 10 år på magten er ikke så simpel: Sandheden er også, at der i Fogh-årene blev stiftet et nyt parti i protest mod Foghs midtersøgende linje. Et parti, der i dag har 9 mandater i folketinget, og som selv Danmarks Radio for nylig har kaldt for ”oppositionens intellektuelle leder” (P1 Debat 14. maj 2012). Siden er mange Venstre-politikere sivet fra moderpartiet og over i Liberal Alliance, men derimod er der ingen større personsager, der involverer socialdemokrater, som har bevæget sig venstre om til SF og Enhedslisten. Søren Pinds liberale teser nævnes ej heller med et ord i Jeppesens indlæg, og sådan kunne man blive ved. Per Michael Jeppesens ”historie” om Fogh-årene er simpelthen for ensidig. Er de systematiske udeladelser mon udtryk for en bevidst fordrejning? Eller er der mon tale om en appel til dumhed, der udspiller sig efter formularen ”rød er bedre end blå”?

Kristian Madsen: ”Tilfældet Joachim B. Olsen” Politiken 25.04.2012

Hvis det ikke var Per Michael Jeppesen, der så lå inde med den overlegne debatkultur, han selv skrev om, så er det i hvert fald heller ikke Politikens lederskribent Kristian Madsen. Madsen har sat sig for at kritisere Joachim B. Olsen (LA), men i stedet for at tage fat på Olsens argumenter, så bruger Madsen mest sine kræfter på at pege fingre: Ifølge Madsens pen er Olsen ”en lille mand” der er ”uden skyggen af empati”, og så er Olsen også ”eksponent for et gennemført usympatisk standpunkt”.

Madsens stil er, hvad Politiken desværre er blevet platform for: En debatkultur, der uden blusel svælger i at gå efter manden og ikke efter bolden. De få ord, som Madsen afser til at behandle Joachim B. Olsens politiske holdninger (frem for blot at angribe ham personligt), bruger Madsen på følelsesmæssigt at kriminalisere Olsens standpunkt snarere end på at gå i rette med hans argumenter. Er det i Madsens bog de facto utilladeligt at være liberalist? Anerkender han kun det gode arguments kraft, hvis han tilfældigvis selv er enig i konklusionen? Eller praktiserer han blot appeller til dumhed efter devisen ”han er et dårligt menneske, og vi lytter ikke til dårlige mennesker”?

Lars Trier Mogensen: ”’Corydon-doktrin’ er dyr for Danmark” Politiken 11.05.2012

Det næste eksempel på Politikens forfald er et indlæg fra en anden af Politikens lederskribenter, nemlig Lars Trier Mogensen. I indlægget ovenfor har Trier Mogensen set sig sur på landets finansminister, fordi ministeren ikke åbner statskassen på nær så vid gab, som Trier Mogensen godt kunne tænke sig. Egentlig er det mindre end to år siden, at Trier Mogensen på tv gjorde sig til talsmand for det socialliberale udgangspunkt, der i gamle dage var med til at gøre Politiken til et seriøst medie på den politiske scene. Men med sit indlæg fra 11. maj har piben fået en anden lyd: Her er Trier Mogensen ude i et fuldbyrdet angreb på de frie kapitalmarkeder, som Politiken engang anerkendte som den bedste vækstmotor til at skabe velstand og vækst til gode for alle samfundslag. Trier Mogensen var engang socialliberal, men nu om dage ser det ud til, at han helt har glemt det liberale.

Trier Mogensens indlæg starter med et angreb på folk, der handler på de internationale finansmarkeder. Finansmarkedets aktører – som ofte er helt almindelige mennesker – er ifølge Trier Mogensen ”hysteriske kællinger” (her stikker den overlegne debatkultur igen hovedet frem). Fra Trier Mogensens side levnes der intet forsøg på at sætte sig ind i ”kællingernes” bekymringer, og ingen overvejelser går til, om det mon er fair, at disse mennesker forsøger at beskytte deres pensionsopsparinger mod at blive brugt som et led i risikable og kortsigtede offentlige investeringer, som ingen i sidste ende ved, hvad vil føre med sig.

Ud over finansmarkederne har Trier Mogensen som sagt også set sig sur på finansminister Bjarne Corydon. Ministeren tækkes nemlig finansmarkederne for ivrigt, og så bærer Corydon rundt på ”det symbolladede mellemnavn Fog”. Mener Trier Mogensen alvorligt, at folks mellemnavne kan bruges som et argument imod deres politik? Eller kører han mon en appel til dumhed af på sine læsere, der spiller efter noderne ”Fog lyder som Fogh, og Fogh kan vi ikke lide”?

Bjørn Bredal: ”Liberal Alliance er i virkeligheden en bank” Politiken 16.04.2012

Så vidt, så uappellerende. Men hverken Madsen, Trier Mogensen eller Jeppesen kan helt hamle op (eller ned) med de causerier, som Politikens Bjørn Bredal disker op med: Han indleder med en konstatering af, at Anders Samuelsen har en tøjstil, der ikke falder i skribentens smag (den overlegne debatkultur manifesterer sig igen). Herefter slår Bredal det uden beviser fast, at Liberal Alliance ”er en bank”. Bredal har ingen virkelige argumenter, men anvender i stedet en primitiv syllogisme: Fordi bankmænd går i jakkesæt, og Anders Samuelsen går i jakkesæt, så er Anders Samuelsen i virkeligheden bankdirektør. For at udstille hvor dumt det er, så kunne vi blot indvende, at eftersom Lenin også gik i jakkesæt, så er Anders Samuelsen i virkeligheden Leninist. Ja, det er faktisk det debatniveau, man holder på Politiken: Man angriber mennesker for at hedde det forkerte til mellemnavn og for ikke at gå i det rigtige tøj, og så lægger man spalter til påstande, som man ikke kan dokumentere.

Havde Bredal ulejliget sig med at se på beviserne, så ville han se, at Liberal Alliance er Folketingets næstmest åbne parti (efter Enhedslisten), og at partiet opfører et tocifret antal private fonde, virksomheder og organisationer som større donorer, heriblandt Saxo Bank. Derfor kunne Bredal selvfølgelig stadig have ret i, at Saxo Bank bidrager med en uforholdsmæssigt stor andel af Liberal Alliances støttekroner, men som seriøs journalist påhviler der i så fald Bredal et gravearbejde for at påvise, at tingene vitterligt forholder sig sådan, hvis ellers han vil udtrykke sig så sikkert. Men Bredal har ingen beviser. Hans arbejdsmetoder er dovenskab, og hans argumentation er, som man kunne forvente, indlysende appeller til dumhed.

Kritisk, demokratisk… og dum?

Men mens Politiken aldrig har været bleg for at udstille Liberal Alliances erhvervsstøtter i Saxo Bank, så er der til gengæld et andet lignende forhold, som Politiken alle dage har været underligt tavs om. Nemlig Politikens eget forhold til de mange støttekroner, som den selv modtager fra udefrakommende. Mens Liberal Alliance i 2011 modtog 17,5 mio. kr. fra en vifte af forskelligartede private organisationer, så modtog Politiken i 2012 intet mindre end 19,7 millioner kroner. Ikke fra mange forskellige donorer, men fra én altoverskyggende donor, nemlig staten. Hvad statens mange støttekroner så måtte gøre ved Politikens neutralitet set ud fra Bredals logik, det skal vi her lade stå usagt.

Nej, hvad der derimod interesserer os ved de statslige støtteforhold er, at statsstøtten ikke er automatisk, men at den går hånd i hånd med en række krav og forventninger fra fællesskabets side. Fra statens side har man nemlig nedsat et udvalg for at sikre sig, at mediestøtten finder en hensigtsmæssig form, sådan at der ikke finder misbrug af støtten sted. I udvalgets rapport fra 2011 beskriver de formålet med mediestøtten som følger:

”Formålet [med mediestøtten] er at understøtte mediernes demokratiske, kritiske og uafhængige funktion. … I forlængelse heraf skal den offentlige mediestøtte bidrage til … At fremme samfundsmæssig og kulturel oplysning.”

Jeg mener, at jeg med min gennemgang af de fire ovenstående indlæg fra Politiken har vist, at Politiken ikke (længere) fremmer den samfundsmæssige oplysning med sin holdningsjournalistik. I stedet mener jeg, at Politikens skribenter formørker og vildleder offentligheden med den debatform, som de gang på gang vælger at lægge for dagen. En debatform, der ikke oplyser, men formørker. Der ikke leverer kritik, men personangreb. Kort sagt: En debatform, der appellerer til dumhed og ikke til demokrati.

På det grundlag mener jeg, at det et fair spørgsmål, om Politiken i sin nuværende form lever op til de krav, der er forbundet med mediestøtten.

Men nuvel, forhandlingerne om fremtidens mediestøtte skal kun lige til at begynde, og for alles skyld kan man håbe, at Politiken udnytter den mellemliggende tid til at sadle om og vende tilbage til det kritiske, analytiske og socialliberale udgangspunkt, der engang var med til at gøre avisen til et forbillede for andre medier.

At Politiken igen kan blive en avis, hvor en overlegen debatkultur ikke blot er noget, man snakker om, men noget man praktiserer.